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Abstract  
 
 
The Kurdish issue has remained in place on Turkey’s agenda and that of the 
world for almost a hundred years. This subject recently became a current issue again 
with the invasion of Iraq by the coalitions in 2003. Over time, Turkey has attempted 
to enact different policies in order to resolve the Kurdish problem that causes armed 
conflicts in some regions even now. Declaration of part of Iraq as Iraqi Kurdistan 
region in 2005 by some Kurds who benefited from the chaos in this region brought a 
new dimension to the subject. The Kurds managed to found an autonomous region 
on the border of Turkey. Civil war broke out along the southern border of Turkey 
and Syria in 2011. The balance of the Southern border of Turkey has changed with 
Kurdish communities actively taking a role in the civil war in Syria. On 16th of July 
2014, ‘The law for ending terrorism and strengthening social integrity’ was 
published in Turkey, and the Democratic initiative process was legalized. All these 
factors brought the Kurdish problem back into question. 
The archival documents show that the Kurdish-British relations became 
intense especially between 1918 and 1923. In this term relationships were established 
between some British officers and Kurdish leaders. Major Noel, Major Soane, Talbot 
Wilson and Percy Cox in Eastern Anatolia and in the Mesopotamia region; Admiral 
Webb and Admiral Calthorpe in Istanbul; Churchill and George Curzon in London 
played important roles in shaping the British – the Kurdish relations, and in 
negotiations on possibility of establishing a Kurdish state. The British officials met 
with Sayyid Abdulkadir in Anatolia, Serif Pasha in Europe, Sheikh Mahmud and 
Sheikh Taha in Iraq and undertook important negotiations. 
A great majority of the Turkish historians and researchers see Britain as the 
main force behind the birth of the Kurdish problem in Turkey and the Middle East. 
Nevertheless Britain was accused of provoking the Kurds, living in Turkish regions, 
against Turks. According to general Turkish claims, Britain made promises to the 
Kurds to found a Kurdish State only as a way dominating over Mesopotamia, and 
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used the Kurds as a tool for its own purposes. This thesis examines the extent to what 
rival these claims are valid and whether Britain really had a significant policy for 
Kurdish autonomy, or not, in the light of the Turkish and British archives. 
In other words, it attempts to throw light on the questions of whether the 
promises for an autonomous or independent Kurdish State were given by the British 
to the Kurds. If the answer is yes; whether the claimed promises to Kurds were a 
result of British state policy or a result of personal initiatives of military officers who 
were acting in behalf of the Britain will be assessed. The study also investigates the 
progress of the Kurdish issue on international platforms, how it was shaped and 
which factors affected it, from the end of the First World War (1918) to the Treaty of 
Lausanne(24 July 1923). In addition to this, the claims made by British officials that 
autonomy promises were given to Kurds by the Turkish government in Ankara are 
evaluated in the light of the Turkish and British records. 
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Glossary  
 
Elviye-i Selase: Three livas; Cities of Kars, Ardahan, Batum 
Heyet-i Temsiliye: Representative Delegation 
Heyet-i Vukela: The Council of Ministers 
İngiliz Muhipleri Cemiyeti: The British Friendship Society 
İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti: The Committee of Union and Progress 
Kürt Teali Cemiyeti: The Society for the Rise of Kurdistan 
Kuvayi Milliye: National Forces 
Misak-ı Milli: The National Act 
Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti: Defence of the National Rights  
Osmanlı Mebusan Meclisi: The Ottoman Chambers of Deputies 
Şurayı Devlet: Council of State 
Vilayet-i Sitte: Six Provinces: Cities of Erzurum, Van, Diyarbakır, Sivas, Bitlis, and 
Harput 
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Introduction  
 
It is important to give brief information on the history of the Kurds under 
Turkish rule to provide a better understanding of the emergence of the Kurdish issue. 
During the reign of the 9th Ottoman Sultan Yavuz Sultan Selim (1512- 1520), 
expeditions was launched against Eastern Anatolia and the Safavid Empire. At the 
end of the expeditions Turkish sovereignty was established in the Eastern region of 
Anatolia and Anatolian Turkish unity was achieved. In order to keep these areas 
under control the system of yurtluk- ocaklık was implemented in the regions where a 
Kurdish population predominated.  Through this system, a sort of autonomy was 
giving to the local people by Sultan Selim. Thanks to the yurtluk- ocaklık system 
Kurdish notables were getting more powerful every day. It is understood that the 
system completely ceased to function in the 19th century. This system was therefore 
rearranged in the process of centralization policies which started with Tanzimat (The 
Hatt-i Sharif of Gülhane) (1839).1 With the proclamation of the Tanzimat, significant 
changes were made to the administrative division of Ottoman lands. The main aim 
was to strengthen central authority. The real resistance against the Tanzimat in and 
around Diyarbakir came from the people who had lands operating right with the 
"yurtluk-ocaklık" system. Because, in order to restore the lost state authority in the 
region the lands of yurtluk- ocaklık were confiscated.2 With the regulations of the 
Tanzimat the operating right of the some lands in this system transferred to the 
treasury and the ex-beneficiaries were appointed to the county government and they 
started to receive salaries.3 However, due to geographical and social reasons, the new 
                                                          
1 Gencer, Fatih, ‘Merkezîleşme Politikaları Sürecinde Yurtluk-Ocaklık Sisteminin Değişimi’, Ankara 
Üniversitesi DTCF Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi ,  XXX. p.76 (P.75-96), (Ankara,2011) .  
2 Cabir, Doğan, ‘ Bedirhan Bey İsyanı’ Journal of Süleyman Demirel University Institute of Social 
Sciences, No: XII, p.15-38, (Isparta,2010) p.16. 
3 Çadırcı, Musa, Tanzimat Sürecinde Ülke Yönetimi, (Ankara,2007), p. 195. 
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practice encountered opposition from time to time in the tribes living away from the 
state authority, since dominance in the Eastern regions could not be established for a 
long time.4 Because of that, the new regulations presented by the Tanzimat met with 
massive opposition especially in the regions where the state had less control.  
The major hostile reaction to Tanzimat was shown by Bedirhan Bey who was 
Emir of Bohtan-Cizre. When the implementation of Tanzimat regulations around 
Diyarbakır started, Bedirhan faced with the threat of losing his power, became 
worried.5 In order to keep him calm he was promoted to colonel.6 After Bedirhan 
learned the Tanzimat regulations intended to join Cizre to the Mosul province7 he 
revolted that against the Ottoman Empire.8 Bedirhan Bey, disappointed with the 
Ottoman government due to the new administrative regulations it attempted to 
implement in the Ottoman lands, had allied with other Kurdish chiefs, especially 
with rebellious Han Mahmud, to get power.9 After he allied with the Han Mahmud, 
who returned from exile, the riot became one of the biggest Kurdish riots after the 
implementation of the regulations of the Tanzimat in the Eastern Anatolia.10 The 
Ottoman Empire had to deal with the revolt between the years of 1843-1848.11  In 
order to conduct talks with Bedirhan, Nazım Effendi was appointed by the Istanbul 
Government.12 Bedirhan Bey was convinced to obey the Ottoman administration but 
Bedirhan Bey had some conditions such as he should be given a guarantee of his own 
safety by the Mosul consul of Britain.13 In this way Britain would be drawn into the 
Kurdish problem. It is understood that Bedirhan Bey's conditions were rejected on 
                                                          
4 Dündar, Safiye,  Kürtler ve Azınlık Tartışmaları, Tarih, Kimlik, İsyanlar, Sosyo-Kültürel Yapı, Terör, 
(İstanbul,2009), p.67. 
5 BOA, İ.MSM, 48/1229, Folder:17. 
6 BOA, İ.MSM, 48/1225, Folder: 17. 
7 BOA, İ.MSM, 48/1225, Folder: 13. 
8 BOA, A.MKT. MHM, 2/13. 
9 Sinan, Hakan, Osmanlı Arşiv Belgerinde Kürtler ve Kürt Direnişleri  (1817-1867), (İstanbul,2007), p. 
171. 
10 Sarıbıyık, Mustafa, ‘Tanzimatın Diyarbakır ve Yöresinde Uygulanması ve Önündeki Engeller’, II. 
Osmanlıdan Cumhuriyete Diyarbakır Sempozyumu, (Diyarbakır,2006), p. 255. 
11 Barkey, Henry J. and Graham E. Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question, (İstanbul,1998), p. 7. 
12 BOA, AD, No. 609, p. 11. 
13 BOA, İ.MSM, 50/1258, Folder: 4. 
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the grounds that they would damage Ottoman sovereignty. Afterwards, the rebellion 
was suppressed by the Ottoman army that sent to the region in 12th August 1847.14 
Kurdish-Turkish relations began to improve during the Abdul Hamid era 
(1876-1909). Talks by Abdul Hamid with Kurdish leaders included which subjects 
should be considered as a part of the centralization policy prevailing during the last 
period of Ottoman Empire. This policy of Abdul Hamid’s focused on getting the 
Kurds to cooperate with central authority. This focus point aimed at suppressing 
Armenian, Arabs and even Kurdish opposition to the sovereignty of the Ottoman 
Empire and towards preventing a Russian threat and it was against directing the 
Kurds’ warrior-like characteristics towards separatist tendencies and towards 
ensuring everyone lived together peacefully.15 
After the defeat in the Russo-Turkish War (1877–78) the Empire not only 
went through a period of financial fragility but also realized that securing the east 
was vital. After the War the Treaty of San Stefano was signed on 3rd March 1878 and 
under the form of the agreement Russia gained great favor within the Ottoman lands. 
The Western Powers decided the treaty needed to be revised. The Great Powers, 
especially British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, were not happy with the treaty. 
Extension of Russian power would harm its interests in former and remaining 
Ottoman territories. These reasons prompted the Great Powers to obtain a revision of 
the treaty at the Congress of Berlin (13 June- 13 July 1878), and substitute the Treaty 
of Berlin on 13th of July 1878. In Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty, it was envisaged 
that, as an addendum, the Armenians in the region should be protected against the 
Kurds and the Circassians.16 This article and other articles on Kurds and Armenians 
would never be implemented; but they are still important to show the first time Kurds 
were mentioned in an international treaty.  
On the basis of this realization, Abdul Hamid wanted his Hamidiye Cavalries 
to prevent Kurd leaders who were used to living independently from becoming 
independent, and to prevent Russian attacks and Armenian riots by including them in 
                                                          
14 BOA. A.DVN. MHM, 4/A/68. 
15 Kösebalaban, Hasan, Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism and Globalization (New York,2011), 
p.36. 
16 Şimşir, Bilal, Kürtçülük (1787-1923),(Ankara, 2007), p.27. 
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this army system founded under his name.17 However, while establishing this 
organization, it was decided that the majors in this regiment must be Turks.18 What is 
more, this regiment, being exempt from some taxes, caused the situation of all Kurds 
competing with each other to join this tribe.19 
Abdul Hamid tried to maintain a balance while forming this structure on the 
Caucasian border of Russia and around Erzurum, Bitlis and Van.20 He aimed to 
channel the warrior characteristics of Kurds in the right direction, against the 
Armenian forces.21 This regiment in an army made up of 47,000 people during the 
mid-1890s, rose in number to the levels of 53,000 in 1910.22 Also the more the 
regiments’ domain increased, the less effective Sheikhs became in the public eye.23 
In time, the regiments enlarged their areas of activity so they became the 
subject of telegrams that reported their independent actions.24 Armenians, who were 
especially against that organization from the beginning, declared their belief that 
these regiments wanted to sweep them all away. Armenians first charged these 
regiments over Samsun (1894-1895), Diyarbakır, Malatya, Urfa events (1895).25 
During the conflict between the Armenians and the Hamidiye Cavalries Kurds 
                                                          
17 Maraslı, Recep, ‘Rizgari’nin Sosyalist Hareket ve Kürdistan Ulusal Kurtulus Mücadelesindeki Yeri 
Üzerine Bir Deneme I’, Mesafe Dergisi,2010,p.69;  Janet Klein, The Margins Of Empire: Kurdish 
Militias In The Ottoman Tribal Zone, (Stanford University Press,2011), p.59; The Manchester 
Guardian (1901-1959) ‘The Kurds: Tribal Organisation Government By Sheiks’, 27 January 1923, p.12. 
18White, Paul, Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers: The Kurdish National Movement In 
Turkey, (London,2000), p.60. 
19 Ünal, Fatih, ‘Osmanlı Devleti’nin Son Yıllarında Güneydogu Asiretlerinden Milli Asireti ve İbrahim 
Pasa’, Hacı Bektası Veli Arastırmaları Dergisi, V.41, 2007, p.183. 
20 Chaliand, The Kurdish Tragedy, p.25. 
21 Jawad, Sa’ad, Iraq and Kurdish Question 1958-1970, (London,1981), p.4. 
22 Gunter, Michael M., Historical Dictionary Of The Kurds, (Oxford, 2004), p.121. 
23 O’Shea, Maria T., Trapped Between The Map And Reality: Geography And Perceptions Of 
Kurdistan, (California,2004), p.79. 
24 Reynolds, Michael A., ‘Abdürrezzak Bedirhan: Ottoman Kurd and Russophile in the Twilight of 
Empire’, Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History,V.12, No. 2, Spring 2011, p.420. 
25 Anderson, Robert E., ‘The Armenian Trouble’, The Villanova Monthly, March1897, V.5, No:3, p.123. 
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thousands of people from both sides lost their lives. So the armed conflict between 
them in a sense turned into a kind of bloodshed.26 
Eastern Question refers to the political and diplomatic issues that arose 
between the late 18th and early 20th centuries following the disintegration of the 
Ottoman Empire. Its origin can be dated to the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca which was 
signed between Russia and Ottoman Empire at the end of the six-year Russo-Turkish 
War and resulted in a huge defeat for the Ottomans in 1774. After the war the 
European States struggled to secure their military, strategic and commercial interests 
in the Ottoman territories. Basically the main issue was which portion of the 
Ottoman Empire lands would be gained by which European State. Consequently the 
minorities living under the rule of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans were provoked 
and rebellions were supported to establish new states under the zone of influence of 
the European states. After the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) the Ottoman Empire was 
expelled from the Balkans. The next stage was to dismiss the Turks from Anatolia, 
Mesopotamia and the Middle East. Therefore European States were focused on these 
lands of the Ottoman Empire. 
Germany, which was able to establish its unity at the end of the 19th century, 
wanted to take part in the Eastern Question and tried to establish good relations with 
the Ottoman State. The Ottoman Empire had thought that it was a good idea to 
establish friendly relations with Germany. The most important demonstration of the 
Ottoman-German agreement was the Baghdad railway project (whose construction 
began in 1903). This kind of rapprochement between the Ottoman State and 
Germany disturbed other imperialist states, especially Britain, and they thought that 
their interests have been damaged, and began to carry out politics on the basis of 
dismembering and sharing the Ottoman state.27 Therefore, it became inevitable for 
the Ottoman state to take part on the side of Germany in the First World War or to 
act with German influence. 
France intended to gain greater influence by increasing the political pressures 
on the Ottoman state by undertaking the protection of non-Muslim elements 
(especially Armenians) living within the Ottoman Empire. 
                                                          
26 Laçiner, Sedat, Ermeni Sorunu, Diaspora ve Türk Dış Politikası, (Ankara,2008), p.16. 
27 Özyüksel, Murat,  ‘İkinci Meşrutiyet ve  Osmanlı İmparataorluğu’nda Alman-İngiliz Nüfuz 
Mücadelesi, İstanbul Üniversitesi’, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi,38, (Mart, 2008), p.241. 
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After its experience of Tripoli, it was understood that the Ottoman lands 
would be the next area where Italy would concentrate its attention. The main aim of 
Italy on the Ottoman lands to have the Aegean and the Mediterranean lands of 
Anatolia. Italy had preferred to make decisions based on political developments in 
the First World War by assessing its current strength in the best way so the Italians 
would have to be content with the benefits it could obtain.28  
Since the beginning of the 19th century, Russia had viewed the Ottoman State 
as ‘the sick man’ while the Austro-Hungarian Empire was trying to develop its 
dominance in the Balkans. Russia was thinking establishing a Greek state in the 
territory of the Ottoman Empire, and had planned to occupy Anatolia after the 
Caucasus was occupied. Russia also was supporting the policy of establishing small 
states, like Armenia, under the influence of Russia, in order to ensure that the 
territories east of Anatolia enter the territory of Russia. In addition, Russia had 
pursued a "Pan-Slavist" policy, which we can define as the creation of a central 
Slavic state on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Empire.29 But 
thanks to the Bolshevik Revolution the balance of the power and international 
policies were changed. Russia had to leave the war prematurely because of the 
Bolshevik revolution, Russia did not want the Allied Powers especially Britain and 
France to gain favour from the Ottoman Empire's fortunes. As a matter of fact, the 
satellite states that were to be established under the British administration in South-
eastern Anatolia and Mesopotamia would protect the British interests in the region; it 
would exist as a major obstacle in front of Turkish and Russian interests. That is why 
Bolshevik Russia would want to have close relationship with Turks especially after 
the opening of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (23 April 1920). 
The main strategy of the British policy was to increase British influence in the 
territories of the rich oil deposits in the Middle East that had been dominated by 
Ottoman Turks. This strategy Britain was crucial for the security of the Indian route. 
In order to put this strategy into practice Britain had started to encourage the 
autonomy, which Britain never granted in her own colonies, among the non-Turkish 
                                                          
28 Çelebi, Mevlüt, ‘Milli Mücadele’de İtalyan İşgalleri’, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi (AAMD), 
Vol.26, (March,1993), p.395. 
29 Kohn, Hans, Panislavizm ve Rus Milliyetçiliği, translated by Agah Oktay Güner, (Ankara,1991). 
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elements living in the Ottoman lands. The British wanted to reshape the Middle East. 
For this purpose they tried to persuade Arabs to establish a large Arab state in the 
region that encompasses the entire Middle East among the Arabs. The British 
officers, such as Major Noel, in order to disrupt the unity of the Turkish struggle and 
to keep the Turks out of the regions that had rich oil fields, provoked the Kurds 
against the Ottoman State.30 
Amidst these wider developments, within the O. E. itself, as a result of a 
military coup Sultan Abdul Hamid II was dethroned and Mehmed V became the new 
Ottoman Sultan (April 1909). After the dethronement of Abdul Hamid by Young 
Turks, 13th April 1909, many Hamidian Cavalry leaders stated that they would not 
obey the government. They asked for the leadership of Abdul Hamid back and 
announced that if that did not happen they would act independently. But these 
requests were not met. Because of the policies of Young Turks, in contrast to what 
Abdul Hamid expected, some of Kurdish tribe leaders’ sons who were educated 
under the control of Abdul Hamid II became affected by nationalist winds blowing in 
Europe and wanted to establish a Kurdish State. 31 Thus, these people became the 
leaders of the Kurdish separatist movement and were in contact with European 
powers.  
The principles of American President Wilson also would help to establish 
communication and promote the idea of national self-determination. American 
President Wilson expressed his opinions about the post-war order to be established, 
at the speech he had given at Congress on 8th January 1918. 32 Article 12 of this 
speech, which would be referred to as the Wilson Principles, was interpreted to mean 
the Turks would preserve their independence in the regions where they were the 
majority; however, right to an autonomous development would be provided for other 
nations under the Turkish dominance.33 The British Prime Minister Lloyd George 
objected to this interpretation and claimed that that it was not possible for the 
                                                          
30 Zeyrek, Suat, ‘Milli Mücadele sürecinde Türk-İngiliz Rekabeti: Kürt Sorunu’, Türkiyat Mecmuası, 23, 
(Bahar, 2013), p.116. 
31 Yavuz , M. Hakan, ‘Five Stages Of The Construction Of Kurdish Nationalism In Turkey’, Nationalism 
and Ethnic Politics,Vol.7, No.3, (2001), p.5. 
32 Lansing Robert, The Peace Negotiations: A Personel Narrative, (1921), p.314-316. 
33 Seton-Watson Christopher, ‘1919 and the Persistence of Nationalist Aspirations’, Review of 
International Studies, Vol.15, No. 4 November1989, p.315. 
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Turkish dominance to continue over İstanbul. He also declared that on behalf of 
Britain, this statement of Wilson’s should be limited to Anatolia.34 
The twelfth article of Wilson’s Fourteen Points gave the impression that all 
the peoples of the Middle East would be allowed to develop independently, when the 
nations were considered together with the fifth article, which regulated the principle 
of self-determination of their futures. These proposals led Wilson to earn great trust 
and respect among the peoples of the Middle East. There were also a large number of 
Ottoman officers and intellectuals who had hoped for the Wilson principles. Some of 
them believed it possible that the empire's territorial integrity before the war could be 
preserved, in other words, by interpreting the expression "providing autonomous 
development to non-Turkish elements" by themselves, by granting autonomy to the 
Arab lands of the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, Kamuran Bedirhan claimed 
that the interpretation of this article was clear and owing to the article all Ottoman 
minorities obtained a right to establish their own administration. Therefore, the 
Kurds had a right to establish their own administration and government system.35 
 
There was not a clear explanation of how these principles would be 
interpreted and implemented. Again, it is known that all states interpreted the 
statements of President Wilson as they wished. However, it can be argued that the 
state which wished to make the most benefit from the Wilson Principles was 
England.  
For instance, it can be asserted that the Wilson Principles were used as a 
screen for the expansion of British dominance over Iraq.  Actually, Wilson´s 
methods were not corresponding with Great Britain´s policy in Mesopotamia by that 
time. But Britain and France did not want to contradict the Wilson Principles which 
proclaimed in 1918 therefore they did some tricks and the British used the concepts 
of war protection rather than war compensation, and mandate system rather than 
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colonialism.36 Indeed, autonomy in the remaining regions of the Ottoman lands 
would not be possible because there was already a share plan in autonomy. As it was 
determined in Sykes-Picot Agreement, part of Mesopotamia, Palestine and Arabia 
would be under British mandate and Syria would be under French mandate.37  
 
Wilson asked Colonel House, to do a detailed study of how to apply the 
fourteen points. Colonel House went to Europe to hold preliminary talks on the 
Peace Conference and assigned Walter Lippmann, Secretary of Inquiry, and Frank L. 
Cobb, editor of the New York World News, to this work. The Lippmann-Cobb report, 
prepared in September-October 1918, constituted the basis for the policy that the US 
would follow in the Paris Peace Conference.38 It is also explained the way of the 
implementation of the twelfth point on the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East.  
According to the Lippmann-Cobb report, the twelfth point was elaborated as 
follows: 1) The domination of Turks should be recognized in Anatolia, where they 
constituted the majority of the population; However, a) a special international audit 
should be established in the coastal regions where the Greek Cypriots are numerous, 
these regions should be placed under preferred mandates; B) In Anatolia, a general 
regulation [meaning capitulations] to link all the mandatories forces must be made 
and this regulation should be added to the peace treaty with the Ottoman State; C) 
with this arrangement the rights of minorities and the application of the "open door" 
principle should be secured; D) All main railway lines in Anatolia should be 
internationalized. 2) It is difficult to enforce the provision of autonomous 
development to non-Turkish elements. Because a) Mesopotamia, Palestine and 
Arabia are under the rule of the British mandate; B) the fact that Syria - as required 
by the Treaty of Picas - will be given to France; C) A port should be given to 
Armenia to provide its opening to the Mediterranean and a power to be taken for its 
protection shall be established. Although France seems eager to do so, it is 
understood that the Armenians will prefer the English. 3) Istanbul and the straits 
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region will be put under international control. This control may be collective, or it 
may be fulfilled by a certain power that the League of Nations will mandate as 
mandatories.39 
As it can be understood by the explication of the article, what Wilson 
understands from self-determination was certainly not their own determination of the 
people's future. Those, who will determine their future; or, -more precisely- who will 
rule their present and future, would be the great powers that will govern them in the 
capacity of "proxy". In Wilson's sense, self-determination is only a peculiarity of 
peoples who are supposed to have attained a level of development that they can 
govern themselves. As a matter of fact, this principle applied only to the peoples of 
Central and Eastern Europe. British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour stated 
that Wilson certainly did not consider the implementation of this principle out of 
Europe in relation to self-determination.40 According to Balfour, Wilson's self-
determination meant that "civilized" societies must not live under the rule of other 
"civilized" societies. Otherwise, it is not possible to apply this principle to peoples 
who do not have the power and ability to express themselves politically.41 As Wilson 
did not foresee the application of the self-determination principle for the lands to be 
settled from the Ottoman Empire, Western Anatolia, Eastern Anatolia, Cukurova, 
Istanbul the Straits, etc., to the administration of the non-Turks as well. 
The system, developed under the mandate, was nothing more than adapting 
the capitulations to the conditions of the day.42 Leo Amery, parliamentary under-
secretary at the Foreign Office, was explaining the new imperial vision of Britain by 
insisting that Britain's presence in the Middle East must be continuous. The mandate 
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system should be arranged so as not to interfere with this continuity. Mesopotamia, 
Palestine and Arabia should remain in the British imperial system, even if they are 
independent in the future. 43  
Mark Sykes, who signed the Sykes-Picot Treaty on behalf of his country, 
conveyed to the British administration a detailed report prepared by the beginning of 
1918, which outlined what should be done in order to permanently settle Britain into 
the Middle East.44 This brief, which reflects the logic of liberal imperialism and its 
philosophy, in changing conditions, urged that the terminology used by imperialism 
must change. Concepts and expressions that were excluded from current political 
terminology, such as "imperialism", "annexation", "military victory", "prestige", 
"responsibility of white man", "domains of influence" Instead, applicable current 
formulas and concepts should be produced. 45 
For example, if Britain wanted to settle in Mesopotamia, it should primarily 
claim, Mesopotamia is one of the largest potential food and fuel deposits in the 
world. When they are well processed, the world’s workers are better fed and warmed 
than they are now. If Mesopotamia remains in the hands of the Turks, it cannot 
develop - and thus it will not be possible to nurture and warm up world workers 
better. The Turks, a militarist / imperialist force, use it only to increase its military 
power. The people of Mesopotamia cannot thrive if left alone, because there are 
nothing but four or five city oligarchs, and a few patriarchal nomadic communities in 
the country. The British must convince both their own democracies and world 
democracies that the British administration will serve not only for narrow capitalist 
interests, but for the development of the country and for the promotion of the 
freedom of the people. For this reason The people of Mesopotamia did not want to 
establish their own state at once, and that they preferred British administration to 
return to Turkish administration; that British contingent administration is based on 
the disposition of the rulers and that they are giving them their true independence; 
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British must be able to argue that their contingency management does not intend to 
establish a commercial monopoly in the country.  
They must also take steps to ensure this. The British must ensure that 
Christians and Jews are to be protected by the British against the reprisals they may 
face in the event of the return of the Turks. For this purpose, the British must have 
good relations with the Zionist and Armenian communities. The British must attract 
them by binding salaries to the chiefs of the great Bedouin tribes in the mountains. 
The British should encourage trade with Baghdad; So that the merchant class should 
feel that if we go away, its existence will fall into danger. The British must promote 
the use of civilizations such as electricity, transportation and water. The British must 
create new business opportunities. The British must establish and subsidize an Arab 
press denigrating the Turks, showing the British as the guardian of the Arab nation, 
and publishing in support of Arab nationalism. The British should set up a nationalist 
Arab party to which the intellectuals of the city are entitled and appoint the leading 
members of it to the official posts under British administration. The British should 
set up a training department and open as many schools as possible to support Arab 
nationalism. The British must meet all of the requirements of a local committee to 
integrate all elements of the country at the point of request to establish a local state 
under the British supervision. For this purpose, the British must provide jobs to those 
who want to work, especially intellectuals; The British must secure the lives and 
merchandise of merchants, Jews and Christians; The British must meet the demands 
of the inhabitants of the villages for less taxation and no military service; The British 
must give defined titles to the leaders of the community.  
In the following chapters it will be analysed if Britain had a certain policy on 
the Kurds and if it did, how it was shaped by the recommendations of the British 
officers such as Sir Percy Cox, Arnold Wilson, Lord Curzon, Major Noel and others. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Relations and Developments from 30 October 
1918 to 19 May 1919 
1.1Mondros Armistice (30 October 1918) 
 
The Mondros Armistice Agreement was signed on the 30th October 1918 
between the Ottoman delegation headed by Huseyin Rauf Orbay, the Minister of 
Maritime Affairs at the Port of Mondros in Limni Island, and the Allied Powers 
Delegation headed by British Admiral Calthorp in order to end the First World 
War.46 This treaty had imposed very heavy conditions for the Ottoman Empire and, 
due to the armistice any part of the Ottoman Empire would be occupied if any unrest 
against the Allied Powers happened. This was a proof which in fact indicates that the 
Ottoman State had actually come to an end. 
Some of the articles in this treaty directly ignored the will of the Ottoman 
Government. And it can be said that the Allied Powers were impatient to start the 
disintegration process of the Turkish lands, without waiting for the signing of the 
peace treaty, by the virtue of the Article 7 and Article 24. In this part a brief 
explanation of the conditions of the armistice will be given to have better 
understanding of the difficult situation that the Ottoman Empire was in after the 
Mondros Armistice. Major Provisions of Mondros Armistice can be listed as; 
 
1)  Decisions on the opening of the Istanbul and Dardanelles Straits and the free 
passage to the Black Sea will be taken by Allied Powers. 
2)  All torpedo fields in the Ottoman waters will show the locations of the torpedo 
and hive locations, help them to search and remove them. 
3)  Information about the torpedoes in the Black Sea will be given. 
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4) Allied Powers and Armenian prisoners will be handed over unconditionally in 
Istanbul. 
5)  Except for the protection of the borders and the provision of internal ordinance, 
the Ottoman army will be distributed promptly. 
6)  The Ottoman war ships will surrender and will be kept under surveillance at the 
Ottoman ports shown by the Allied Powers. 
7)  In the event of a threat to their security, the Allied Powers will be entitled to 
occupy any strategic location. 
8)  Allied Powers will benefit from the Ottoman Railways and Ottoman Trade ships 
will be in the service of Allied Powers. 
9)  Allied Powers can benefit from the facilities in the Ottoman ports and shipyards. 
10)  The tunnel in the Toros will belong to the Allied Powers. 
11) It is necessary to withdraw from the places where the Ottoman forces inside Iran 
and the Caucasus are occupied. 
12) The control of radio, telegram and other communication channels outside the 
government communication will be handed over to the Allied Powers. 
13)  Commercial, military and marine related materials and materials will be 
prevented from being destroyed. 
14)  Turkey will meet the coal, diesel and oil requirements of the Allied Powers. 
Agreements with other countries for export will not be the issue. (None of them will 
be exported) 
15) The Alliance of Allied Powers will control all the railways. 
16) The forces in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Hijaz must surrender to the commanders of 
the closest Allied Powers. 
17) The Ottoman officers in Benghazi and Trablusgarp will surrender to the nearest 
Italian Garrison. 
18)  The harbours under Ottoman occupation in Benghazi and Trablusgarp will be 
left to Italians. 
19) German and Austrian nationals who are soldiers and civilians will leave the 
Ottoman lands within a month. 
20) An order will made to deliver both the delivery of the military equipment and the 
dismantling of the Ottoman Army as well as the delivery of the means of transport to 
the Allied Powers. 
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21)  A member shall, on behalf of the Allied Powers, work on the supervision of the 
subsistence, provide the needs of these countries and shall be given to him any 
information he wishes. 
22) Ottoman prisoners of war will be under the supervision of the Allied Powers. 
23) The Ottoman government will lose all relations with the central states. 
24) If there is a chaos in places called six provinces (Erzurum, Van, Elazığ, 
Diyarbakır, Sivas, Bitlis), the right to occupy any part of these provinces will be in 
the Allied Powers. 
25) The war between the Ottoman State and the Allied Powers will end on the 31st 
October 1918, at local time and noon. 
 
The Armistice, which narrowed the sovereignty of the Ottoman State, was a 
threat to the independence of the Ottoman Empire.  Particularly because of the 
occupation of the Straits by the Allied Powers, the connection of Thrace to Anatolia 
was cut so the security of Istanbul fell into danger. 
 
Due to the 5th and 7th articles of the Mondros Armistice Treaty the Ottoman 
state territories would be occupied for any adverse incident. In addition to that 
Ottoman forces were disbanded and the war vessels were confiscated so the Turks 
were deprived from self-defence right. Besides, due to the Article 24, six eastern 
provinces would be invaded. These six provinces were the places where the 
Armenians put in a claim for establishing an Armenian state. 
 
Following the signing of the Armistice, Admiral Calthorpe and General 
Townshend expressed their satisfaction. Rauf Bey (Orbay) was anxious for the 
unclear articles of the armistice. Rauf Bey stated that although they knew how hard 
the conditions of the armistice were, they had signed the armistice due to their 
confidence in the British. Furthermore, he emphasized over and over that the Turks 
hoped that allies would stick to their commitments and promises. 47    
In the meantime, Mustafa Kemal Pasha informed the Grand Vizier Ahmet 
Pasha of the consequences of the provisions of the Mondros Armistice and is 
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strongly protesting the practices that went beyond the truce conditions. Mustafa 
Kemal Pasha prevented the Turkish forces in Syria from surrendering to the Allied 
Powers by pulling the Turkish forces, which had to be delivered to the Allied armies, 
out of the territory determined in accordance with Article 16 of the Armistice. 
However, the Allies stated that the Syrian border passed through the north of Maraş 
so they demanded that the Turkish forces under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, 
which was located in the north of Aleppo, should surrender on the grounds of the 
armistice articles. But Mustafa Kemal refused to surrender and insisted on that the 
Syrian border border was under the control of the Turkey when the Mondros 
Armistice was signed.  
In response to Mustafa Kemal Pasha's criticism and severe objections, the 
Istanbul government abolished the Yıldırım Army Group and the 7th Army 
Headquarters, and Mustafa Kemal Pasha was taken under the command of the 
Ministry of War. Nihat Pasha, who replaced Mustafa Kemal, was ordered to 
withdraw military troops to Seyhan and Göksu coasts and then to Pozantı, it was also 
declared that the remaining troops would be taken prisoner if they did not retreat 
within the given period of time. Thus, the last Turkish troops in Syria and Iraq began 
to retreat to specified areas. 
1.2 The Situation under the Lights of British Officer’s Reports  
 
Britain, the leader of the Allied States, would maintain its leadership in the 
new post-war regime, and would play the most important role in all significant 
decisions regarding Turkey. Therefore, the political superiority achieved in these 
days has made it possible for the British Empire to have more say on the territory of 
Turkey. With this being the case, England abstained from the actual occupation in 
Anatolia and preferred to control strategic locations for its benefit. 
The Allied powers described the reasons for their occupation with the 
declaration they published.48 According to the Mondros Armistice; the invasion was 
temporary; the Allied Powers' intention is not to break the dominance of the reigning 
authority, but to strengthen and consolidate that influence in the countries which 
would remain in the Ottoman administration; the intent of the Allied Powers was that 
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they did not deprive the Turks of Istanbul. However, if there were incidents, such as 
a general disorder or massacre in the country, this decision could be changed. In this 
delicate period, whether it was Muslim or non-Muslim, everybody's job was to look 
at their own power, to help them to secure their security, to have a last hope for the 
establishment of a new Turkey from the ruin of the Ottoman Empire, not to be 
deceived and those who want to ruin them to comply with the orders to be given 
from Istanbul, which still remains as the center of the corps. 
The British would not put in a claim for a place where was not occupied 
before the truce that's why the British occupied the Mosul before the Mondros 
Armistice was signed. As a matter of fact, the Turkish forces were unable to stand up 
against the British troops, which started to attack Ottoman lands in Mesopotamia on 
the 18th of October 1918, and they were obliged to retreat. The British forces, which 
were continuing to military march in defiance of the armistice, were warned to 
remain where they were. The British military units, which had not taken this warning 
into account, continued to their military move on the 31st of October 1918. The 
British military units, who demanded that the Turkish forces, should withdraw five 
miles north of Mosul border, reported that they would invade Mosul. General 
Marshall, the commander of the British forces, requested the 6th Army commander 
Ali Ihsan Pasha to evacuate Mosul from the Ottoman troops until 15th November. 
Eventually, on 8th of November, the city was evacuated and on the same day Mosul 
was left to the British administration.49 
Upon the signing of the Armistice of Mondros, the evacuation of Kars, 
Ardahan and Batum -Elviye-i Selase; three provinces- were demanded by the Allied 
Powers according to Article 11 of the armistice. The 9th Army commander Yakup 
Şevki Paşa acted slowly about the evacuation procedures. Hereupon, on the 1st of 
December 1918, the Foreign Office of England demanded accelerating the 
evacuation process in these three provinces and to dismissing of Yakup Şevki 
Pasha.50 Therewith, two British warships were sent to Batum and on the 24th of 
December 1918 the city was occupied by British forces. The British occupation was 
not limited to Cukurova, Mosul and Batum; British troops also invaded Antep, 
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Maras, Urfa and Ardahan. The British, who benefited from the Armenian elements in 
the places where they occupied, such as Ardahan, left some places to Armenians. 
Thanks to the Syrian Agreement that was signed between Britain and France 
on 15th of September 1919, the French had the opportunity to confiscate some places 
in the South-eastern Anatolia region except Cilician Plain. By doing this move, the 
British would leave the French forces in the area where there was a powerful Turkish 
resistance, thus the British would prevent the French from directing their attention to 
the oilfields located on the South-eastern Ottoman lands. Within the framework of 
this policy, the British abandoned Antep, Maras and Urfa, which they had occupied, 
in favour of the French towards the end of 1919. The French benefited significantly 
from co-operation with the Armenian to control the lands which the French captured 
and Armenians were appointed with important positions such as security, 
communication and administration. To ensure security in the region a volunteer army 
which consisted of 6,000 Armenians was established. The Turks and the Kurds living 
in the region protested against these developments, with considerable Kurdish 
support for the Turkish resistance. 
In contravention of the provisions of the agreement, immediately after the 
signing of the Armistice of Mondros the British attacked and seized Mosul, Kirkuk 
and Sulaymaniyah.51 Following that, they attempted to implement the plan of 
establishing an autonomous Kurdistan whose centre was Sulaymaniyah under the 
leadership of Sheikh Mahmud, the chief of the Barzanji tribe, which was the most 
powerful Kurdish tribe of the era in the Sulaymaniyah region. The British sent 
specialist officers to the areas they occupied in order to protect their interests in the 
region by collaborating with the Kurds. These officers met with the notables of the 
region, conducted special investigations and sent important reports to the British 
authorities about the region and people. The policies of the British were shaped by 
the reports of the officials. Because of that these officers and reports will be 
mentioned often in the research. Undoubtedly that the most important and effective 
one of the specialists was Major Edward William Charles Noel. 52 In this manner, 
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Major Noel’s primary mission in Sulaymaniyah was to alienate the Kurds from the 
Turks and to win the Kurds over to the British.53 To achieve this goal, Major Noel 
was assigned to Sulaymaniyah on the 1st of November 1918; for the recognition of 
some issues, such as the whereabouts of the borders in the event of the establishment 
of an independent Kurdistan being approved, determining the tendencies of Kurds, 
and finding out the extent of relations between the Turks and the Kurds. 
Acting in accordance with the above-mentioned mission, Noel associated 
with Sheikh Mahmud, the leader of the Barzanji tribe in Sulaymaniyah, and reached 
a compromise in relation to the removal of Turkish forces from the area. As a 
requirement of this compromise, Noel arranged a meeting on the 1st of November 
1918 not only with the Kurdish tribal leaders in Iraqi territory but also with some 
Kurdish tribe leaders in Iran.54 At this meeting, by declaring Sheikh Mahmud as the 
governor55 of Sulaymaniyah on behalf of the British government, Major Noel aimed 
at the British creating a fast and efficient order within the territory.56 According to 
Major Noel, the Turks wanted to assimilate the Kurds, just like they had done with 
the Armenians and Arabs, under their brutal and poor administration for 400 years.  
This claim is open to debate, but it is important to see in terms of the reflection the 
viewpoint of officers sent to the region by the relevant British authorities. During 
World War I, Major Noel made a pretty good impression through requesting sugar, 
tea and flour from the Baghdad and Kirkuk warehouses and distributing the materials 
to the needy during the creation of this order.57 A great many rupees and gold were 
handed out to Kurdish leaders thereby literally contributing to the Kurdish-friendly 
profile of Major Noel. 
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Major Noel prepared a report58 regarding the Sheikh Mahmud incident and its 
effects on the economy of Sulaymaniyah on the 16th November 1918. In his report, 
Noel claims that he was sincerely welcomed by the notable figures of the region 
upon arriving to Sulaymaniyah in the 16th November 1918 in which Sheikh Mahmud 
and his hundreds of men took their stand in this welcome, and he stated that shortly 
after, some Turkish garrisons were captured and the Turkish soldiers residing there 
were sent to Kirkuk.  He reported that the city had become a complete ruin, 80 % of 
the population lived in poverty, the villages and the towns had been devastated, and 
production had almost come to a standstill under Turkish domination. It is important 
that Noel gives information about the previous sale of 1.600 tons of wheat and 2.400 
tons of rice in the region, so as to gain a better understanding of the region’s 
situation. 
Bearing in mind that this picture painted by Major Noel was in the immediate 
aftermath of World War I, it will be noted that the situation was not that different in 
other cities of Anatolia within the given timeframe. This should not be considered as 
a result of maladministration by the Turks but rather should be assessed as a 
consequence of the devastation brought by the war. 
Major Noel warned the British that providing financial support to the region 
before winter was extremely important.59 Major Noel argued in the continuation of 
his letter that Kurds in Sulaymaniyah had intense nationalist feelings and under the 
supervision and control of British political officers sent to the region, a Kurdish State 
would be shaped quite quickly and effortlessly.  
In the telegram,60 Noel emphasized that for the establishment of self-
determination among the Kurds with the support of the British government, a serious 
association was at stake and that Kurdish leaders were expecting the support of the 
British. He gave the arrest of Turkish forces in the region by the tribes of Southern 
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Kurdistan as evidence to his claim. The matter referred to by Major Noel in this 
telegram was the capturing of Turkish forces with Sheikh Mahmud’s forces and the 
agreement reached on the removal of Turkish troops from the area. Here, the point 
we need to emphasize is that although Major Noel admitted in the meeting arranged 
on the 19th of November 1918 that there was no unity between the Kurds; he declared 
a completely dissimilar idea in this telegram. 
The subject of the telegram61  sent from the Political Bureau of Baghdad to 
Delhi and Tehran in the 27th of November 1918 comprised Major Noel’s proposals 
for the establishment of an independent Kurdish state with the help of the British. 
The telegram includes the assessments of Noel's suggestion by the British 
government of trying to establish a Kurdish state whose borders would start at Lake 
Van. In the telegram it was also stated that the Kurds of Sulaymaniyah greeted Major 
Noel warmly, and that they were willing to accept England's taking the control of the 
region although there were some small problems. Those ‘problems’ seem to be the 
anti-British movements emerging around Erbil. Captain William Rupert Hay62 who 
was in Altınköprü was determined in his duty to prevent the case turning against 
England in the region as appropriate. For that purpose, it is seen that Major Noel, 
being sure that these events would quickly cease when Hay took control, ordered 
Hay to come to the region immediately and take control. From the information given 
in the attachments to the telegram, the conclusion that Major Noel‘s main purpose 
was to ensure the establishment of an independent Kurdish state under British 
protection can be reached.  It is ascertained that a Kurdistan in accordance with this 
purpose would be shaped according to the desire of British government starting from 
the shores of Lake Van which could be easily occupied.63 
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Major Noel conducted a meeting with 60 Kurdish notables from Iran, Seniye, 
Sakiz and Avroman in 1st of December 1918. 64  During the meeting he stated he had 
full confidence in them finding the right way under the guidance of the British. 
Arnold Talbot Wilson, head of Baghdad Civilian Administration, also gave 
information about the meeting with the Kurdish notables. He expressed the view that 
the 60 tribe leaders in Sulaymaniyah on the 1st of December 1918 would establish a 
Kurd Federation under the leadership of Sheikh Mahmud in North Iraq and the tribe 
leaders accepted that by signing a declaration. In this declaration, tribe leaders 
wanted an overall policy of saving eastern people from Turkish oppression and 
helping them in gaining their independence. As representatives of Kurdistan they 
wanted the British government to mandate Kurdistan and unite them with Iraq so as 
not to be cut off from the advantages it had. Also these leaders, who asked for a 
representative from the High Commissioner in Mesopotamia, promised to obey the 
demands and suggestions of the British government in the event of their providing 
support and protection. 
In a meeting held on 1st of November 1918, it was decided to accept the 
authority of Sheikh Mahmud, who had been assigned as a governor of Sulaymaniyah 
on behalf of the British government by Major Noel. The part relating to the 
acceptance of the authority of Sheikh Mahmud in the agreement was only written 
because of the changing attitudes of some Kirkuk and Iran Kurds. A promise was 
also seemingly made not to give administrative positions to Arabs in places densely 
populated by the Kurds. 65 
The Kurds were not united and while they were all seeking to gain their 
independence, some wanted a British mandate and some came up with completely 
different ideas. 66  Thus a multipartite structure of Kurds shows itself in this meeting 
and this is, in fact what the reality was. 
Despite Major Noel’s demands to establish a Kurdish state as expressed 
above, his report dated the 8th of December 1918 is quite important in terms of 
                                                          
64 PRO, FO 371/3385, From Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, p.216. 
65 Godfrey Rolles, Driver, A Report on Kurdistan and Kurds, Royal Anthropological Institute, 
(London,1919), p.80. 
66 McDowall, David, A Modern History of The Kurds, (NewYork,2004) , p.152. 
31 
 
assessing his point of view on Sulaymaniyah, Sheikh Mahmud and the Kurdish 
question. 67  According to Noel’s report, Sheikh Mahmud's appointment as the 
British representative through taking into account his influence in Sulaymaniyah was 
decided in the 8th of May 1918 but could not be realized with just one last minute 
letter. The assignment's having been effectuated approximately 6 months later was 
also seen as a positive development by Noel who faithfully supported this. According 
to Noel, noting the influence and power Sheikh Mahmud had, there had been no 
control over this region by the Ottomans since before the war, and anarchy had 
prevailed in the region. 
The task of maintaining order and safety in Sulaymaniyah and its 
surroundings lay under the influence of Sheikh Mahmud. When the document is 
examined in detail, it is seen that in fact, Major Noel had serious doubts about Sheikh 
Mahmud. According to Noel; there was a concern that Sheikh Mahmud's power was 
a problem for the British. The past experience of Turkish authorities was also that the 
Sheikh was prone to rebel any time. When it is considered that the Kurdish policy 
Britain was trying to carry out in Sulaymaniyah was based on the whim of Sheikh 
Mahmud, because Sheikh Mahmud’s influence was much stronger than it had been 
in the past there was a possibility that this situation would damage British interests. 
However, in order to ensure the British plan of establishing order in Sulaymaniyah 
without the help of Sheikh Mahmud, England needed have to send a garrison to the 
region. Due to the conditions prevailing in that period the British government was 
totally against establishing a garrison in the region.  Therefore, the risk of Sheikh 
Mahmud had to be taken and order should be ensured in the region without the direct 
military intervation of the British.68 
 In his telegram Noel69 argued that among the Kurds there was a small 
intelligentsia which had the capacity to understand their progress in national feelings, 
for an autonomous government, depended on the relationship developed with 
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Baghdad, and that this situation put British politics into trouble. Noel warns that due 
to the fact that the demands of many nationalist Kurds in the region were not fulfilled 
and that they were disappointed, it would not be easy to convince the Kurds held in 
custody.70 Noel alleges that the manifestation of anarchy or opposition from the 
Kurds would cause serious damage to the sustainability of the British policy. 
Therefore, although there was the possibility of an increase in costs, spending money 
should not be withheld in order to avoid such a situation. While these expenditures 
are made, support for Kurdish leaders taking sides with Britain should be given. This 
is because controlling national feeling amongst the Kurds was an extremely 
important issue for Britain.  
According to the report,71 should a compromise be reached on establishing 
the Kurdistan stipulated in the British-French agreement; this should be actualized 
through maintaining order with the ones selected as administrators and applying the 
guidelines that will be developed. The realization of this plan should both provide 
justice and development. The meaning of independence for many Kurds, who have 
national feelings, is to be free from all limitations and laws. Therefore, while talking 
with Kurds who have national feelings, one should take care not to discuss this. 
Unless the national movement among the Kurds is kept under control, this will be a 
process leading to disaster for British interests. The connection with Baghdad, also 
important due to geography, is emphasized as an obligation rather than a necessity in 
the report and the report also comprises matters that should be regarded in shaping 
policy towards the Kurds. Based on these considerations; administrator or assistant 
positions should be selected from Kurdish individuals; Kurdish troops should be 
trained by British consultants but should be controlled by Kurdish commanders and 
Kurdish should be the government's official language. 
In addition, laws should be shaped according to Kurdish traditions and 
customs, the annual tax collection system should be formalized according to Kurdish 
practices and the distribution of the tax should be carried out in a manner that meets 
people's needs. It is emphasized in the report that the tribes' being respectful and 
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loyal to the structure to be established would function in direct proportion to 
chieftains' placement in effective positions. This is due to the fact that the leaders are 
believed to have a vital importance in maintaining the order and forming the 
structure. Constituting a separate budget for each city, collecting the taxes in regards 
to provide country development and administrative sustainability without any delays, 
allocating shares to Baghdad at a certain rate are also other recommendations given 
place in the report. 
The autonomous structure should establish close ties with Mesopotamia and 
issues such as education, social services, agriculture, and communication policies 
should be determined by Baghdad and implemented.72 The fact is also mentioned in 
the report that as a result of the autonomy promised to the Kurds by Britain, the level 
of education in the country would rise in a very short time which would strengthen 
ties with Iraq. The report also discusses relations between the British government and 
Sheikh Mahmud. It is specified that Sheikh Mahmud made decisions under the 
influence especially of the people with whom he had spoken recently, that he was 
surrounded by meddlesome people and therefore, he was mostly occupied with 
trivial matters. Influenced by the people around him, it is argued that Sheikh 
Mahmud produced a variety of absurd projects, since he saw himself as the king of 
Kurdistan. Moreover, Sheikh Mahmud was considered as a rebellion-prone person 
but also it was anticipated that this would be kept under control. In the report it was 
highlighted that Sheikh Mahmud's appointment was supported by four out of every 
five people and this rate was quite important in terms of being an indicator of to what 
extent Sheikh Mahmud was supported socially in a scene where blood feuds 
perpetually prevail. Noel claimed that the best way to effectuate the interests of 
Britain was to do it through Sheikh Mahmud, therefore the British political officer 
assistants should contact the tribes in the region via Sheikh Mahmud and they should 
refrain from contacting with them directly. That's why the British policy officials to 
be assigned to the region should be approved by Sheikh Mahmud. But, Sheikh 
Mahmud was severely warned by the British authorities that his dominance in the 
region could not continue without the financial support of Britain.73  
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British officials also worked on the ethnic composition of the region and on 
determining the tendencies of non-Muslim and non-Turkish origin local people, the 
Nestorians, the Armenians, the Arabs, and the Kurds, of the population in Eastern 
Anatolia and Mesopotamia. One of these reports was prepared by Lieutenant Read 
on the 31st of December 1918.74 According to the information provided by 
Lieutenant Read, in Bakuba there were Urmian Nestorians that supported Britain, 
consisting of a population close to 10,000. The majority of the people in Caldiran 
have never attended the Nestorian Church. They preferred to be under the auspices of 
France rather than Britain. This could be disadvantageous for Britain in this region. 
The population around Van Lake consisted of Armenians and Kurds. Nestorians and 
Kurds get along very well and they were assigned to important tasks. However, the 
Nestorians were adopting an attitude against Armenian oppression. Except for two 
villages, the population of Hakkari consisted of Kurds and Nestorians. These two 
villages, Karanfil and Pagi were occupied by Armenians.  The Armenian settlement 
started from the North of Baskale and spread to Siirt and to Muş. 
A similar report that includes important information was prepared by the 
Major Francis Jardine about the Milli Tribe on the 23rd of January 1919. As it 
mentioned in the report, in 1919, the Viranşehir border ran across Siverek and the 
Karaca Mountains in the north, Urfa in the West, and Derek Meskok in the east and 
the Aziz Mountain in the south. Information about the population of the tribes, their 
economic structure and relation with other tribes and nations, and number of arms 
form the basis of this report prepared on tribes in the National Confederation and 
their subdivisions. But the part of the report about Kochekan Kurds, who lived in the 
north peaks of Nusaybin, is more important than others for this work. Hamo Agha 
ibn Ahmed Mahi, who was Sheikh of Koçhekan Kurds, saved Armenians during the 
Armenian risings. Although he was called to Nusaybin by Ali Ihsan Pasha, he did not 
obey this order. Hamo Agha was a supporter of England and in order to facilitate the 
progress of the British in the context of the Mondros Treaty, Article 24, he attacked 
the Turks in Nusaybin. He was on good terms with Ali Batı who was the leader of 
the rebellion against Turks which would start on the 11th of May 1919 and finish on 
the 18th of August 1919. 
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At first glance this report seems to be one of the ordinary reports that give 
information about the tribes. However, when the report is analysed in detail it can be 
seen that it contains crucial information. The Koçhekan tribe, which is a branch of 
the Milli tribe, could be used to solve the problems that England encountered. As it is 
known, one of the major causes of the anti- British activities was the noncommittal 
attitude of Britain in the establishment of the promised Kurdish State. One of the 
major reasons for this noncommittal attitude was the difficulty in determining the 
boundaries of the proposed Kurdish and Armenian States. Another was the attitudes 
of the two communities against each other. Protection of Armenians during 1915 
events by Hamo Agha, who was one of the leaders of the Milli tribe, can be one step 
towards improving the relationship between Kurds and Armenians. Also it can be 
claimed that Hamo Agha, who had 400 armed troops and good relations with 
England, gave support to Ali Batı during his revolt against the Turks. Considering 
these events, thanks to a collaboration being possible, Britain could get a partner to 
fight against Turks and a partner who can help to solve the problems between the 
Armenians and the Kurds. Herewith the British could kill two birds with one stone. 
 
Major Noel, who was sent to the Mesopotamia officially just to contact the 
people who lived in the Eastern Anatolia and Mesopotamia and gather information, 
showed great efforts to establish a Kurdish State in the region and prepared some 
important reports in order to further his aim. One particularly important report about 
establishing a Kurdish administration was prepared by Noel in February 1919. 
Major Noel started his report75  dated in February 1919 and prepared at 
Sulaymaniyah with the statement ‘Kurdistan is looking for its own government’ and 
explained his ideas about an autonomous Kurdistan in this report. Indicating in the 
report that Kurds desired an autonomous government based on a Kurd-centred 
administration, Major Noel also stated that the current administration borders, 
including the areas where Kurds are densely populated should be rearranged. This 
administration system would be established outside the borders of the area described 
as the Southern and the Central Kurdistan. Suggesting the formation of a separate 
province that he called the Western Kurdistan, for the southeast region of Turkey, 
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with an administration system centralized in Diyarbakir, Noel laid stress on making a 
political arrangement for the separation of this province from the region he described 
as the Southern Kurdistan and the Mosul province. There were various different 
offers about the borders of an autonomous Kurdistan to be established under the 
leadership of Sheikh Mahmud according to Major Noel’s recommendations for 
example, to establish an administrative system centred on Sulaymaniyah to Kuwait. 
In the last part of the report Noel stated that he believed that if the suggestions above 
could be accomplished the Kurdish confederation would gain sympathy of the Kurds. 
Noel stated in this telegram that the feeling in the region he identified as 
Kurdistan should be called nationalism; however, this naming deserved to be 
considered as tribalism rather than nationalism.76 Noel introduced the concept of 
tribalism as people’s desire to protect their language, customs and traditions and 
exclude foreign elements - whether Armenian, Turkish or even other Muslims - from 
Kurdistan. Major Noel, despite the matter stated in this telegram, implied that he was 
astonished by the absence of any antipathy against the Nestorians, or Chaldeans, but 
that Kurds had serious concerns about people that emigrated from those lands during 
the war coming back and reclaiming their properties. 
He stated the Kurds preferred the administration of British political advisers 
instead of Sheikh Mahmud's, and expressed the Kurds desired a structure shaped by 
their own values and that they would be just as opposed to Arab domination in any 
form.77 
Noel declared the opinion if the establishment of Kurdistan was approved 
under various political titles as proposed, the northern border of Diyarbakir province 
should be determined by population.78 The strongest reaction to the proposal of the 
determination of borders according to ethnographic lines in Major Noel's telegram 
came from A. Talbot Wilson. According to Wilson, such a border was not acceptable 
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both due to the lack of Kurdish unity and the possibility of damaging the long-term 
plans of British interests.79 
As a part of the British policy to gather information about the controversial 
region where an Armenian or a Kurdish State would be established, a report was 
prepared about Van vicinity and Iran border by the British Officer William Ainger. 80 
In his report dated on the 1st of March 1919 all the leaders, name lists and forces of 
the Kurds in the Urmia region were listed. As it can be understood from the report 
the number of their weapons increased after World War I, however, it can be 
observed that their forces had actually declined significantly. However, the report 
does not include any information about who provided these weapons to the Kurdish 
tribes or why these weapons were provided.  
William Ainger Wigram81, stated that the Kurdish view of independence was 
in unity, although it appears so, were not able to desist from expressing that this unity 
does not cover all Kurds.82 According to Wigram, if this unity expands in a manner 
that will cover all Kurdish people, this would be a first in history. Again, if the 
Kurdish tribe leaders were to be left alone under the supervision of British 
consultants, and if their raids on the surrounding regions were prevented, this 
liberation movement maybe occur on its own. Wigram, who stated that the respect 
the Kurds have for Britain and other countries is related to how much power they 
have, believed that Britain may utilize this respect they have to realize their plans for 
the region. 
 
 
 
                                                          
79 Lazarev, M.S., Emperyalizm ve Kürt Sorunu (1917-1923), p.85. 
80 PRO, AIR 20/512, Kurds And Kurdistan Affairs, p.137-144. The document also has a map, showing 
the settement of the tribes mentioned. It can be seen in Appendix 3. 
81 He was a British author and  a missionary to the Church of the England. On 1 March 1919 He drew 
a graph and gave information about the Kurdish leaders lived in the region of Van and Iran. PRO, AIR 
20/512, “Kurds And Kurdistan Affairs”, p. 137-144. 
82 Lazarev, M.S., Emperyalizm, p.88. 
38 
 
 
 
1.3 Paris Peace Conference (18 January 1919 - 10 August 1920) 
 
Many groups from various countries and societies participated in the 
meetings of the countries, which convened in Paris to reshape the world, especially 
the Middle East, at the end of World War I.83 32 states participated in the conference. 
However, negotiations with the defeated states were not conducted during the 
preparation of the peace treaties. Despite the fact that 32 states took part in the Paris 
meetings, the main speakers were the representatives of England, France, Italy, USA 
and Japan. The four great powers England, France, Italy and America discussed 
among themselves what they saw fit for the defeated states. Then they presented the 
resulting treaty texts to the defeated states. At the Peace Conference, agreements 
were concluded with Germany (The Versailles, 28th of June 1919), Austria (The 
Saint Germain, 10th of September 1919), Bulgaria (The Neuilly, 27th of November 
1919) and Hungary (The Trianon, 6th of June 1920).  The extent of the Ottoman 
State's heritage was remarkable and there were conflicts of interest between the 
allies.84 That is why the agreement to be made with the Ottoman State was delayed. 
Britain, France and Italy were not thinking the same about the sharing of the 
Ottoman lands.  Before and during the war Russia had great designs on the Ottoman 
lands especially in the Straits and in the Eastern Anatolia. But after withdrawal of 
Russia from World War I, Italy, France and England started a political fight for 
obtaining benefits on these regions. 
At the Peace Conference, the issues establishing a new Turkish State in Asia 
and the while Armenian, Kurdish, Mesopotamian, Syrian and Hijaz states would be 
discussed. At the Peace Conference, secret agreements aimed at sharing the Ottoman 
State lands among the Allied Powers were discussed. Moreover, the British 
commitments given to the subjects who lived under the rule of Ottoman Empire had 
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been discussed. According to those commitments the Straits would be brought under 
control of the allies, Armenia, Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia would be separated 
from the Ottoman State.85 
After Russia's withdrawal from World War I, Wilson joined the war on the 
side of Allies, and put forward some principles that undermined the interests of the 
Allied Powers. These principles encouraged the defeated states, and led to 
intellectual and political reactions in the colonies. On this occasion, the elders of the 
nations, which had been promised independence in order to benefit from them, came 
to Paris. Hence, apart from the Ottoman delegation, Arab, Armenian, Kurdish and 
Greek delegations also came to Paris to participate the negotiations.86  
British diplomats supported the claims of the Greek and Armenians 
throughout the conference. Lloyd George had claimed that the Armenians would 
have to defend themselves by building an army of 40,000 people, and then that 
Britain would provide weapons and materials to Armenians. As a result, allies agreed 
on the future of the territories of Turkey, Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Kurdistan, 
Palestine and Arabia. Britain thought to use Kurds against Russia in Eastern 
Anatolia, Mesopotamia and Iran. By establishing an independent Kurdish state in 
these regions, Britain would have prevented Turkey from controlling the region 
between Armenia and Mesopotamia. 
At the Paris Peace Conference, military representatives prepared a report on 
5th of February 1919, which covers the areas of occupation and influence. According 
to the report, British forces, would occupy Palestine and Mesopotamia; French troops 
would occupy Aleppo, Humus and Damascus railway. If the occupation of Armenia 
and Kurdistan became necessity America would send troops to these regions at 
request of the League of Nations. As will be seen in the future, despite the report, a 
detailed decision on the sharing of these regions could not be made until autumn 
1919. 
Meanwhile the French were busy with internal affairs, likewise the Italians 
were dealing with Adriatic problem. The British, who had the opportunity to take 
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advantage of this situation, got the chance to apply their policies on Mesopotamia 
more comfortably than ever in the context of international policy. Nevertheless, the 
British would have to act with greater caution in order to avoid the reaction of the 
Muslim societies in British colonies and further complications resulting from French 
politics. 
Shortly after the invasion of İzmir by the Greeks, the High Council of the 
Paris Peace Conference discussed the text sent by Damat Ferit Pasha on the 30th of 
May 1919 and decided to listen to an Ottoman delegation. After this decision, the 
French High Commissioner De France in Istanbul visited the grand vizier Ferit Pasha 
on the 1st of June 1919 and invited him to the conference. Grand Vizier Damat Ferit 
Pasha, former Grand Vizier Tevfik Pasha, Finance Minister Tevfik and Shura-i 
Devlet Reis (Council of State Chief) Riza Tevfik went to Paris to attend the 
conference. On the 17th of June 1919, before the arrival of Tevfik Pasha in Paris, 
Damat Ferit Pasha had a meeting with the delegations in Paris. During the meeting 
Ferit Pasha claimed that the Ottoman Empire was not a war criminal, that the state 
had been put into a war by the members of the Committee of Union and Progress, the 
Unionists, who were also responsible for the Armenian deportation.87 
In the memorandum presented to the conference after the meeting, Damat 
Ferit demanded the conservation of the Ottoman territories status before the war. He 
also declared that negotiations could be started on the establishment of an Armenian 
state in the Eastern Anatolia and that autonomy can be granted for Arabs provided 
that it is bound to the Ottoman Empire. Although the requests expressed by Damat 
Ferit Pasha presented in the conference did not work at all, Allied Powers understood 
that the liquidation of the Ottoman state will not be so easy. The Turks, who were 
deprived of all the belligerent powers and pushed into total poverty, could still not be 
regarded as completely dangerless. Taking this into consideration, the committee 
announced that the peace, they were planning to sign on the 27th July 1919 with 
Turks, would be delayed until the time United States of America decided whether to 
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accept the mandate of some parts of Ottoman lands. It was announced that Turkish 
delegates could return to Turkey.88 
Two important British officials from the Mesopotamia region participated in 
the Paris Peace Conference.89  These were Arnold Talbot Wilson and Gertrude Bell. 
When we add Montagu from India to these two, it would not be wrong to claim that 
the staff shaped what the administration to be established in the Middle East should 
be. 90   
 
People who were thought to represent ethnic groups were invited to the 
conference. In this respect, the conference was the first international forum in which 
the Kurds presented their own demands. It can also be accepted as a significant 
milestone towards the “internationalisation” of the Kurdish issue, in line with the 
British aims.91  It is seen that many candidates among the Kurds were considered to 
establish a delegation to be sent to Paris. These candidates can be listed as Sureyya 
Bedirhan, Abrürrezzak Bedirhan, Abdulkadir, Mahmud Ibn Hafid, the Milli tribe 
leader Mahmud Bey and Şerif Pasha. According to Driver, who assessed these 
candidates, it was difficult for Sureyya Bedirhan to be elected to the committee since 
he had been away from the Kurds for a long time. It was also difficult for Abdulkadir 
and Abrürrezzak Bedirhan, to be elected for they have lived in İstanbul for years, or 
again it was difficult for Mahmud Bey to be elected since he did not have that much 
influence outside his own small settlement. Şerif Pasha had gained his authority due 
to his education in Europe and his familiarity with the European culture, and was 
considered the best and most talented person for this job, although he had been away 
from the region where the Kurds lived.92 Bulloch and Morris stated that the Bedirhan 
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family members were recommended by members of the Committee for Kurdish 
Liberation, however, another group preferred Sayyid Abdulkadir, and claimed that 
the Kurdish groups made contact with not only the British but also with America.93  
 
The first negotiations; in the conference on “Kurdistan” started at the end of 
1919 and in order to protect their interests there the British and the French 
participated in the negotiations. It is seen that some Kurdish leaders attended the 
conference by sending telegrams. For instance, it is confirmed that the leaders of the 
Ertusi tribe from Hakkari, and some Kurdish tribe leaders from Van sent a telegram 
stating that they wished for a separate Kurdish State to be founded under the 
leadership of the caliphate.94 During the negotiations on the regions where Kurds 
lived, it was stated that although the Kurds lived in the highlands of Mesopotamia, it 
was of particular importance to utilise the regions where they lived, since they were 
living on the fertile grounds run through by the rivers of Euphrates and Tigris, and 
also in important oil zones such as Mosul and Kirkuk.95 
 
The purpose of the British in these negotiations was to control the southern 
regions of Kurdistan and Mesopotamia, in other words to define the Mosul oil region 
and its security zones; and to keep the French away from this region.96 In order to 
achieve this, it was necessary to ensure the security of the periphery. The plans to 
establish buffer zones between Turkey and Mosul and between Turkey and the Baku 
oil zones underlie the British efforts to establish independent regions under the name 
of Kurdistan and Armenia. For achieving this goal and satisfying the Armenians, the 
British followed two different policies in the regions where the Kurds lived. These 
regions were the highlands, Eastern Anatolia, without any oil reserves were claimed 
by the Armenians, and the plains with oil reserves, where the Kurds lived. This 
situation inevitably brought along two alternative policies to be pursued in the 
Kurdish regions. The first one of these was to stall the Northern Kurds who lived in 
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Eastern Anatolia with various promises, while trying to use them against the 
Independence Movement which had started in Anatolia. The second one was to bring 
the Southern Kurds, Mosul and periphery, under British control.  
 
Within the framework of these policies, it is seen that Lord Curzon, in order 
to protect British interests, wanted to avoid meeting with Kurds. Because of this 
Curzon agreed with Barthelot, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to leave Kurd 
problem as it was and deal with this subject again after discussing the Mosul 
problem.97 
It is understood that in the trilateral meeting held on the 23rd December 1919 
by French and British delegations, the subject of the Kurds was discussed.98 Their 
proposals of the probability of Britain or France having a mandate for Kurdistan 
raised the chance of establishing an independent Kurdish state, but it was only an 
offer and it excluded south Kurdistan.99300 Because Britain was focused on the 
economic, military and political significance of South Kurdistan for Mesopotamia.100 
 Before the meeting began, Barthelot sent a diplomatic note suggesting that 
one part of Kurdistan must be included back in the Mesopotamian domain, and rest 
of it must be turned into a federation of Kurdish tribe leaders under the supervision 
of the French and British but Turkish sovereignty must be taken into consideration. 
Lord Curzon, who took the floor in the meeting, opposed Barthelot’s proposal. 
Curzon firstly said that the Sultan lacked sovereignty in this region and he himself 
would not accept such a partition and he would never accept Turkish sovereignty.101 
According to Lord Curzon, it is not possible for the whole of Kurdistan or for 
any part of it, to be under the mandate of either the British or the French; not even as 
a joint mandate of England and France. As a matter of fact, the states in question do 
not have any wish for a mandate. But one exception for this was the settled region in 
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“South Kurdistan”. Also in the light of past experiences, establishing Turkish 
sovereignty in the region is against British interests. According to Curzon the Kurds 
may live together with Assyrians, Armenians. But the problem was that Kurds 
cannot be separated from the establishment of an Armenian State, which has been 
approved by British and French.   
It was understood that Lord Curzon wanted the Kurds to decide for 
themselves on whether to organize in one state or as separated small states.102  In the 
event of Turkish intervention to the region, Curzon suggested Kurds should be 
guaranteed against Turkish attacks. But neither France, nor England agreed to 
officially assign a counsellor. Both the French and British declared that they did not 
want to be faced with the kind of problem which England encountered on the Indian 
border.  
These decisions presented by Curzon were accepted by Barthelot on 
condition that the Mosul problem was to be handled later. As a result of this meeting 
held in Paris 1919, Britain’s official policy had become manifest. The basis of these 
policies was formed on Curzon’s ideas. But those ideas did not match with the ideas 
of the experts in Kurdistan. Because of this, British policy makers were in a 
dilemma. However, Curzon, who followed a realist policy, had no intention of 
dealing with Kurds. His sole aim was to rationally protect the interests of England. It 
is well understood that the British policy was to dominate over oil fields and protect 
their own interests, not to protect the whole region where Kurds lived.103 
 
On the whole, it is seen that there were four important heads of state who 
were influential in this conference. These were the US President Wilson, the British 
Prime Minister Lloyd George, the French Prime Minister Clemenceau, and the 
Italian Prime Minister Orlando.104 However, we see studies claiming that the 
American President Wilson was in a position of total deception, when the last 
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version of the treaty is examined.105 Although issues such as language, race, religion, 
levels of development and geographical features were put on the agenda as factors to 
be used in the reassigning of the borders;106 these were not in fact used, and the 
results emerged depending solely on the power balance of the four states 
participating in the conference.107 The most important issue, with regard to our topic, 
was the issue of Kurdistan and Armenia, the states to be established. It is seen that 
the previous Stockholm Ambassador of the Ottoman Empire, Şerif Pasha, introduced 
himself as the chairman of the Ottoman Delegation first, and then as the chairman of 
the Kurdish delegation. This is sufficient to indicate that both parties, with common 
will left the decision for establishing an independent Armenia and Kurdistan to the 
great powers, as in the joint declaration by Şerif Pasha and Boghos Nubar Pasha.  
 
1.3.1 Şerif Pasha in Paris Peace Conference 
 
Before moving on to Sharif Pasha's activities at the Paris Peace Conference, it 
would be better to briefly talk about his meeting with Percy Cox on the 4th October 
1918.108 
 
Cox expressed the belief of Serif Pasha that the British were not in a position 
to politically dispose of the region which he defined as the Southern Kurdistan. 
During the occupation of the Basra province, he provided information that the British 
occupied Basra, Baghdad and Kirkuk, and carried out political negotiations with the 
Kurds in these regions. It was recommended that the positive British opinion 
regarding the Kurds should be announced in a declaration in order to prevent an anti-
British movement in the region and to win the Kurds as a whole over in favour of the 
Britain.  
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Cox also reported Serif Pasha's belief that no modus vivendi was possible 
between Northern Kurdistan and the Armenians but that if Britain promised a 
"benevolent policy", Kurds from the North would move southwards in order to 
achieve autonomy as a race under their protective aegis. Cox also reported from Serif 
Pasha that enlightened Kurds favoured a British administration centred on Mosul. 
  
According to Şerif Pasha, Britain should follow a unifying policy among the 
Kurds, and a Kurdish state should be declared, while monitoring the status of the 
Mesopotamia Arabs. The capital of such a government should be Mosul. Also, Şerif 
Pasha argued, it did not matter how many states participated in the Peace 
Conference, there were only two main powers there; one was England, while the 
other was Germany.109 It is very interesting that Şerif Pasha did not mention of 
America here. However, mentioning Germany as one of two main powers (neither 
France nor America) at that time was not a correct approach. Cox recommended that 
Britain, should declare in the Peace Conference that both Mesopotamia and the 
region known as Kurdistan were occupied by England; however, if the British 
government did not to annex these regions it would strengthen Britain’s hand in the 
peace conference. He claimed that in the current situation, the British aim was the 
establishment of a system for the benefit of the people of the region.  
 
Cox reported that, Şerif Pasha was ready to serve in whatever capacity,110 
stated that it is not correct for him to give an opinion about the advancement of 
Mesopotamia until he returned to the region called Kurdistan and understood what, 
was happening there. As it is understood from the document,111  in this meeting Şerif 
Pasha requested from Cox, on behalf of the British Government, that an autonomous 
body be constructed in Southern Kurdistan, and while it was being formed, Northern 
Kurdistan should be taken into account. In this way, Şerif Pasha argued that the 
Armenian issue would be put on the right track with regards to the migration of the 
Kurds living in the North to the Southern Kurdistan, which was happening as a result 
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of the unifying policy followed by the British. He also argued that both the Kurds 
and the British would gain maximum advantage if it was declared, without delay, 
that the British would establish a state, on behalf of the Kurds. 
 
Some scholars claim that the Cox-Şerif Pasha meeting was a turning point for 
determining the future of the region called Kurdistan.112 However, the accuracy of 
this judgment may be doubted. This meeting should only be considered as a 
preliminary study, since it had occurred at a time, when the British position on the 
matter was still unclear. 
 
According to the Foreign Secretary,113 Şerif Pasha was aiming to learn what 
the British policy over Southern Kurdistan was in the first meeting between him and 
Percy Cox on 3rd of June 1918. Percy Cox’s aim was to learn whether it was possible 
for Şerif Pasha to step up to rule if a balance between the Armenians and the Kurds 
in the region defined as Northern Kurdistan, were to be established and an 
atmosphere in which the two communities would live in peace to be provided. 
 
Şerif Pasha had interviews with the French, in addition to the meetings with 
the British. Şerif Pasha, in fact, mentioned the idea of an autonomous Kurdistan to 
the French on the 26th of December 1918. However, the French, considering the 
emerging events, were not interested in the idea of autonomy.114 According to his 
own claims, he participated in the Paris Peace Conference as a Kurdish delegate; 
however, he was a member of the Jaff tribe, and had tried to declare himself as the 
King of Kurdistan. 
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A short time after, Şerif Pasha, bearing the title of ‘Chairman of the Kurdish 
Delegation’, participated in the Paris Peace Conference.115 The British authorities, 
considered Şerif Pasha’s participation in the conference as an opportunity for 
reconciliation between the Kurds and the Armenians, partially had the benefits of this 
opportunity in the process which had started with the publication of the joint 
declarations.116 Meeting on a common ground would be a great opportunity to set the 
boundaries of the establishment of planned Kurdish and Armenian states. In addition, 
the Kurds would be prevented from supporting the Turkish National Forces. 
However, thanks to the subsequent successive victories the confidence and support to 
the National Struggle among the Anatolian people rose and the British officers could 
not manage to achieve their aims. 
 
Şerif Pasha presented two memorandums in the Paris Peace Conference, titled 
the Demands of the Kurds. The first was on the 22nd of March 1919; and the second 
on the 1st of March 1920.117 However, the British met with Şerif Pasha and Boghos 
Nubar Pasha118 on the 20th of November 1919, and they published a joint declaration, 
different from Serif Pasha’s declaration. This declaration, formed by joint decision of 
the two representatives, was based on leaving the future of the Kurds and the 
Armenians to the decisions made at the Paris Peace Conference.119 There were some 
comments that the most important historical consequence of this joint declaration 
was the indication that the states of Armenia and Kurdistan, anticipated in the Treaty 
of Sèvres , would survive side by side.120 
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The memorandum presented by Şerif Pasha to the Peace Conference on 22 
March 1919 can be abbreviated as below: 
 
“As the extreme imperialistic demands of the Armenians have been declared 
today, I can overtly present the legitimate rights of the Kurdish Nation to the 
conference. The ethnographic borders of the Turkish Kurdistan start from Ziven in 
the north and extend to Erzurum, Erzincan, Kemah, Arapkir, Behismi and Divriği in 
the west; to Haran, Sincar heights, Telafer, Erbil, Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah, Akk-el-man 
and Sinna in the south; and to Rawanduz, Başkale, Vezirkale, to Iranian border in 
the east. The Kurds have occupied these territories under various names since the 
oldest times and under the name of Kurd since 13th century. Kurdistan, had been 
comprised of 46 independent signatories before her voluntarily subjection to Sultan 
Selim the Stern ( ... ). 
 
Let us be allowed to express the objection that the centres, in which the Kurds 
were the majority, are being tried to be included in Armenia, which is yet to be 
established; however, nobody should doubt that, due to the Kurdish majority, who 
are warriors devoted to their independence, there would be a permanent turmoil in 
that future Armenia; and even if the allied powers station a military force there, this 
force would face guerrilla warfare.  
 
The Armenians base their demand for a Great Armenia on the claim that 
there was an Armenian Kingdom in the territory in 50 B.C. during Tigran’s reign; 
however, they deliberately forget to mention that this territory belonged to the 
Roman Empire, and Tigran, was invaded by Pompei. In this respect, a Great 
Armenia could not be claimed to be the ethnic cradle of the Armenian race. The 
Armenians and their supporters, in order to justify their demands, try to use a couple 
of thousands Armenians living in Kurdistan as a support. Against this claim, we will 
be contented only with the testimony of Nuttals encyclopaedia. Nuttals claims that 
“the Armenians have been migrating to neighbouring countries for a long time. Like 
Jews, the Armenians only engage in trade and most of them are bankers. The Kurds, 
too, never deny that the Armenians, following their commercial instincts, migrated 
voluntarily to Kurdistan to exploit the Kurds.” 
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Again, with the same commercial instincts, the Armenians have always 
preferred to live in the cities, and almost completely neglected to do agriculture. We 
may present the latest official resources of the great states of Europe and Turkey as 
evidence. Following the Treaty of Berlin, a delegation comprising of the British 
General Baker Pasha, the chairman of the council of state Said Pasha, and one of 
the Armenian notables Minas Effendi, was sent to Kurdistan to carry out a census. 
By way of example, it was found that the total population of Diyarbakır was 840.000, 
and of this population 600.000 were Muslims, and 240.000 were Armenians and 
Jews. ( ... ) 
 
In a meeting on the Armenian issue, on 3 November 1896, at the French 
Assembly, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs issued the following declaration: 
“according to the statistics at hand, the ratio of the Armenian population to the 
general population, in the Turkish provinces at stake at the moment, is 13%. In the 
Asian province (of Turkey) the distribution of the Armenian population is high in 
some places, while low in other places. Simply put, there was no single place in these 
provinces, in which this hapless nation was the majority or could demand any kind of 
autonomy.” As per the Wilson Principles, the Kurds have the right to establish a 
fully independent Kurdish State. As 14 articles by Mr. Wilson were accepted by the 
Ottoman Government, Kurds believe that they deserve to demand their independence 
without ever committing disloyalty to the Empire, in which they have lived for many 
centuries and which has protected their customs and traditions.  
 
We can summarise our demands resulting from the explanations above as 
follows: we strongly protest the Armenian claims on Kurdistan, and we believe that 
the territory, with its borders defined on the attached map121, should remain under 
Kurdish control. 
 
In order for the Kurdish people not to fall into poverty, since their national 
treasure almost completely depends on stockbreeding and stockbreeding requires 
winter and summer grasslands, we insist that these grasslands should not be 
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removed from Kurdistan borders. We demand our rightful independence; because, 
independence would pave the way for progress and civilisation for us; and enable us 
to make benefit of the richness of our country, and to live in peace with our 
neighbours. 
 
Also, according to the principle for nationalities, we kindly request from the 
Peace Conference that an international commission be established to draw up the 
borders of Kurdistan in ways that it would include all territories in which there is 
Kurdish majority. If any minorities would remain in the territories to be left to 
Kurdistan, they would be given special status for their national traditions. 
 
We leave the life and future of an ancient nation, determined to 
modernisation if allowed, to the Congress, which, we hope, would do justice.122” 
 
After this memorandum, a recommendation was made to the British in May 
1919 and Şerif Pasha stated that he was ready for service by coming to power in a 
Kurdistan under British rule.123 However, when the Kurdish notables’ opinions are 
considered at the time of this offer by Şerif Pasha, it is seen that Sayyid Abdulkadir, 
and the sons and grandsons of Bedirhan Bey in İstanbul, Sureyya Bedirhan in Cairo, 
and Sheikh Mahmud in Sulaymaniyah each claimed that they were the best candidate 
for this position. It is also seen that there were no Kurdish notables, standing out, at 
the same period in today’s South-eastern Anatolian region.124 Some sources, which 
may be considered more accurate, add to the aforementioned names, those of Sayyid 
Taha and Simko. 125 
 
According to Kurubaş, who made mention of the details of the letter of 
Sayyid Taha sent to the British in May 1919, Şerif Pasha claimed that the Kurdish 
people were so primitive that they could not keep a western type democracy alive 
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and the election would provoke conflicts among the tribes.126 Şerif Pasha also stated 
that the Kurds lacked a leader to preside over the country even with British 
consultants trained for military and administrative matters but claimed that he was 
ready for service at this position. 
 
Sheikh Mahmud, during the period in which Şerif Pasha’s demands, 
recommendations and memorandums were declared, sent two envoys to participate 
in the Paris Peace Conference. Although Reşid Kaban and Sayyid Ahmed Barzanji 
started off from Sulaymaniyah, they were arrested in Aleppo by the British, and 
therefore Sheikh Mahmud’s opinions could not expressed at the Paris Peace 
Conference.127 There are some aspects of the British propaganda that Şerif Pasha was 
representing the Kurds as a whole, therefore, to be reconsidered. However, it should 
be immediately noted that the Kurdish nationalists, referring to the event of 
preventing Sheikh Mahmud’s representatives from arriving in Paris, also included in 
their studies the assumption that Şerif Pasha could be the representative of the Kurds 
as a whole, since the Kurds in İstanbul had sent a telegram saying that all Kurds were 
represented by him. Here, they were discussing whether Şerif Pasha was a 
representative or not, rather than the idea that Şerif Pasha’s opinions were, in fact, in 
harmony with the opinions of all Kurds, i.e. an independent Kurdistan was the 
demand of all Kurds. 
 
Both local and foreign resources are unanimous that the joint declaration by 
Şerif Pasha and Boghos Nubar Pasha in the Paris Peace Conference was the text of a 
reconciliation built on the idea that the Kurds and Armenians would forget past 
experiences and remove the Turks from the region, and an independent Kurdistan, 
besides an independent Armenia, would be established.128 
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Although some resources, after the declaration of the memorandum on the 
22nd of March 1919, comment, upon the participation of Şerif Pasha in the Paris 
Peace Conference, that he was elected as the representative of the Kurds by the Kürt 
Teali Cemiyeti, this was just a claim;129 because; there is no concrete evidence about 
when, where and by whom this election was held.  
 
Şerif Pasha, subsequent to his memorandum dated on the 20th of November 
1919 in the Paris Peace Conference, for which the translation was presented above, 
published a joint declaration together with Boghos Nubar Pasha.130 The summarized 
translation of the declaration as below131; 
 
“Is as authorised delegates of the Armenian and Kurdish nations, we, as 
members of the majority race, and their official and unofficial governments are 
proud to present the desires of these two nations to the Peace Conference. We follow 
no other purpose and intent than their independence from the grip of the Turks which 
had so far tortured the Armenians and the Kurds. Depending on the principles of the 
self determination of nations, we have arrived at a consensus on demanding from the 
Peace Conference the establishment of independent Armenia and a Kurdish state 
under the protection of one of the great powers; and requesting all great states 
accept the purpose and intent of our nations, and help us in enlightenment and 
progress. As for the sharing of the territories, we leave the issue of drawing the 
borders, which we indicated in the memorandums we presented before, to the good 
faith and sense of justice of the Peace Conference.” 
 
Şerif Pasha totally abandoned the opinion that Kurds and Armenians were 
enemies and these two societies could never come to terms, which he had expressed 
in the meeting in Marseilles. In almost all studies analysing the character of Şerif 
Pasha, there is a consensus this situation was natural.132 It was stated that Şerif Pasha 
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acted pragmatically and at that time was thinking of his own interests, more than the 
benefits that the joint declaration would provide the Kurds. 
 
It is understood that there were many reactions to the publication of the joint 
declaration from Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia. The focus of the reaction was 
the ten thousand years brotherhood of the Turks and Kurds and the belief that the 
Armenians and Kurds would never be friends.133 The efforts of the Ottoman Empire 
to inform the Kurdish tribes about this declaration, needless to say, contributed to the 
spread of this reaction. 134 
 
The letter, dated on the 22nd of February 1920, sent by the Kurdish tribe 
leaders and notables, can be given as an example of the reactions which emerged. 
They135 claimed that Şerif Pasha, who lived in Paris and claimed to be a Kurd who 
would not be successful in his plots with Turkey, collaborated upon in the Paris 
Peace Conference with Boghos Nubar Pasha, supposedly, for an independent 
Kurdistan; rather he claimed worked only for his own interests. In the remainder of 
the letter, it was emphasised that Kurds were legal brothers to the Turks with the 
same lineage and religion in the same country, and no one except for the Ottoman 
Government had the right to speak for the rights of Kurds.  It was also stated that no 
discrimination had been made against the Kurds in Ottoman history and the Turks 
and the Kurds had fought side by side in all battles. It was underlined that 80% of the 
Muslim population who were killed by Armenians after the retreat of the Russian 
armies from Eastern Anatolia were Kurds, and it was meaningless for Şerif Pasha to 
enter in such cooperation with Boghos Nubar Pasha having knowledge of this fact. In 
the letter, it was argued that separating out a part of the Empire to give it to the Kurds 
would constitute the foundation for an Armenian state to be established in those 
territories. Therefore, it was stated, any attempts to cooperate with the Armenians 
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would remain inconclusive. It is worthy of consideration that, in the last section of 
the letter, the following note was made: ‘We present to the attention of the Peace 
Conference that they had to annihilate us without leaving anyone alive before 
separating us from the Ottoman Empire’.136 
 
Not only the aforementioned tribe leaders but also many tribe leaders from 
Erzincan, Siverek, Adıyaman, Kahta, Silvan, Nusaybin, Van, Hakkari, Hasankale, 
Urfa, Derik, Eruh, Siirt, Garzan, Eleşkirt, Palu and Hınıs showed their protests with 
telegrams they sent to both to the Bab-i Âli and to Western States’ embassies.137 
 
In view of the reaction to the declarations, Şerif Pasha was obliged to end his 
activities in Paris. Kazım Karabekir Pasha argued that the main reason for Şerif 
Pasha’s resignation, wired from the Monte Carlo casinos to İstanbul, was the reaction 
of the Kurds living in Anatolia. As it was declared by Karabekir the Kurdish notables 
affirmed that Şerif Pasha did not represent all Kurds and they did not agree with the 
opinions of Şerif Pasha. Karabekir also stated that the sole representative of the 
Kurds was the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. 138 
 
It is seen that the only person who was cautious about the joint declaration in 
the British Government was Admiral Webb. Webb argued that Şerif Pasha was not 
aware of the real conditions of the Kurds and did not represent their real demands, in 
his comment about the joint declaration, on the 8th of January 1920.139 
 
There were some British statesmen who thought that his joint declaration and 
the actions of Şerif Pasha would lead to an obvious conclusion. The most influential 
among these was A. Talbot Wilson. Talbot Wilson believed that Şerif Pasha was 
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ignorant, and did not have any influence among Kurds, and was a Turkish 
sympathiser.140 
Numerous scholars indicate that Şerif Pasha did not have much of a place in 
British politics, and his main use was to find a compromise for the resolution of the 
problems with the Armenians.141 Considering the joint declaration, this opinion 
seems fair.142 
While Şerif Pasha was presenting his claims about establishing a Kurdish 
state and looking for support of the European Powers in the Paris Conference, other 
Kurdish leaders were having meetings with the British officers in Eastern Anatolia 
and Mesopotamia. It is possible to see the names of the presumptive leaders of the 
planned Kurdish State in the report which was prepared by the Baghdad Civil 
Commission.143 
 
It has been ascertained that a report that related to the power struggles was 
sent from Baghdad Civil Government to İstanbul High Commissioner on the 27th 
March 1919. The telegram includes some important points such as; Sayyid 
Abdulkadir, Sayyid Taha's brother, Abdullah Cevdet and Suleiman Nazif were 
supporting an independent Kurdish State under British sovereignty. According to the 
report, the members of Bedirhan Bey Family had close contacts with Ottoman 
bureaucrats in Istanbul, and the Kurds notables in Mardin and Diyarbakır. Sureyya 
Bedirhan was aiming to get independence in Mardin and Diyarbakır and he was 
showing effort and spending money to establish a Kurdish committee.144 But the 
source of the funds was not mentioned in the telegram. It is likely that it was 
provided by rich Kurdish tribes or by the British, French and Russian authorities in 
the territory. But when the expenses made by British officers in order to gain Kurds’ 
trust and support are taken into consideration, it can be surmised that the important 
part of the financial aid was made by Britain. 
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Sayyid Abdulkadir was aware of his family's influence among Kurds,145 so he 
negotiated with Andrew Ryan, the head interpreter of İstanbul High Commission 
several times at various times. The first negotiation was on the 15th of April 1919, 
and the second one was in May 1919. In these meetings he demanded the 
establishment of a self-governing Kurdistan. 146  
On the 15th of April 1919, Sayyid Abdulkadir met with Andrew Ryan, and 
informed him that Kurds did not display an anti-British attitude but also would not 
accept Armenian sovereignty. It is indicated that in case he was not given guarantees 
about Armenian sovereignity he would seek collaboration with the Turk.147 In a 
sense Ryan was threatened indirectly by Sayyid Abdulkadir. 
Sayyid Abdulkadir many times met with the British officers between the 
dates of 5th of January and 20th of April 1919.148 In a telegram on 20th of April 1919 
Admiral Calthorpe informed the Foreign Office that he was visited by Kurdistan 
Committee members and received a letter about demands of the committee. Şerif 
Pasha also sent a very similar letter to Paris.149 When the letter is examined it is 
possible to claim that Şerif Pasha has already met with either Sayyid Abdulkadir or 
the Kürt Teali Cemiyeti before sending the letter. In both situations it means they 
were acting together.  
Admiral Webb and Sayyid Abdulkadir held a meeting, and in the meeting 
Sayyid Abdulkadir clearly stated the allegiance of the Kurdish community to Britain. 
Calthorpe was pleased with Sayyid Abdulkadir’s statement,150 because Abdulkadir 
was one of the prominent people, who were able to contact with Kurds, Armenians 
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and even Turks, and acting in favour of Britain.151 This could have a positive impact 
on British interests.  
 
 Meanwhile, Calthorpe received some reports from Baghdad. There is no 
clear information about the context of the messages but it is seen that Calthorpe was 
cautious about the information in the messages received from Baghdad. But it is 
quite likely that the information was about the Kurds who showed negative attitudes 
towards the British and acted with Turks. According to Calthorpe these anti-British 
activities could be suppressed easily by threatening the rebels with their relatives in 
the region. As it can be understood from the context most probably Sayyid 
Abdulkadir was reported as one of the anti-British Kurds in the messages received 
Baghdad. Calthorpe did not believe the reports about Sayyid Abdulkadir for being in 
anti-British activities. Calthorpe believed that as Abdulkadir had no hope from 
Turkish negotiations, thus he was making effort to establish an autonomous 
Kurdistan under British dominance.152 According to Calthorpe, the possibility of 
establishing an independent Armenian State could cause some problems with the 
Kurds. This idea could be affirmed by considering the discontent of the local 
community about an Armenian threat. When the document is analysed within this 
frame, it is seen that England was trying to produce concurrent and compatible 
policies not only for the Iraq territory but also for all places that it regarded as 
significant. 
 
While Sayyid Abdulkadir was meeting with Ryan, Major Noel was given a 
new mission and he met with some authorities and notables in Eastern Anatolia. 
Before giving information about the meeting of Noel, it will be useful to see where 
and why Noel was assigned. Major Noel, to collect information and contact with the 
Kurdish community leaders in Eastern Anatolia, was sent to the South-eastern 
Anatolian territory. To assign Noel to this duty, the British Secretary of State Balfour 
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was informed and asked for his consent. 153  The first place of duty for Major Noel in 
Anatolia would be Nusaybin. But Balfour had concerns about sending Major Noel to 
Nusaybin because Nusaybin was under the control of France at that time. The 
activities of Major Noel in the region could damage Anglo-French relations. 
However, Balfour suggested that if Major Noel conducted his activities without 
being noticed by the French authorities, he could have a major role in maintaining 
the British interests in the region.154 In the meanwhile the Egyptian Expeditionary 
Force Commander General Allenby stated that in order to mask Noel’s real duty, a 
fake task would be given to him. 155 
 
After all this correspondence Major Noel arrived in Nusaybin on the 12th of 
April, and to fulfil his secret duty he started to meet the chiefs of the tribes. After his 
meeting with the leader of the Miran Tribe, he had the impression that Britain was 
seen as an enemy, just as the Armenians were, by the local community. Then with 
the purpose of collecting information about the region Noel met with the district 
Governor of Nusaybin. The District Governor reported to Noel that as a result of the 
provisions of the Treaty of Mondros, 400 Ottoman soldiers in Mardin and 200 
soldiers in Resulayn (Urfa) would be dismissed. 
 
Noel continued to hold meetings to seek support in the region so he met with 
Zeki Bey, Governor of Mardin on the 20th of April 1919.156 According to Noel, Zeki 
Bey was pro-British and an enemy of the Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti thus he could 
be a useful person for the British interests. On the 21st of April 1919 Noel met with 
American missionaries157, and then he also met with Catholic Assyrians and 
Chaldeans on the 22nd of April 1919. In the meetings Noel noticed that Americans 
were not popular in the region due to their support for the Armenians during the war. 
Then Noel prepared a report about the situation of the region. In his report he 
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claimed that due to Ottoman propaganda against Britain, local communities were 
afraid of a British and Armenian threat. Because of this they had harvested and 
bought weapons to protect themselves against the British and Armenians. According 
to Noel, if no measure was taken, new incidents could appear in the region. As 
mentioned above, in his reports Noel stated that hostility against Britain had 
increased in the region and in order to stop this problematic situation the British 
Government should introduce a political initiative for the Kurdish tribes.158 
A telegram that gives information about the relationship between the British 
and the Kurds in İstanbul was sent by Calthorpe to Baghdad Civilian Administration 
on 22nd of April 1919. 159 When the content and wording of the telegram is regarded, 
it is realized that Admiral Calthorpe used quite diplomatic language, avoided definite 
judgements and posed probable options. According to Calthorpe; the Kurdish stance 
against the British involved some facts which must be definitely examined and there 
were four main reasons which caused Kurdish aversion to the British. These four 
reasons were; the Panislamist activities of the Committee of Union and Progress, 
nationalist movements in Egypt, the effects of Indian nationalism on rebellions, and 
the effects of Bolshevist rebellions on the Kurds. Calthorpe was informed about the 
Kurdish independence demands of the Kurdish committees and he had reservations 
as to such an administration being established in Hejaz. In this respect he was 
showing a different attitude from Major Noel. 
 
Sayyid Abdulkadir applied to the İstanbul High Commissioner, to ask for 
support from British authorities, to establish a self-governing Kurdish state under 
British protection, to escape from Turk sovereignty. 160 Meanwhile, to achieve his 
purpose Sayyid Abdulkadir was also negotiating with the French authorities. Sayyid 
Abdulkadir’s dialogues with French authorities, in order to establish Kurdish 
sovereignty, can be regarded as a threat to the British, as England was in a power 
struggle with France for that territory at that time. Considering this, it can be 
assumed that Sayyid Abdulkadir did not trust the British much. Another possibility is 
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that, by contacting the French, he was trying to hasten the development of the British 
policy towards the Kurds.   
Sayyid Abdulkadir was of the opinion that it was time for salvation from 
Turkish sovereignty.161 It is possible to see the details of the policy followed by 
Sayyid Abdulkadir in the telegram sent by the British High Commissioner in Istanbul 
to Baghdad’s Civil Administration. Also, reports from the Van British Consul about 
Sayyid Abdulkadir's aims to reconcile Kurds and Armenians and expel Turks from 
the territory, affirms the above given information.162 This is because, with the Wilson 
Principles, British authorities could not find a way to compromise about borders of 
the Armenian and Kurdish States which they planned to establish East of Anatolia. 
This occasionally caused England to remain in between the Armenian-Kurdish 
conflicts and was the major obstacle to the development of the policy they were 
planning to carry out in the territory.  
While these negotiations were being performed with Sayyid Abdulkadir, in 
the meantime Admiral Webb mentioned the probability of the establishment of a 
Kurdish State under the sovereignty of England, within the remaining four cities, 
with an Armenian State under American protection, in Trabzon and Erzurum in 
return. When it is considered that the foundation of a Kurdish State in the territory 
depended on the improvement of the Kurd-Armenian relationship, it can be said that 
importance of Sayyid Abdulkadir in the eyes of British authorities increased. It was 
believed that he could improve the relations between the Kurds and the Armenians. 
When all this information is taken into consideration, it is understood that Sayyid 
Abdulkadir's activities, aimed at providing solidarity between Armenian and Kurds, 
had caught the attention of the British. The British established intensive relations 
with Sayyid Abdulkadir, who was one of the people who actively followed politics in 
the period after the Armistice of Mondros, for the purpose of providing this 
solidarity. 
Meanwhile, the people of Mardin repeated their allegiance to the Ottoman 
State by way of telegram sent to the Grand Vizier on 7th of May 1919. In many other 
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telegrams sent from East and Southeast Anatolia, people asked the government to 
dispatch Ottoman troops to the region. In response to the telegrams, it was stated that 
it was not possible to send troops to the region due to financial and logistical 
difficulties but that the British High Commissariat would be informed of this 
situation.163 The Ottoman government, who did not want to lose complete control 
over the region, began to send envoys with a view to approaching and to advising the 
tribes.164 To this end the Diyarbakir governor Faik Bey was advised and 
encouraged.165 However, the Ottoman government’s failure to provide the Kurds 
with sufficient support in the region started to alienate them from the Ottoman 
Empire. The fear that Eastern Anatolia could be handed to the Armenians, a 
Christian power, like Smyrna was handed to the Greeks, in the Paris Peace 
Conference, resulted in the birth of a policy amongst the Kurds and the Turks to save 
the empire. The fact that the communities in the region, notably Erzurum and 
Diyarbakir, told the Grand Vizier that, taking the Armenian threat into account, 
Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia were inseparable parts of the Empire as well as 
the fact that these communities confirmed their allegiance to the Ottoman Empire 
could be considered as incentives to bring about the birth of this policy. 
Noel, investigating the reasons why the tribes swore allegiance to the 
Ottoman government one after another noted that the local communities had no 
hostile attitude toward the British forces until a few months ago but that the 
communities who saw the Armenians as a foe came to see Britain as foe, too, due to 
the British backing of the Armenians during the process that started with the Paris 
Peace Conference and in its aftermath. According to Noel, this was the reason why 
the local peoples displayed resistance to the British.166 Now realising that the root 
cause of the rage against the British in the region was a British protectorate of 
Armenia that was planned to be established in this very region, Noel reported that the 
use of force against the tribes would not bring a solution but rather increase the 
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peoples’ rage. According to him the support of the key people who had influence on 
the Kurds such as Sayyid Abdulkadir, needed to be gained by the Britain. 
The influence of Sayyid Abdulkadir was thought much more than that of the 
Turkish Governors within the places where Kurds were densely populated.167 But 
although Sayyid Abdulkadir was quite dominant among the Kurds, he was in a 
power struggle with the Bedirhan Bey family members, just the same as the conflict 
he had with Sayyid Taha.168 This could have been a problem in establishing a 
Kurdish union under the leadership of Sayyid Abdulkadir and in ensuring the support 
of other Kurdish leaders to Sayyid Abdulkadir to establish the Kurdish state. In fact, 
this situation could have led the leaders of Bedirhan and Sayyid Taha to move to the 
Turkish side by showing a reaction against the British scheme. This would have been 
a blow to the interests of Britain in the region. 
It is clear that Calthorpe used a diplomatic language and always had an error 
margin in the information that he gave. In his reports it is seen that both Sayyid 
Abdulkadir, and Bedirhan Bey and his family members, had a close relationship with 
the İstanbul High Commissioner. Calthorpe, who assumed Sayyid Abdulkadir to be 
an important character in Kurdish policy in İstanbul, had projected that sending his 
son to the territory defined as Kurdistan would serve British interests in the territory. 
Calthorpe emphasized that the families of both Sayyid Abdulkadir and Bedirhan Bey 
should be kept on the British side, failure of which would cause serious breakups in 
Britain’s Kurdish policy, and this would in favour Turkish interests.In his telegram, 
Admiral Calthorpe stated that the policy of stalk the Kurdish leaders and direct them 
was failed. He was complaining about not having clear information as to who was 
supporting or opposing the British. 169  
 
According to Calthorpe Kurds could be evaluated in two groups; as pro-Turks 
and Kurdish Nationalists. He claimed that İstanbul Kurds were in the second 
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category and they presented their side as ‘Kurdish nationalist’. After receiving 
information on Sureyya Bedirhan from his military attaché, Calthorpe stated that 
Sureyya always worked in favour of the British during World War I. Calthorpe 
frequently met the sons of Bedirhan Bey and they were acting completely within the 
instructions of the British in order to achieve Kurdish unity.170 Thus, Bedirhan family 
members were placed in the second group in Calthorpe’s evaluation and  that was 
why ‘Kurdish nationalists’ were to be supported.  
 
According to Calthorpe there were three alternative ways to be followed; and 
the British Government need to choose one of them. 171  The first way Calthorpe 
suggested was that the government in London would ignore unfolding events outside 
the lands Britain had captured, an option he deemed harmful to the British interests 
in the region.  The second way was that Britain would demand that the Istanbul 
government take measures in the region.  This might have created the impression 
amongst the populace that Britain was incapable of responding to the incidents. And 
this in turn might result in Britain losing the psychological warfare against the 
Ottoman Empire in the region; as well as in the Kurdish tribes supporting the Turks. 
For Calthorpe, the third and best way was that Britain would have a firm and 
constant hand on the tiller in the region by obtaining the allegiance of as many 
Kurdish leaders as possible. The best way to get the tribes` backing was to appease 
them. For Calthorpe, the concessions that would be made to the Kurds would result 
in some of the promises that had been made to the Armenians not being redeemed 
and this could leave Britain in a difficult position. However the fact that the Turks 
could begin winning the Kurds over by using the Armenian threat could mean that 
the alarm bells started to ring for Britain. Herewith once again we see that Britain 
would eventually have to choose between the Armenians and the Kurds.172  
It is seen that in some points the opinion of Major Noel was parallel to 
Calthorpe. According to Noel who argued that for the first time in history such a 
strong policy of Kurdish nationalism was pursued by the Kurds, whose future was at 
stake due to the British backing of the Armenians, and due to the Armenian threat; 
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the best way to solve the problem was to reconcile the notables and win them over 
for Britain. Arguing that some sacrifices should be made to gain the support of 
Kurdish tribes, Noel tried to win the notable chiefs over by giving them money and 
posts.173 In fact, this was addressed in a telegram sent to the Ottoman Ministry of 
Interior from Van province in May in which it was stated that the British agents and 
other officials in the region avoided no sacrifice to impress the Kurdish tribal 
chiefs.174 In the telegram it was also reported that the British agents gave the chiefs 
money, posts and arms in return for their service to the British interests in the region. 
Likewise Kazim Karabekir Pasha, the Commander of 15th Army Corps, stated in a 
telegram sent to the War Ministry that the British worked hard to win Sayyid Taha 
over for them. According to Karabekir, the British promised a vast principality 
stretching from Rumiye to Cizre and donated him money and arms. As stated in the 
cable the British gave Sayyid Taha money, two cannons, four machine guns, 400 
rifles and ammunition. When documents in the Turkish archives are surveyed, we 
see that the British government welcomed Noel’s suggestion of sacrifice.175  
Talbot Wilson notified in his telegram to Simla, Tehran, Cairo, Istanbul and 
Aleppo on the 12th of May 1919, that he had the opportunity to closely examine the 
Kurdish problem.176 Also, Wilson expressed that he found the Istanbul High 
Commissioner’s suggestions more suitable after he had had a meeting with Sayyid 
Taha. During the meeting he realised that Sayyid Taha would not support Sayyid 
Abdulkadir in Mesopotamia so the fact that Abdulkadir was in Istanbul would be 
more beneficial for the solution of the Kurdish problem. 
Wilson, who believed that it was necessary to implement the general amnesty 
proposed by Noel, mentioned that the Armenians now lived in the regions where 
Kurds lived, and these regions must be given independence. But Wilson offered that 
it made sense to wait and decide later about the subject of the mandate planned for 
Kurds beyond the Mosul province.177 He also mentioned that preserving the current 
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situation was of the utmost importance for the sustainability of British policy and no 
other attempt must be made to change it. Talbot Wilson mentioned that the 
implemented Kurdish policy needed to be decided and controlled the special 
governmental unit and he wanted to be the only authorized officer in the region.178 
While Wilson was supporting a wait and see policy, Major Noel was 
continuing his meetings at top speed. Arriving in Mardin once again on 11th of May 
1919, Major Noel had a meeting with Colonel Kenan Bey, the commander of V. 
Army Corps. In this meeting Kenan Bey discussed the strict order sent from General 
Allenby, the invading forces’ commander of Egypt, to Ottoman Foreign Ministry on 
12th of February 1919. 179 The orders are important to understand British policy in 
regard to the Ottoman State and its Eastearn lands:180 Ali Ihsan Pasha,181 the 
commander of the 6th Army, who was responsible for the defence of Mosul when 
Britain landed troops there on 15th of November 1918, and made tremendous efforts 
not to surrender the city to the British, was to be removed from office. All of the field 
guns, rifles and machine guns that were in the possession of the 6th Army, the biggest 
force in the entire region capable of withstanding Britain, should be surrendered to 
General Allenby at an agreed location. All guns should be confiscated when General 
Allenby ordered so. Excessive personnel of gendarmerie within the General’s 
administrative region should immediately be discharged. Those who were not 
discharged should be placed under command of General Allenby.182 The Ottoman 
civil servants would be replaced by the personnel designated by Britain.183 The 
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Armenians who were deported in 1915 would return home. 184 Britain would help 
those whose property was damaged if they reported the damage through British 
soldiers. Those who broke the peace and those who committed murder could be 
arrested by order of a British army officer.185 The administration of the entire 
railways east of Konya would be at his disposal. The control of the telegram lines 
within his area would be at his disposal and no encoded cable that was in Turkish 
would be accepted.186 The 6th Army’s personnel that were to be disbanded would be 
sent home in groups of 900. Thus they would be prevented from creating trouble. 
Ottoman officials should surrender all fugitives. Britain could occupy any area that 
they wanted. 187 
Just when Noel began to think that he had an influence on the local tribes, he 
found out that Elias, the Jacobite Patriarch, along with Fehim Effendi whom Noel 
failed to persuade despite all efforts, left for the capital in order to demand the 
continuation of Ottoman sovereignty in Mardin. Noel then feared that the Patriarch, a 
representative of local Christians, swearing allegiance to the Ottoman government 
could have an influence on other Christians, and thus he began to undermine this 
initiative by preventing them from reaching Istanbul. 
Setting off to go to Mardin once again in company of a number of Ottoman 
cavalry men on 12th May 1919, Noel was received the following evening by the 
Mahalmi tribe presided over by Sheikh Halil188 and his brother Hasan Bey.189 Noel 
was puzzled upon hearing their confirmation of loyalty to the Ottoman government 
as long as the Sharia law was practised despite the fact that Halaf Bey, uncle to 
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Sheikh Halil had been executed by the Ottoman government. This caused Noel, for 
the first time, to realise the religious factor, an important element binding the Kurds 
and the Turks together. In fact, Noel clearly expressed his opinion on this factor in a 
report sent to London in July. Classifying the Kurds as the “Islamists” and the 
“Nationalists” in it, Noel concluded that Turks and the Islamist Kurds 
collaborated.190 That is why England should support the “Nationalist Kurds” and 
give them a stable country. In this way a buffer zone between Caucasus and 
Mesopotamia under British protection could be created.191  
Meanwhile on the part of the Ottoman Empire it does not seem possible to 
conclude that the significance of Noel’s activities was fully recognised. Ahmet 
Cevdet Bey, the   XIII. Corps deputy commander informed the War Ministry of the 
activities of Noel in Mardin.192 He stated that Noel wanted to gain locals’ support for 
Britain in Mardin through making propaganda about Britain having been in the 
region in order to protect the Kurds’ rights, but he had failed. 193  Cevdet Bey 
reported that Noel was giving money to the Kurdish citizens to get their support for 
Britain. Ottoman officials in Istanbul claimed that the Kurds would not betray the 
Ottoman government for money and posts.194 In a telegram sent by the government 
in Istanbul to XV Army Corps headquarters, Major Noel’s activities were described 
as insignificant.195  But this was contrary to what the British thought about his 
importance. This was because the Baghdad Civilian Commissioner’s proposal about 
Noel going to Istanbul after he was finished in Diyarbakir was refused by the Foreign 
Office since he had undertaken substantial tasks in Iraq and Eastern Anatolia. For the 
Foreign Office, Noel’s life could be at stake once he was sent to Istanbul, and this 
could disturb British interests in the region.196   This confirms again that whereas 
Noel and his activities did not mean much for the Ottoman officials they had an 
essential place in regard to British regional interests in the eyes of the Foreign Office. 
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Noel was received by the Sürgici and Seykhan tribes in Avira on 21st of May 
1919 and he held talks with Ahmed Agha, the chief of Sürgici tribe.197 Noel briefed 
Ahmed Agha on current European politics and in particular on the British policy 
regarding Southeast Anatolia. After this meeting, Noel stated that achieving a 
mandated territory or protectorate in the region would not be easy and if successful 
the state that would undertake the mandate over the region would have a hard time.  
On the same day an important event came up to justify the opinions of Noel. 
Sheikh Mahmud in Sulaymaniyah rebelled against the British and had British 
officers arrested. This caused fear on the part of Britain that the riot could spread all 
over Anatolia and Iraq in a chain reaction. In a sense this came true and the people of 
Southeast Anatolia appealed to Sefik Pasha, the War Minister, to support Sheikh 
Mahmud, but they were refused. 198  In spite of willingness on the part of the locals to 
support Sheikh Mahmud, the Ottoman government, due to its apparent incapacity, 
made do with a petition to Britain that a situation contrary to the Armistice in 
Diyarbakir and Mosul be prevented from developing. This eventually led to a lesser 
confidence in the Ottoman government on the part of the Kurds thanks to the 
propaganda made about the Kurds achieving no positive results in their favour when 
they sided with the Ottoman rule. 
Increasing unrest in East and South-eastern Anatolia led the British 
government to hasten their work on designating a policy in regard to the Kurds in the 
region. According to Montagu, the borders of Mesopotamia should not be kept large 
and no military operations should be performed outside the determined border. A 
mandate state, in the area specified as Kurdistan, should not be constitued by Britain. 
If any state accepted the mandate over Armenia, the borders of the mandate that were 
to be formed should not include any part of Mesopotamia and the Turkish 
administration should never be re-established on the Kurdish region. The Foreign 
Office reviewed their Kurdistan policy, coming to the decision, on the suggestions of 
Montagu that assurances given to the regional Kurds were kept limited.199 According 
to the British Undersecretary Shuckburgh, making concessions to the Kurds about 
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Kurdistan before the borders of an intended Armenia were specified could 
subsequently put Britain in a difficult position. After all the talks had been held, the 
British officers in the region and in particular Noel were told that they could make 
promises to the local people in a way that ensured England was not stranded later on, 
for it was understood that turning a blind eye to the regional developments was not in 
the British interests. In the telegram sent from the India to the Civilian Commissioner 
in Baghdad it was stated that ambiguous promises may be made to Kurdish tribes.200  
In the light of this information it could be argued that despite the Armenians the 
British government decided to make some concessions to the Kurds, too, in East and 
Southeast Anatolia. 
The Commissioner in Baghdad who reviewed Calthorpe`s suggestions 
maintained, too, that the third way was the best to follow. For the commissioner, the 
Kurds should be granted an immediate amnesty, and a British protectorate beyond 
Mosul should be considered.201 In a report dated 25th of May 1919, Montagu, 
Montagu as Secretary of State for India suggested that the Kurds be granted an 
amnesty, that regulations related to the region- even if only temporary - be made, that 
the Bedirhan brothers be made use of for a solution to the problem, and that the 
British policy in regard to Southeast Anatolia and Mosul be conducted from 
Baghdad.202 
On 28th of May 1919, Noel left Mardin for Dirik, Diyarbakir and had a 
meeting there with Mesud Bey the former governor of Rawanduz.203 As a result of 
all these meetings and investigations he engaged in in the region, he came to realise 
that the Americans who supported Armenian regional interests were not liked either 
and that whatever country that was in favour of Armenian interests would not be 
wanted in the region.204 It could be argued that what Izzeddin Bey, the chief of 
Habasbani tribe, told him in their meeting near Sor on 17th of May 1919 had an effect 
on Noel’s coming to this conclusion.205 In the meeting, Izzeddin Bey stated that he 
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was not on good terms with the Ottoman government. He declared that he would not 
offer his support to Britain, because he was not comfortable with the British regional 
policy, and particularly, he did not trust Britain regarding the Armenian issue.206 
Noel asserted that the Turks and the regional Kurdish tribes would not pursue a 
hostile policy against the British, and would even support her, as long as Britain gave 
no support to the Armenian cause. That was why the Kurds should be convinced that 
Britain was by no means in co-operation with the Armenians and she would never 
would be.  In this way, a branch of the İngiliz Muhipleri Cemiyeti (British Friendship 
Society) could subsequently be installed and operate in Diyarbakir, and regional 
British interests could thus be safeguarded.207   
During his meetings with the Arabs in Sammar, Noel obtained information 
that the fellows of Serif Hussein who started the Arab Riot against the Ottoman 
Empire together with the British during World War I but who subsequently came to 
be at odds with Britain, were seeking support in the region with a view to removing 
the British from Mosul. When the ethnic components inhabiting parts of Anatolia 
and Iraq that were under British control were considered, the Kurds inclusion in a 
union that would be formed by the Turks and Serif Hussein could trigger events that 
would potentially bring an end to the British presence in Anatolia and the Middle 
East. Probably convinced that such a union could only be created under an umbrella 
of “Islamism” and that the spirit of nationalism in the Kurds should be awakened to 
prevent this union, Noel speeded up his negotiations with the tribes and obtained 
somewhat favourable results.208  
Şerif Pasha was in various negotiations with the representatives of Armenia 
and participant countries, especially with England, for the establishment of a Kurdish 
state, while Major Noel was conducting meetings among the Kurdish tribes to protect 
British interests in the region. However, because of the disagreements between the 
British policy makers, the conflicts of interests among the Allied states, and the rise 
of the national resistance in Turkey while the Paris Peace Conference negotiations 
were still in progress, the activities of Şerif Pasha could not be successful. The 
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reactions of the Kurdish tribal leaders were also influential. On 27th February 1920 
Kurdish leaders send telegrams to the embassies of the Allied Powers, Paris Peace 
Conference delegates, the Ottoman Government in Istanbul and the Heyeti Temsiliye 
delegates in Ankara. In their telegrams they declared that Kurds were first of all 
Muslim, then Ottoman and finally Kurdish. They declared that they had never 
betrayed the Ottoman Government and would never betray it. They also declared that 
Şerif Pasha was an opportunist, had collected millions of lira and embezzled it, that 
such a person could never represent the Kurds. Lord Curzon, who had learned the 
reactions to Şerif Pasha through telegrams, stated in the session of the conference on 
19th April 1920 that although had shown himself as representative of the Kurds but 
the Kurds did not recognize him as their representative.209 Finally Şerif Pasha 
announced his resignation with a telegram dated 5th May 1920 to the Conference and 
he left the Conference negotiations.210 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Turkish National Struggle Emerges (19 May 1919) 
 
After the Mondros Armistice while the British officers meeting with the tribes 
and trying to influence them in British interests, the Turkish and pro-Turk Kurds, 
who could not accept the capture of the Ottoman lands by the Allies, were protesting 
in many places. Because of that reason some unrest events were seen in many places, 
such as the Samsun and its vicinity. The Turkish government declared that the events 
of unrest were commenced by the Greeks, but the British held the Turks responsible 
for the events in the eastern regions of Turkey.211 
Therefore, in order to determine the source of anarchy and unrest in the 
Eastern Black Sea and Eastern Anatolia, and to restore the disrupted order in the 
region, to prevent the deterioration of public order, to collect the weapons of the 
Turks and to close the organizations established against the Allied Powers Mustafa 
Kemal Pasha was appointed as 9th Army General Inspector on the 30th of April 
1919.212 The area of his inspectorship was Trabzon, Erzurum, Sivas, Van provinces 
and Erzincan and Canik sanjaks, but his inspection area was not only limited to these 
areas because, as it was indicated on his certificate of authority, the corps 
commanders in Diyarbakir, Bitlis, Elazig, Ankara and Kastamonu had to consider 
Mustafa Kemal's orders. He was appointed to this mission with the duty of 
establishing order in the above mentioned region and investigation of the reasons of 
unrest in the region; collection and protection of the weapons and ammunition in the 
region and their storage in the Ottoman depot; suppression of the alleged Turkish 
resistance communities in the region.213 Actually Mustafa Kemal wanted to go to 
                                                          
211 Evsile, Mehmet, ‘Amasya Tamimi ve Atatürk’ün Amasya’daki Faaliyetleri’, Atatürk Araştırma 
Merkezi Dergisi (AAMD), XIV, Vol. 40, (March,1998), p.70-72. 
212 Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı, Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Dairesi Başkanlığı Arşivi, İstiklal Harbi 
Kataloğu, (ATASE,ISH), K.26, G.117, B.17-5. 
213 Atatürk ile İlgili Arşiv Belgeleri, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Daire Başkanlığı Yayım, Ankara,1982, p.23-
24, Doc. 21 
74 
 
Anatolia to encourage powerful Turkish resistance there and to establish a fully 
independent new Turkish state.214 After his appointment, Mustafa Kemal and his 
delegation of 18 officers departed from Istanbul and arrived in Samsun on 19th of 
May 1919. After arriving to his zone of responsibility Mustafa Kemal had meetings 
with military and civil officers and received information about the situation in the 
region.215  
After Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s arriving at Samsun, General Milne gave a note 
to the Ottoman Ministry of War on 6th June 1919, asking for the reason for this 
assignment. This note requested the reason of appointing a General Inspector, an 
Executive officer and delegates to the 9th Army which was previously abolished. It 
was also requested that the British authorities be informed of the duties and 
responsibilities of these officers.216 
The note of General Milne was answered by Cevat Pasha on 24th of May 
1919. Cevat Pasha stated that the 9th Army was previously abolished but its zone of 
responsibility was spreading over a wide area so in order to control how the orders 
were implemented by 3rd and 15th Army corps the 9th Military Inspectorship Office 
was established. In addition, Cevat Pasha informed General Milne that this 
delegation was not given a permanent place of duty and therefore could go on long 
journeys to fulfil their duties.217 
Despite General Milne's note, it is possible to understand from the British 
press that the British did not much care for the sending of Mustafa Kemal to Samsun, 
and even that they could not understand very well the aim of his activities in Samsun 
and its surroundings. It can be seen that, because the movement initiated by Mustafa 
Kemal Pasha in Anatolia is not given importance at first but after the Sivas Congress 
(4-11 September 1919), news and commentary are seen to be increasing. In the 
British press, Mustafa Kemal Pasha was seen as a rebellious general, and the Turkish 
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National Struggle Movement was seen as one of the rebellions which often break out 
in the colonies. 218 
Despite the fact that just a few months had elapsed since the start of his 
mission the activities of Mustafa Kemal started to damage the interests of the nations 
who were claiming rights on the Ottoman lands. After staying in Samsun for a week, 
Mustafa Kemal Pasha who passed to Havza and then went to Amasya started to deal 
with the events that happened in various parts of the Ottoman lands and started to 
send telegrams and to publish notices. It can be seen that Mustafa Kemal Pasha had 
contacted the 15th Corps commander Kazım Karabekir Pasha on 21st May 1919. 
Again he had contacted the 20th Army Corps commander Ali Fuat (Cebesoy) Pasha 
and the inspectorship that affiliated to that corps on 23rd May 1919.219  
 
2.1 Declaration of the Havza Circular (28/29 May 1919) 
 
Mustafa Kemal came to Havza (a borough of Samsun), regarded as a safe 
region during the period of the national struggle, communicating with the army 
commanders and then sent general information and orders to the military and civilian 
authorities on 28/29 May 1919. In the circular it was decided that big and exciting 
rallies would be organized and occupations would be protested; protest telegrams 
would be drawn to the Istanbul Government. Notice letters and telegrams would be 
issued to representatives of the major states. The Christian people would not be 
harmed at the rallies. The circular is the first national document to be published 
during the Turkish National Resistance Period (April 1919- September 1922) that 
started by Mustafa Kemal after his arriving Samsun. Immediately after the circular, 
the public began to organize rallies; serious steps have been taken towards national 
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unity and solidarity. In addition, Mustafa Kemal contacted the commanders of 3rd 
Army Corps in Samsun and the 13th Army Corps in Diyarbakir on 1st June 1919.220 
Mustafa Kemal Pasha believed that the arms of the army should not be 
surrendered in order to protect the indivisible integrity of the state and the nation. He 
applied to the Ottoman Ministry of Defence and suggested that British demands for 
the disarmament of the Turkish Army be rejected.221 By contacting the military 
authorities under his command, Mustafa Kemal Pasha ordered that the ammunition 
should not be delivered to the British control officers.222 
Seeing the movements contradictory to Mustafa Kemal’s duties of 
appointment, the British immediately took action to recall him. On the 6th June 1919, 
Commander of the British Naval Forces in the Black Sea, General Milne contacted 
the Ottoman Ministry of War and demanded that Mustafa Kemal Pasha should be 
dismissed from his duties.223 A similar demand came from Admiral Calthorpe. The 
Istanbul Government, which accepted the British demands, ordered Mustafa Kemal 
Pasha to return to Istanbul immediately. In the meantime, the Istanbul Government 
made some attempts to prevent the activities of dismissed Mustafa Kemal Pasha. But 
Mustafa Kemal Pasha continued to his activities non-stop. 
2.2 Borders of Kurdistan on the Baghdad Administration Report 
on 13 June 1919 
 
While on the one hand British officers were trying to prevent the activities of 
Mustafa Kemal Pasha, on the other hand they were trying to determine the border of 
the Kurdish State which it planned to establish. The post from the Baghdad Civilian 
Administration dated on the 13th of June 1919, entitled ‘Kurdistan’ was sent to India, 
London, Cairo, İstanbul and Tehran, and Wilson summarized recent developments in 
a list;224 
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1. The ethnographic map of East Anatolia had been recorded with the number 
of 2901 in the War Office. According to Wilson the map printed by the Royal 
Geographical Society in which East Anatolia was mostly shown as a Kurdish region 
was important in showing how difficult it was to designate Kurdish borders. 
However, the map referred to by Wilson could not be found in War Ministry records. 
Related to ethnological border discussions a map dated 23 July 1919 was inspected 
in a Foreign Office document, in the file numbered PRO, FO 371/4192 and this map 
is placed in Appendix. There is no information about the preparation date of the map 
referred to by Wilson. However, the possibility that this map is the one Wilson spoke 
of is very low because Wilson’s telegram is dated 13 June but the map found the in 
Foreign Office is dated 23 July. 
 
2. The Turkish –Iranian front line forms the eastern border of the region and 
this region was mostly populated by Kurds. In order to protect the advantages of the 
mountain regions of Iraq which were more suitable for development for both 
economic and strategic reasons, Sulaymaniyah and Rania were to be included within 
the borders of the Mesopotamia Administration. According to Wilson, Dahok and 
Zaho must also be regarded as in Mesopotamia; but Amedia must be excluded from 
Mesopotamia. Wilson, who saw Erbil as the completion of the Mosul province, 
expressed his anxieties about the involvement of prominent figures of Erbil in 
Kurdistan due to observations made on 6 June225. The sensitivity of people living in 
Erbil about the topic was related to the population distribution there. Likewise, if we 
remember that there is no sign that Kurds were in the majority in Erbil in June 1919, 
the anxieties of the people of the region where Kurds, Arabs and Turks lived 
altogether may be understood better. 
 
3. The South border of Kurdistan was to start from point 1143 of Qandil 
Mountains and shall continue from the point where 37 Parallel and 44 Meridian cross 
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towards the point where 37th Parallel and 43rd Meridian intersects.226 In other words 
(if we take this explanation into consideration) the region between Van, Mardin, 
Nusaybin, Resulayn, Birecik, Elâzığ, Bitlis, Van, the Qandil Mountains, Revanduz 
and Sulaymaniyah would mark the borders of Kurdistan. 
 
4. The South border of the region must be formed from areas with a majority 
population of Kurds, and this border should start from West of Cizre and the 
Nusaybin Province, from South of Mardin, from North of Resulayn to Birecik (Urfa) 
throughout 37th Parallel and from the upper Euphrates must follow the borders of 
Harput (Elazıg), and Bitlis Van provinces but Erzincan and Erzurum must be 
excluded. It is seen that this suggestion made by Wilson was criticized, and the 
person who criticized Wilson’s idea most harshly was Major Noel. According to 
Noel, Kurds must not be separated and Kurds must be assessed as a whole. As will 
be mentioned in the following parts of the chapter, Kurds were seen as holistic by 
Major Noel. According to Noel, the establishment of a powerful Kurdish state in the 
region depended on integrity of Kurdish notables. 
 
5. This region including the Diyarbakır province was mostly formed of 
Armenians and these parts were shown with thick lines in the map. However, as far 
as we can understand from Major Noel’s explanations and other sources, Armenians 
were in a minority in that region, and settle them down there as administrators and 
giving them independence was not possible. Wilson said that it was guaranteed that 
the rest of the region and Erzurum and Trabzon would be under an American 
mandate and building a civilian and military administration would not be hard for 
America. 227 
 
6. In the telegram the region called as Kurdistan was divided into two ways; 
those people either supporting Britain or Turkey and Christians and those against 
them. If precautions were not taken, people supporting the Turks may effectively 
seize the control of the country. For this reason, the British side must hold an 
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election. According to Wilson, if Turkish authority was rebuilt in Armenia and 
Kurdistan, the idea of a Kurdish State and an Armenian State would completely 
disappear. Time would prove Wilson right and some Kurdish tribes declared their 
support to the Turkish National struggle that was commenced by Mustafa Kemal and 
decided to fight on the Turkish side.228 
 
7. According to Wilson, the lack of a foreign administration in the centre of 
Bitlis and Van, the tendency towards Islam in the Middle East, and the reaction 
towards the actions of Greece and one of the important Kurdish leaders Sayyid Taha 
pose an unfavourable situation for being under a Christian authority. Because of this, 
decisions taken for the policies to be implemented must be quickly carried out in the 
region and directions must be made according to British interests. 
 
8. Trabzon and Erzurum provinces may be shaped to found a unique 
Armenian State under the auspices of America. The remaining four provinces, 
Elazıg, Van, Sivas and Diyarbakır, must establish a Kurdish State under the auspices 
of England. An Arabian State must be established under the auspices of England in 
Mosul, Baghdad and Basra provinces. The only alternative plan in place of these was 
the re-establishment of Turkish authority covering the six provinces to be established 
under the auspices of Europe.  
 
9. The way for Britain to broaden its actions for Kurdistan was through 
understanding American policy. The British government must improve its policy by 
examining these issues. Also, Wilson suggests that Kurdish State currently run by 
British officers must be recognized by the British government.229  
 
On 12th of June 1919, another telegram230 was sent by Major Noel to the Civil 
Administration of Baghdad in which he reported that Kurdish nationalism launched 
by the British was expanding day by day and that some of Sheikh Mahmud's men 
came to see him and delivered him some of the Sheikh's demands about the Kurdish 
movement. 
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A response letter231 from Baghdad Political Office was sent to Noel on the 
17th June 1919. In this letter, it was stated that the Kurdish policy had been approved 
by the British government, and that a Kurdish federation would be established if 
Kurdish tribes were ready and willing, and that Noel had been authorized to 
negotiate with the Kurds to investigate their situation. 
2.3 Declaration of the Amasya Circular (22 June 1919) 
 
After Havza, Mustafa Kemal Pasha went to Amasya and met with the Turkish 
delegates and patriots. The Amasya Circular showed both intention and route for the 
Turkish resistance. The circular starts with a notice that there was a threat to unity of 
the fatherland and to the sovereignty of the nation. As can be understood from the 
notice, securing the national independence and the territorial integrity were two 
purposes of the Anatolian movement. The Istanbul government was affirmed as 
being under influence of Allied Powers, so the government was not capable to 
protect the interests of the nation. Therefore, to preserve its independence the nation 
needed to take more responsibility. In the Circular the need of a national committee 
to lead the national resistance and declare and prove to the world of the legitimacy of 
its goals was emphasized. The Amasya Circular called for a national congress to be 
held in Sivas on 4th September 1919, with the participation of three delegates sending 
from each sanjaks. Meanwhile, the Turkish resistance societies (Müdafaa-i Hukuk 
and Redd-i İlhak) were called to send delegates to the upcoming regional congress in 
Erzurum on 23rd July 1919.232 
 
 The general draft of the text of the Amasya Circular was signed on 22 June 
1919 by Mustafa Kemal, Kazım Karabekir, Rauf Bey, Refet Bey, as well as many 
others. The prepared Amasya Circular was distributed to all civilian and military 
institutions immediately after its approval.  
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The Amasya Circular, which is one of the turning points in the history of 
Turkey, has caused many significant results. With the Amasya Circular, the 
revolution phase began on behalf of the Turkish National Struggle. Justification, 
purpose and method for the War of Independence have been put forward. For the 
first time, there is an idea that a government based on national sovereignty should be 
established. The Government of Istanbul was ignored. A call was made to the 
Turkish nation to fight against the occupiers of Istanbul and Anatolia. With the 
Amasya Circular, the patriarch, the caliphate, and patriarchal ideas were replaced by 
nationalism and national ideas. An opinion on the formation of the Representative 
Mission was given. For the first time together with the Amasya Circular, liberation 
resistance has been written down. A decision was taken to convene a congress in 
Sivas for the unification of the Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti. The decision not to 
discharge the army has been taken. The War of Independence was officially 
announced along with the Amasya Circular.233 
Under the pressure of the Allies the Ottoman government reacted to these 
developments. On the 23rd of June 1919, Ali Kemal, who was the Ottoman Minister 
of Internal Affairs, send telegrams to the provinces, such as Sivas,234 and announced 
that Mustafa Kemal Pasha had dismissed from office by the demands of the British 
and that his orders were invalid.235 Ordered to return to Istanbul, Mustafa Kemal 
Pasha had received telegrams on various dates but he refused. Minister of War Ferit 
Pasha sent a definite order to Mustafa Kemal to return to Istanbul as soon as possible 
with the telegram he sent on the 5th of July 1919. Finally, on 8th of July 1919 it was 
reported to Mustafa Kemal that he was dismissed from his inspectorship duty.236 
Upon this, Mustafa Kemal Pasha sent telegrams to both the War Ministry and the 
Ottoman Sultan and informed them that he resigned from both the inspectorship and 
the military service. Mustafa Kemal would continue to lead the Turkish resistance as 
a civilian. 
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On the British side Major Noel was still struggling to determinate the borders 
of the Kurdish State which he wanted to establish. On the 26th of June 1919, Major 
Noel met with Baghdad High Commissioner who suggested to the British 
government on 13th June that an independent Kurdish state comprising of Van, Bitlis, 
Diyarbakir, Elazig, Malatya,Tunceli be established under British protection. In this 
meeting Major Noel briefed Colonel Wilson on the situation in the region. During 
this meeting, Major Noel must have mentioned to Colonel Wilson his conviction that 
the common ground binding the Ottoman government and the Kurdish tribes together 
was Islam. This view was featured in a June report237 he sent to London that we 
mentioned above briefly; and Colonel Wilson suggested he should revisit the tribes 
in the company of a few men from Bedirhan tribe in order to prevent the Turks from 
spreading an Islamist policy in regard to Southeast and the East Anatolia.238 
Welcoming the idea, Noel persuaded Sayyid Moin, son of Emin Ali Bedirhan, and 
Sayyid Ibrahim, son-in-law of Sheikh Abdulkadir, to go with him. 239 
After all these developments, Major Noel began to lobby some Kurdish 
people against the Turks, for instance, Celadet Ali, and Kamuran Ali Bey from the 
Bedirhan Tribe, and Ekrem Bey from Diyarbakir. In these negotiations, Ekrem Bey 
stated that he was almost arrested by Turkish officers allegedly for being a supporter 
of a British mandate, but he escaped from the arrest by giving the name of Major 
Noel.240 If this memory is true, it can be shown as evidence of the influence Major 
Noel had in the region.  
Two days after meeting with Ali and Ekrem Bey, Noel faced an important 
issue when he went to Antep which was under British control. This incident showed 
how the Kurds’ worries about the Armenians were justified. While he was there he 
heard some Armenians crying “this will be our home!” The Kurdish people thought 
that the British Army had captured the region to establish an Armenian State due to 
the complaisance of the British authorities towards these kinds of Armenian 
activities. After the investigation of Diyarbakır, Antep, and Maraş by Noel, he 
concluded that the Armenian population was one-tenth of that of the Turks, even 
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prior to the War. Because of that, he declared that the abandonment of the region to 
the Armenians would not be an impartial decision.241 Moreover, Noel sent a telegram 
to the Clayton Egypt Force on 28th of June 1919.242   In his telegram he stated that 
the population figures of the six vilayets, which were given in the reports of Tiflis 
British Occupation Command on 25th of April 1919 obtained from Armenian 
sources, did not reflect the truth. He based his assertions on the Turkish records and 
some interview results with Christian communities. He also gave some information, 
based on the same source, of the population distribution in Diyarbakır province. In 
the light of Major Noel’s knowledge, although the Kurdish population was 750,000 
before the war, it had decreased and became 600,000 after the war. Noel also 
indicated that the number of Armenians was 120,000 in the pre-war period, but it had 
fallen to 20,000 in the post-war period. When examining these population ratios, it 
can be seen that the Kurds were always the majority of the population. In this 
respect, from his point of view, if the region was given to the Armenians, it would be 
not only be a strategic mistake but also a demographic one. Noel indicated that, 
despite all difficulties, the Kurds were still dedicated to acting on behalf of British 
interests.243 
Noel dwelt on the necessity of the Kurds' forming their own government in 
the Sulaymaniyah region in parallel with events after the Mondros Armistice 
Agreement. Noel also demanded the recognition of the Kurdish language and support 
for the tribes therein. Noel asserted that he considered the Kurds were not being 
adequately represented at the Peace Conference but that the problem actually 
originated from the warranties given to the Kurds not being clear and distinct. Noel 
indicated that the Ottoman Unionists would never accept the Kurds' demands, and 
this was indeed a distinct advantage for Kurds. In continuation of his report, 
(indicating that he published a notice about the region identified as South West 
Kurdistan from the Egypt Expeditionary Force in July), Noel stated that Turks were 
very angry with the British for discussing the Kurdish and the Armenian issues. 244  
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Major Noel admitted that there was no unity among the Kurds, and ensuring 
long-term unity would happen through forming different structures with different 
centres. This is why Noel suggested forming autonomous structures for each area 
which in Southern Kurdistan was Sulaymaniyah, in Central Kurdistan was Mosul, 
and in Western Kurdistan was Diyarbakir, in his report.245 Although Major Noel was 
obsessed with endeavouring to establish of a Kurdish state, he warned England to 
take military precautions against a tribe that can rapidly unite a troop of 3.000 armed 
soldiers any time even in a small residential area.  
2.4 Erzurum Congress (23 July – 7 August 1919) 
 
In order to prevent the establishing of an Armenian or a Kurdish state on the 
Eastern Anatolia lands of the Ottoman Empire, Erzurum Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti 
were established on the 10th of March 1919. British officer Alfred Wilson, who 
supervised the application of armistice conditions and was tasked with dispatching 
the Ottoman army's weapons to storage under the control of the Allied Powers, was 
investigating the establishment of an independent Armenian state in the region.246 
People living in Erzurum were provoked by the news that Erzurum would be given 
to Armenia. With the encouragement of Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti in Trabzon, 
Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti in Erzurum a provincial congress was held in Erzurum 
on the 17th of June 1919. 
American authorities were aware of the newly started Turkish struggle; 
therefore to make observations on the developments, American High Commisioner 
Admiral Bristol, then a delegation headed by General Harbord came to Erzurum on 
1st of August 1919 in order to inspect the merits of Armenian demands in Eastern 
Anatolia, including Çukurova (Cilician plain).247 The delegation had come to 
Erzurum and started their inquiry. At the end of the investigations Harbord reported 
that there was no Armenian majority anywhere and anytime in the region. Harbord 
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also stated that taking the Armenians under the American mandate would bring a 
great economic and military burden to the United States. Thus, the hopes of the 
Armenians to be under the American mandate would be greatly reduced. These 
developments saved the Kurds from fear of massacres at the hands of the Armenians 
and contributed to making a decision to maintain their loyalty to the Ottoman State. 
On the opening day of the Erzurum Congress, 23rd of July 1919, American 
High Commissioner Admiral Bristol sent a telegram to the Foreign Office. In it 
Bristol claimed that the only solution of the Turkish problem was to set up a mandate 
regime for the whole of the Turkish lands. According to Bristol, to hold an election 
in these nations was not easy, because they were both ignorant and uneducated. 
Because of that reason, only after a certain period, might an opportunity be given for 
the right of self-government to those nations, who sought for self-governance.248 
Holding a nationalist congress would damage both British and Ottoman 
Governments who therefore wanted to prevent it. But they failed to achieve their 
aims despite attempts to prevent the congress from gathering in Erzurum. British 
officer Rawlinson had meetings with some leaders of the national struggle movement 
and demanded that the congress in Erzurum should not be held. He demanded that 
Mustafa Kemal should not be invited to the congress even it were to be held. 
Rawlinson threatened that if his warnings were not taken into account, the Eastern 
lands of Ottoman Empire would be invaded by Allied Powers as required by the 
Mondros Armistice resolutions. Before his meeting with Mustafa Kemal, Rawlinson 
conducted a meeting with Kazım Karabekir.  In his meeting Rawlinson wanted to 
threaten Kazım Karabekir by asking him the number of troops that British forces 
had. But the response of Kazım Karabekir was more threatening. According to 
Karabekir, ‘every single Turk was armed and nobody could have power to control 
millions of armed men’.249  On the 9th of July 1919, in the meeting with Mustafa 
Kemal, Rawlinson wanted to threaten him by saying that it would be better not to 
convene the congress but Mustafa Kemal stated that in any case the congress would 
be convened. The congress was held with the participation of 62 delegates mainly 
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from Trabzon, Erzurum, Sivas, Bitlis and Van eastern provinces and some important 
decisions were taken.250  
The National Border would be defined as the Turkish historic boundaries 
when the Mondros Armistice was signed. It was emphasized that the people of the 
Ottoman country were inseparable from each other so the country cannot be divided 
by any reason or excuse. If the Ottoman Government is dispersed, the nation would 
show total defence and resistance against all kinds of foreign occupation and 
intervention. If the central government cannot be established for the protection and 
integrity of the country and its independence, a provisional government will be 
established for the purpose of the cause. This government delegation will be elected 
to the Heyeti Temsiliye. If the Congress is not convened, this election will be made 
by the Representative Delegation. It was the basic principle of the National Forces to 
recognize the sole force and to make the national forces dominate. Christian 
minorities could never be given the privilege, which could cause a disruption of 
political domination and social equilibrium. Mandate and patronage would never be 
acceptable. The National Assembly should be assembled immediately and the 
government work had to be controlled by parliament.251 Upon the complaints of the 
British about Mustafa Kemal, an order was sent to the 15th Corps Command by the 
new Minister of War Nazim Pasha on the 30th of July 1919 and ordering Mustafa 
Kemal to be sent to Istanbul due to his opposing behaviour against government 
decisions.252 This order also shows that the Istanbul administration and the British 
were disturbed by the National Movement in Anatolia. 
Those who participated in the congress adopted the principle of not avoiding 
any sacrifice and not migrating at all by facing all kinds of danger in order not to 
leave the Ottoman homeland. Participants of the congress also promised that if the 
country was attacked by the Armenians, they would react violently and protect their 
land until death. Turks and Kurds living in the vicinity of Erzurum had been gathered 
under a single roof for the defence of the country against the Armenian danger. In 
one sense, if the British proposals failed, which aimed to pull the Kurds out of the 
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Turkish national struggle and persuade the Kurds to join the British troops failed, 
then British interests in the region would be affected negatively. 
 But there were some Kurdish leaders, such as Sayyid Taha, who were 
collaborating with the British. He visited Semdinan with the British authorities; and 
told the governor that the city should be handed over to the British; and demanded 
that the Turks retreat.253  Sayyid Taha was thinking that if the Turkish forces were 
removed from Rania and Rawanduz, he would be the king of Kurdistan. The 
expectation of Sayyid Taha was supported by the British officer Captain Beale. He 
claimed that establishing a North Kurdistan state covering the whole Rawanduz 
Region and Dest-i Harir plain and expanding to the North including Semdinan 
district and Gavar would be a positive development with regard to the British 
interests in the region. Beale considered Sayyid Taha as the only person who could 
rule the region with his intelligence and influence in this part of the country. He 
recommended Sayyid Taha to be assigned as the king of the Northern Kurdistan state 
which would be established.  
 
 
 
2.5 Ali Batı Revolt (11 May 1919-18 August 1919) 
 
After the signing of the Armistice of Mondros the Occupations of the Allied 
Powers and the demobilization of a large part of the Turkish army weakened the 
central authority. The interpretation and application of minorities' demands for land 
in Anatolia, in accordance with the provisions of the Armistice, contributed to the 
weakening of the central authority. During the armistice period, the instability in the 
Ottoman Empire led to riots in various parts of Anatolia including the Ali Batı riot. 
The activities of Ali Batı during the armistice are in line with the arrival of 
the British intelligence officer Major Noel in the region. According to the District 
Governor of Şırnak, Jiljanlı Rasul and Ali Batı had been sent to Mosul for political 
purposes; in appearance they went for commercial purposes but in reality to provide 
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British control in Siirt.254 Diyarbakir Deputy Governor Mustafa Nadir informed that 
the gendarmerie organization in the region should be established as soon as possible 
in order to ensure the security of the province in the telegram he sent on 22 May 
1919.255According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ response to his telegram, it 
was necessary that the incidents in the region were settled by the gendarmerie and 
that the events should not be exaggerated in the eyes of the Allied Powers by using 
military force. The intervention of the army in the small events which the gendarmes 
could manage, would damage the situation of the Otoman State.256 
Moreover, in the telegram257 dated the 16th June 1919, Lieutenant Governor 
Mustafa Nadir claimed that the ammunition used by Ali Batı, a Kurdish bandit in 
Nusaybn, had been abandoned in Mosul by the Turkish army and secretly given to 
Ali Batı by the British. There was no evidence that Ali Batı wanted to set up a 
Kurdish State. It may plausibly be claimed that he did not have a sufficiently 
intellectual background nor were there Kurdish intellectual with him who were 
aiming for an independent Kurdistan. It is understood from the documents that Ali 
Batı practised banditry at least since 1908. He wanted to cause unrest to benefit from 
the unstable situation in the country. Before the Greeks invaded İzmir and Mustafa 
Kemal Pasha moved to Samsun, Ali Batı, who had acted with the help of the British 
with the help had made the Ottoman Empire suffer for months. The rebellion was 
suppressed by Turkish forces. And it was reported that, Ali Batı was seized in the 
telegram dated the 24th of August 1919, which was sent to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 258 
The documents used in this part are important to show that most of the 
Kurdish tribes in the region were supporting the Turkish forces and naturally, the fact 
that the tribes had the ability to act independently of one another in the structure of 
the tribes, and sometimes the presence of hostility between them, made it possible for 
the state to quickly suppress the situation. Following the suppression of the incident, 
some tribal leaders were rewarded for their help.It is seen that after the rebellion was 
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suppressed, the district governor of Midyat and some Kurdish tribal chiefs such as 
Mezineli Ali Çelebi, Keferzili Mahmud Salih, Salahi tribal leader Ramazan and 
İzzeddin Agha were rewarded with medal for their support in the suppression of the 
revolt.259 
 
2.6 Sivas Congress (4-11 September 1919) 
 
The Congress of Sivas was the gathering of elected national representatives in 
Sivas to search for measures to save Turkish land after the First World War and after 
the declaration of Amasya Circular of Mustafa Kemal, which aimed to protect the 
full independence of the Turkish nation. The Sivas Congress was a national 
conference that was held between 4th September 1919 and 11th September 1919. 
The decisions of the Sivas Congress can be summarised as follow; the 
homeland within the national borders was an indivisible whole and it cannot be 
broken into pieces. The nation would defend itself against on foreign occupation and 
intervention and would resist them. If the Istanbul Government has to be obliged to 
abandon any part of the country in the face of external pressure, any measures and 
decisions would be taken to ensure the independence and integrity of the country. It 
was fundamental to recognize the Kuvayi Milliye as the only force and to make the 
national forces dominate. Mandate and patronage were denied. In order to represent 
the national interest, it was compulsory for the national assembly (Meclis-i Mebusan) 
to be convoked immediately. The national societies, which were set up to secure 
Ottoman citizens’ rights and lands, have been combined as a general organization 
under the name of "Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti". The General 
Assembly would be elected by the Congress to conduct the administration and 
decisions taken. 
Thanks to the Sivas Congress’s decisions; the National Pact principles were 
determined. The principles of independence and national sovereignty were accepted 
as basic principles and Mustafa Kemal officially elected as leader.  Heyet-i Temsiliye 
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was accepted as the only representative of the entire Turkish homeland so that 
Turkish national unity and solidarity would be provided.  
In addition to these, other importance of Sivas for the National Struggle was 
derived from being one of the mentioned cities Vilayet-i Sitte260, whose future was to 
be determined under the 24th article of Mondros Armistice agreement. Due to the 
agreement in the event of any disorder in these cities, they were to be occupied by 
Allied Powers. Due to the pressure of the British, the Istanbul Government was also 
trying to prevent the congress from being convened in Sivas. For this purpose, orders 
were sent to many state officials to prevent the Sivas Congress from being convened. 
One of these orders was sent to Reşit Pasha, the Governor of Sivas on 29th of August 
1919.261 Sivas Governor Reşit Pasha reported to Mustafa Kemal Pasha that he had 
received an order from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and that in case of a congress 
gathering in Sivas, Sivas would be occupied by Allied Powers.  
Despite all the orders and threats of Damat Ferit Pasha, the gathering of a 
congress in Sivas could not be prevented, and as it was seen as a proof of the 
incompetence of his governance Damat Ferit Pasha had to resign from his post on 1st 
of October 1919. According to General Milne, Damat Ferit Pasha’s government, lost 
the control of the State and fallen as a consequence. General Milne’s opposition on to 
opposition to allowing British troops to go to Eskişehir in order to suppress the 
National movement and his orders to the British troops to follow a neutral attitude 
towards domestic politics accelerated the collapse of the Damat Ferit Cabinet.262 
After the resignation of Damat Ferit Pasha, Ali Riza Pasha, who had 
sympathy for the Anatolian Movement, became the head of government. These 
statements are important to show how ineffective the British were in the truce period 
of Istanbul. It was also recommended that the new Turkish government should have 
good relationships with Anatolia, thus aiming to make the expanding and 
strengthening national movement passive. The most important point for the Heyet- 
                                                          
260 Erzurum, Van, Diyarbakır, Sivas, Bitlis, Harput. 
261 Arıburnu, Kemal, Sivas Kongresi, Samsun’dan Ankara’ya Kadar Olaylar ve Anılarla,Atatürk 
Araştırma Merkezi (AAM) yayınları, (Ankara,1997), p.63. 
262 Sonyel, Salahi, R., Kurtuluş Savaşı Günleri’nde İngiliz İstihbarat Servisi’nin Türkiye’deki Eylemleri, 
(Ankara,1995), p.41. 
91 
 
Temsiliye was to be gathered as soon as possible and to reach the goals which were 
set in the congresses.  
The gathering of the Sivas Congress and the decisions taken concerning the 
whole country created significant repercussions in Turkey and in the world. While 
the Western states described the Anatolian national struggle as a rebellion, this 
movement was seen as a national and fair movement by especially French public 
opinion. These developments gave moral support to the Anatolian movement and 
national unity.263 
2.7 Inter-Departmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs (10 
October 1919) and the Evaluation of the Conference  
 
In the document registered in the British archives as of 10th of October 1919, 
a meeting was held by the Ministries to discuss the Middle East Affairs.264 When the 
minutes of the meeting are analysed, the emphasis is on re-evaluating the idea of 
reshaping the Kurdish policy of Britain, which was decided should be discussed after 
the Egyptian Expeditionary Force Commander Lord Allenby returned to London. It 
was determined that this request for re-evaluation was based on two main reasons.  
 
1) Due to the treaty between Britain and France, Britain needed to retreat from the 
region from the right of the River of Euphrates to Habur, from Jagjag Su to Erad 
valley, from the shores of Tigris of Cezire Bin Omar and from Til to the right of 
River Tigris. 
 
2) The region, as reported by Major Noel and Colonel Bell who visited the regions 
where the Kurds live, was outside the borders of the lands the British have 
occupied in Syria and Iraq in 1919. Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his troops had 
prevented them from advancing causing them to postpone their expedition to a 
future date. 
 
With these two reasons in mind, the first matter to be resolved concerning 
British policies for the Kurds was the discussion for moving the British troops to the 
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western regions, and according to the minutes of the meeting, it was stated that this 
situation is not clear. In the minutes of the meeting, the issue concerning the French 
retreating to their mandate is not clarified, and it is emphasized that it would be 
necessary to abandon the idea to found an autonomous Kurdish state in this region, if 
a decision to retreat to the west of this line is made. 
 
It was decided that the Armenians would be the main factor in determining 
Kurdish policy, and policies should be established in accordance with the Armenian 
factor. In the reports it was also suggested that how the future of Kurdistan and 
Armenia would be reshaped. 
 
It was stated that a decision was made in previous meetings held on the 
determination of the borders of Mesopotamia and Kurdistan, on limiting the financial 
expenses on the works on the Kirkuk railroad construction, if necessary. The grounds 
for this reason are that the British would not benefit from the railroad reaching Mosul 
but instead from the railroad traveling the desired route. However, one of the most 
important issues concerning the matter was to determine what kind of a solution 
would be found for the expansion of British influence in the region called Kurdistan, 
based on the determination of the route of this railroad. The importance of analysing 
this matter in detail was well-known. 
It is seen in the reports that the Mesopotamian Civil Government 
Commissioner Arnold Talbot Wilson proposed the idea of establishing an 
autonomous Kurdish state around the regions where Arabs live in Mosul, under the 
leadership of the Kurds and the supervision of a British consultant. However, it was 
stated that the British authorities have not yet reached a decision concerning this 
suggestion and it was emphasized that the matter of whether this construction will 
reach Iran’s borders should first be considered when making this decision. 
 
In addition to all the suggestions made, the peace delegation in Paris should 
consider whether the issue concerning the Assyrian immigrants who should be 
returned to the Amedia region in Bakuba, should be analysed in detail. Based on the 
correspondence of the Ministry of War, it was a question of if the Assyrians, as 
planned, were brought to this region, chaos would reign and public order would be 
harmed. 
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Also, the decision stands out that the officers of India and the Foreign Office 
should be the key decision makers concerning the policies to be followed in regions 
under British dominance. In the meeting, the importance of the British determining 
their own policies for their own interests, before a decision was made at the Paris 
Conference, was emphasized. 
 
It can be seen that in the final hours of the meeting some correspondence 
from the Istanbul High Commissioner’s Office were examined. For example, it was 
stated that the Istanbul High Commissioner’s Office expressed in the telegram dated 
10th of September Serif Pasha were not a good candidate for governing Kurdistan 
and that a similar telegram had also been sent by the Baghdad Civil Government to 
the Office of the Indian Commissioner and the Indian Commissioner’s Office had 
informed the Foreign Office of this telegram on 13th of September. 
 
It can be observed from the minutes that the Egyptian Expeditionary Force 
presented their opinion on the region called Kurdistan on 15th of September 1919, 
and they emphasized that the issue concerning the region called Western Kurdistan 
should be considered seriously. Looking at the minutes, it is possible to conclude that 
it was expected that this situation would cause serious conflicts with the Kurds and a 
warning was made as the natural outcome of these conflicts would mean an increase 
in the quantity of troops and in the budget allocated to Mesopotamia. It was also 
briefly suggested by Major Noel that in the opinion of the Egyptian Expeditionary 
Force, instead of including these regions in the state of Mesopotamia, it would be 
more favourable to include them within the borders of a Kurdish-Armenian state. 265 
 
As far as the minutes are concerned, a telegram was received from the Office 
of the Istanbul High Commissioner on 18th of September 1919.266 In this telegram, 
the Istanbul High Commissioner stated that the reason why several Kurdish leaders 
were assigned to the area under the supervision of Major Noel was to improve their 
interaction with the various peoples in the region. However, he argued that they have 
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deviated from the target and this has caused the understanding that Britain was on the 
point of directing the Kurdish national movement, and the people of Anatolia began 
to perceive Britain as a country, whose main purpose was to found a Kurdish state 
under British dominance. Due to this situation, the Istanbul High Commissioner 
suggested the British government should revise their Kurdish policy based on the 
latest developments of that time. 
 
It can be observed in the meeting, that a telegram was sent by the Baghdad 
Civil Government to the Indian Office on 18th of September 1919 conveying that 
there were serious problems in the region called Kurdistan, especially in the Erbil 
region. Also, another telegram sent by British officers in Istanbul on 20th of 
September 1919 suggested that before the idea of an independent Kurdistan was 
assessed, the idea of establishing a front in Mesopotamia, within the scope of British 
policies, should be analysed. After this issue had been settled, it was emphasized that 
it would be important to focus on this region called Kurdistan for the interests of 
Britain.267 
 
In the telegram sent by the office of Istanbul High Commissioner on 2nd 
October 1919, it was stated that Damat Ferid Pasha suggested assigning certain 
Kurdish leaders to important Kurdish regions, especially to Diyarbakir, and the 
opinion of Baghdad Civil Government was requested. On the same day, concerning 
the opinion requested from the Istanbul Government, Baghdad Civil Government 
stated that Damat Ferid Pasha needed to gain the diplomatic support of the British 
government; however, they did not believe that sending Serif Pasha to the region 
would be helpful and the Babanzade family would be a better option for this mission. 
It was expressed that Babanzade family was suggested because they knew the region 
and it was believed that they would adapt easily if the government in Istanbul was to 
change. 
 
During the meeting a telegram from the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 
received on 3 October 1919, was analysed. The Egyptian Expeditionary Force stated 
that no Kurdish land should be in Mesopotamia otherwise it would be inevitable that 
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a situation similar to the problems faced on the north-western region of India would 
ensue and military troops would have to be assigned to this region.268 
 
If this meeting is analysed in detail, it can be seen that British still had not 
decided on their policies on the region even in October, 1919. This perspective of 
reviewing alternatives, at the heart of their foreign policy, can be observed from the 
telegrams and reviews sent from Baghdad, Istanbul and Cairo.  
2.8 Turkish-British Talks after Paris Conference (November 
1919) 
 
The British authorities held talks with Turkish officials after the Paris Peace 
Conference. The most important of them was the meeting that was held between 
Andrew Ryan from the Istanbul High Commission and the Turkish Foreign Minister 
Reşid Pasha in November 1919.269 The meeting was important because Reşid Pasha 
was given important information in it about British policy. 
 
During the meeting Ryan informed Reşid Pasha about Britain’s Kurdish 
policy. Ryan tried to compensate for misunderstandings because of Major Noel’s 
being in Malatya. According to Ryan, when Major Noel was in Malatya, as a result 
of a bad coincidence, he came across Governor of Elazıg Ali Galip Bey270 who was 
charged to carry out a raid on the Sivas Congress and to eliminate Mustafa Kemal 
and the Turkish National Struggles leaders. The Turkish authorities took advantage 
of the meeting of Bedirhans who were with Noel and Ali Galip and commanded the 
arrest of the Bedirhans and Major Noel. But this was unacceptable because according 
to Ryan the telegrams sent from Diyarbakır about Noel’s intention to found 
Kurdistan were all nonsense. Ryan asserted that Major Noel’s relation with the Kurds 
stems from his companionship. His duty was not propaganda, as was claimed by 
Turkish authorities, it was only research. Ryan also mentioned exactly after the 
ceasefire that the High Commissioner would be equidistant to all groups not only to 
Kurds. As he indicated, England saw Kurdish people as a different race whether they 
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accepted their different race or acted along with the Turkish people. The future of the 
people in that region would be determined the same way as other nations were 
determined. The will of the people in that region was not certain, because the British 
government did not have a clear picture about this. Ryan claimed that the problem of 
Kurdistan was important to England because Kurds were important, and the 
importance of Kurds stemmed from their being on a military border and their being 
close to Syria which had been invaded some days before. British interest in Kurds 
would continue into the future too. The reason for their concern for Kurds was 
because of British interests in Iraq. According to Ryan it should be understood from 
the actions that were seemingly for the benefit of the Kurds were actually the British 
officials misusing Kurds for their own country’s profit. These actions of the British 
should not be seen as a counter attack against a national movement. While saying 
this Ryan emphasized that this policy was valid only for that time and in the future 
England would change this policy. According to Ryan England was not a decision 
maker or authority. British officials were listening to each group in order to create a 
British policy. The Kurdish problem would cause real challenges for England, 
because there was no one who would represent all the regions the Kurds inhabited. 
Ryan also indicated in the meeting that Britain did not want to divide Turkey. The 
reason for Turkey’s misunderstanding of British policy by Turkish government 
stemmed from the perception that Britain supported the minorities in their actions. 
 
The veracity of the information given by Ryan in this meeting should be a 
matter of suspicion. If the explanations he made were true, there would be many 
questions without an answer such as; what were the reasons for British officers' close 
relations with the Kurds and for their paying them salaries? Did the reason for British 
travellers and officials carrying out detailed research about Kurds just originate from 
curiosity? Was it just a coincidence that Major Noel was seen with separatist groups 
in the region? If the reason Ryan held the meeting was to prevent the adverse 
reaction of the Ottoman Empire, he made a serious miscalculation. In fact, the real 
reaction would not come from İstanbul; it would come from Anatolia by Mustafa 
Kemal.271 
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2.9 The Foreign Office Meeting to Determine Kurdish Policy (22 
November 1919) 
 
Several meetings were held in London concerning the matter after the 
correspondence between Baghdad and the Indian Office. The telegram sent by the 
Foreign Office on 22nd of November 1919 to the Baghdad Civil Government lists the 
principles of British Kurdish policy as follows;272 
 
1. Due to military and policy related reasons, the borders of Mesopotamia should be 
as limited as possible, 
2. As it is not possible to complete a military operation beyond the borders of 
Mesopotamia, this situation needs to be considered, 
3. The British government shall not agree to any kind of protectorate in the region 
called Kurdistan under any circumstances, 
4. If a protectorate is suggested for the Armenians, the borders of this state should 
not reach Mesopotamia. 
5. The Turks will not be allowed to dominate the Kurds. 
 
It is understood that the British Foreign Office’s and Major Noel’s 
suggestions concerning these five items, on keeping the Turks out of the region 
called Kurdistan, to avoid segregation in the region and to shape the border between 
Arabs and Kurds according to an ethnological determination should be evaluated 
carefully. It was also noted that according to Major Noel, the Kurds would be 
victorious against the Turks with minimal support.273 
 
In this letter from the British Foreign Office, it was clear that they were 
seriously concerned about the activities of the Turks. The reason for that was the 
belief of the British officers of the Department of the State that if Turkish 
propaganda was not prevented, not only the region called the Southern Kurdistan but 
the area all the way to Iran could be under the influence of Turks. Actually, this letter 
is extremely important. The Foreign Office seems as if it was afraid of a country that 
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was compared to a "sick man", and whose defence forces were taken away with the 
Armistice of Mondros. Despite Damat Ferid Pasha’s works in Istanbul in favour of 
British policies, there was concern that the region could fall under the influence of 
the Turks, and this indicates that the spirit of the Turkish National Movement and 
maybe even the spirit of Ottomanism was still alive. 
 
It is that the British Foreign Office made certain suggestions to prevent the 
expansion of Turkish influence. These suggestions may be outlined as follows;274 
 
- Kirkuk and Altun Kopri should remain on the British side, 
- The region from Erbil to north of Mosul and Cezri bin Omar should be left to the 
Kurds. 
- The foundation of an autonomous state in the region called Kurdistan is both 
practical and applicable; however an adjustment to the borders in the Mesopotamia 
region should be considered. 
- The adjustment made should not include the Assyrians. 
- In the northern region of the Kurdish settlement, the Bedirhan family should be in a 
strong position. 
- Commercial relations should be established between the Sulaymaniyah region and 
Baghdad, considering the economic and strategic importance of the region. 
- If the region called Kurdistan were to be recognized as an autonomous state in unity 
both economically and geographically, it would not be difficult to build good 
relations with the local Sheikhs. 
- As the fulfilment of the above mentioned conditions would give rein to the 
construction of the railroad between Kizil Road to Kirkuk, Tigris to Mosul and Fatha 
to Kirkuk, British dominance could be achieved in a faster and more effective 
manner. 
- Erbil regional government would be shaped easily as required. 
 
In this telegram sent by the Foreign Office, many aspects of the suggestions 
made by Major Noel stand out. The most important ones of these are the request to 
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exclude the Turks completely, to ensure that the Kurdish people stay united and to 
base the borders on ethnological elements. 
 
On 22nd of November 1919, Noel made three proposals on Kurdistan. 275 
According to him, the Turkish government had to be removed out of Kurdistan; 
Kurdistan must not split; and the border has to be determined in accordance with the 
ethnological border between the Kurds and Arabs as much as possible. Major Noel’s 
proposal faced serious protests because it contained handicaps that could not be seen 
as acceptable; notably, by Arnold Talbot Wilson as well as by the Baghdad 
Administration and the Indian Administration.276 The most important of these 
handicaps originated from the fact that Mosul and Kirkuk, where oil resources, 
would be given to the Kurds according to Noel's proposal. Lord Curzon was seen to 
be the strongest supporter of Talbot Wilson, who reported these handicaps to 
London. Noel's proposal was not accepted as he could not win the support he needed 
from Wilson and Curzon. However, within this process, Noel enforced the orders 
successfully in relation to continuing studying the Kurds and developing bilateral 
relations. Arnold Talbot Wilson, while explaining the drawbacks about Major Noel's 
plans asserted that Diyarbakir, Nusaybin and Urfa should definitely be kept out of 
the Mesopotamian State (Iraq) formed under British Mandate.277 Also he stated that 
autonomous states could be established in Sulaymaniyah, Revanduz, and Cezire bin 
Omer which formed the borders of the above-mentioned state; however, he believed 
that these places should not be within Mesopotamia.  
In the letter sent by Major Noel, the emphasis on ethnological borders is 
based on the relations of Kurds with Arabs. Major Noel, who lived among the Kurds 
for a significant amount of time, believed that they would not agree to be under Arab 
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dominance and expressed this opinion not only in this letter but in many letters. In 
fact, Major Noel is not the only officer expressing this concern. Western newspapers 
published much news on the relations between the Kurds and the Arabs.278 For 
example in the article published in The Times on 22nd of November 1919, it was 
stated that Britain was responsible for including the region from Mosul to Hanikin 
and Sulaymaniyah in Iran and defined the borders with a perspective similar to that 
of Major Noel; based on ethnological characteristics. 
 
The aforementioned opinions of Major Noel were protested against in a 
telegram sent by A. Talbot Wilson from Baghdad to the India Office on 26th of 
November 1919, and considered unacceptable. As the discussions went on, the India 
Office held a meeting in London on 6th December 1919 and the delegates attempted 
to reach a decision considering the borders of the state of Iraq. In this meeting, Sir A. 
H. Hirtzel argued that Sulaymaniyah could be governed under British supervision 
and the region between two Zap rivers could be managed with a council. In addition 
to that, a suggestion was made to exclude Revanduz from all of these structures and 
to assign the Bedirhan family for the government of the Cizre region. Talbot Wilson 
objected to this suggestion and stated that the regions of Zaho and Akra should be 
included in the state of Iraq. In response to this objection, Major Noel emphasized 
the fact that Zaho and Akra were Kurdish settlements and that they should not be part 
of Iraq.279 
 
On 8th of December 1919 Sayyid Abdulkadir met Hohler at the office of the 
İstanbul High Commissioner, and repeated his request to establish an autonomous 
Kurdistan. But apparently Hohler states that he would not be able to make a 
commitment on behalf of the British government. 280  However, in order not to create 
a negative atmosphere he made a speech such as to promise that the British 
government would support Kurdish rights at the Paris Peace Conference. Sayyid 
Abdulkadir claimed that an agreement had been made between Kurds and Armenians 
in İstanbul. But on the following day Hohler met with Armenian notables and he was 
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informed that no agreement made between the Armenian notables and Kürt Teali 
Cemiyeti because of the divergence among the Kurds.281  
 
Admiral De Robeck sent a telegram to Lord Curzon on 9th of December 
1919.282 According to the Admiral the Kurds pinned their hopes for independency 
upon England. Because of that, the impact of the results of the determined policy on 
British interests in the region had to be well calculated. In the Admiral’s telegram, 
there was no information relating to the Armenian State. This is probably because 
they were waiting for decision of the U.S as whether to accept the protection of the 
Armenian State. 
 
An event that may be commented on as a reflection of Curzon’s anxieties in 
the context of Mosul-Kırkuk manifested itself on 23rd of December 1919, in his 
negotiations with the French in London. In the meeting, the subject of sharing the 
territories left over from the Ottoman Empire was discussed and whether the regions 
with dense populations of Kurds should be open to Turkish influence or not on the 
condition of being under the control of a British Mandatory in Iraq.283  
In the meeting Curzon was unsure about the Kurdish lands which were under 
the Turkish domination, but according to him it was not right to separate these 
regions into population zones. Curzon claimed that it was hard to decide about the 
borders of the region to be established as Kurdistan before determining the borders of 
the Mosul province and South Kurdistan. In addition to this, Curzon listed the issues 
needed to be paid attention to the British and French consensus. 
 
According to Curzon,284 it was not possible for the entire region called 
Kurdistan to gain mandatory status whether it be only a British mandate or French 
mandate or a common mandate between the British and French, for the region called 
South Kurdistan must be excluded. Although it was rational to sustain a symbolic 
Turkish government in the region called as Kurdistan, but no compromises would be 
                                                          
281 Perinçek, Kurtuluş Savaşında,  p.44. 
282 FO 371/4193, 1426. 
283 Bulut,Sedef, Paris Konferansı'nda Şerif Paşa'nın Faaliyetleri ve Doğu Anadolu Ahalisinin Durumu, 
(Ankara,1998), p.53. 
284 Şimşir, Kürtçülük, p.400. 
102 
 
made. The Kurds could not be considered as independent in Armenia. Kurds must be 
left free to have their own government or establish loosely connected small regions. 
According to Curzon, if Turkish interference with the Kurds were prevented, the 
Kurds could be free to make their own choices.285 Kurds must be secured against 
Turkish attacks but they must not officially be assigned French or British 
counsellors.286 
 
2.10 Declaration of the National Pact (28 January 1920) 
 
The National Pact that would be the main objective of the ‘National Struggle’ 
covered the Ottoman borders when the Mondros Armistice was signed. During the 
National Pact negotiations, the Erzurum and Sivas Congress decisions were adopted 
in the Ottoman Parliament. Thus, the boundaries of the national and indivisible 
Turkish homeland were drawn definitely. Moreover, in the treaties with foreign 
states, the acceptance of the National Pact would be a precondition.  After identifying 
the decisions of the National Pact, it was announced that it would be possible to hold 
a referendum to determine the legal status of Kars, Ardahan, Artvin, Batum and 
Western Thrace. Furthermore, it was accepted that the future of Arab lands would be 
determined by the votes of the people living there. Although this decision would the 
cause the danger of establishing an Armenian State in the region, the idea of the 
Mustafa Kemal was different.  It can be claimed that General Harbord’s 
investigations was taken as a reference by the National Forces leaders to prove the 
population of the East Anatolia was predominantly of the Turks.287 According to the 
report of Harbord there was no Armenian majority anywhere and anytime in the 
region. In this context, the National Pact's decisions288 showed that the Anatolian 
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movement would not allow the establishment of an Armenian or Kurdish state under 
any circumstances in Anatolia. 
2.11 Report of Garbett on the Kurds (30 January 1920) 289 
 
Mr. C.C. Garbett, in his report on 30th of January 1920, provided further 
information on Kurdish activities; that representatives from both the Ittihat ve 
Terakki Cemiyeti and the Istanbul Kurdish Party met with Şerif Pasha in Switzerland 
in the second week of January. Furthermore, he stated that these representatives also 
organised meetings with Sayyid Taha, Simko and other Kurdish leaders in the region 
defined as Kurdistan. If this information is correct it means a significant point had 
been reached with regard to procuring the cooperation of the Kurds.  
 
Garbett, who defined the determination of a Kurdistan policy as a vital 
requirement, and suggested that the idea of establishing the anticipated Kurdish state 
in the north should be closely pursued, considering the issues mentioned above. 
Garbett also recommended that Urfa and Diyarbakır stay under French dominance; 
Southern Kurdistan, the region to the south of Zab, needed to be under British 
authority; and Central Kurdistan should be established in the remaining region up to 
the Iranian border. According to him, the realisation of the formation anticipated in 
this plan would please the Kurds with regard to the Iranian border. Garbett claimed 
that the most contentious issue would be the definition of the Armenian border; 
however, the agreement of Şerif Pasha and Boghos Nubar Pasha in Paris would be 
the key instrument in resolving the issue.  
Garbett asserted that if his recommendations were to be accepted by the 
British government, this would result in a Treaty, and, after imposing this upon the 
French government, this would provide the Kurds with an opportunity to build their 
own administration and system within the defined geography. 
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For Garbett, although the dream of the Kurds Party was to capture the 
administration of Central Kurdistan with the help of a foreign state, this was 
impossible. He claimed that the future of the Kurds living in the region he defined as 
Kurdistan would take different paths; however it would become an inseparable part 
of a whole. According to him, each Kurdish state would maintain good relations with 
their neighbours, after defining their own territories and they need to limit the 
influence of the dominant states where the Kurds lived, and thus the central Kurdish 
government would be established by itself.  
 
The Kurds considered this aforementioned plan dangerous. Just as Major 
Noel did, Garbett, too, exercised the right to speak on behalf of the Kurds and 
asserted that the Kurds were afraid that they would lose their lands when the Turkish 
State’s lands were shared by Allied Powers. Again, according to Garbett, the Kurds 
wished for a united Kurdistan under the protection of an external power. Their desire 
was so powerful that, they longed for a united Kurdistan even if it was under a 
powerless Turkish dominance. According to the Kurds who thought that the 
foundation of a united Kurdistan would provide the Kurds with self-expression, the 
system to be formed by the British was threatening the ideal of a single and united 
Kurdistan.290 
 
In his report, Garbett claimed that the Kurdish groups had two aims. These 
were the recognition of the Kurdish nation, and protection for the Kurds whose 
governance was still in its infancy. This nationalism was built, not on the relation 
between the south and the region called central Kurdistan, but on the assurance of 
continuity and communication between Urfa and Diyarbakır. The dream of the Kurds 
was the foundation of a central government which controlled the tribes and gave 
them quite broad rights in their own territories, but this was to be administered via an 
external power. According to Garbett’s claim, the Kurds knew that neither the British 
nor the French would take on this kind of responsibility. Their abstaining from such a 
responsibility could cause the idea of a united Kurdistan to stagnate and die. 
According to Garbett, the Kurds wished for a united Kurdistan under the protection 
of an external power. According to the Kurds who thought that the foundation of a 
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united Kurdistan would provide the Kurds with self-rule, the system to be formed by 
the British threatened the ideal of a single and united Kurdistan.  
As Garbett reported,291 the Turks offered the Kurds an autonomous Kurdistan 
system under the Ottoman sultanate, where the Kurdish representatives would take 
their places in the assembly. In this offer, it was anticipated that the administrators, 
the gendarmerie forces and civil servants would comprise the Kurds. It was decided 
that a fair amount of the income obtained would be spent for Kurdistan, and a small 
amount would be sent to the central government of the Ottoman Empire. The Kurds, 
while being free to accept foreign consultants from other states for some particular 
matters, the system to be formed would still remain an absolutely inseparable part of 
the Turkish Empire. According to Garbett, if the aforementioned plan was supported 
by the United Kingdom, the Turks promised to quickly repress the rebellions that had 
started to emerge against the British. Garbett stated that the Turks thought that, in 
this way, the anti-British movement, not only in the region but also in India, would 
be significantly reduced. 
 
In the present situation, even though the opinions of the Allied Powers 
favoured founding an independent Kurdistan, the Kurds continued their plots 
together with the Turks. Garbett claimed that there would be severe problems with 
border security, as in the example of the murder of the five British officers. So, in a 
sense, Garbett did not trust the Kurds. 
 
According to Garbett, Britain should accept that the region, defined as 
Kurdistan, should no longer be left to Turkish administration. He indicated that this 
acceptance required the immediate recognition of the Kurdish nation and the 
determination of a policy to be followed in the future; and especially emphasised that 
it was not possible for the British to establish an administration in the region defined 
as Central Kurdistan, without spending money and men.292 
 
It is seen that Garbett discussed the details of the system to be established if 
his predictions came true. According to him, the official language of the Kurdish 
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state formation should be Kurdish; the rights of the minorities should be protected; 
and a democratic establishment should be aimed at by forming Kurdish gendarmerie 
forces with local officers. Parallel to these developments, first the Kurds should be 
encouraged and when they had the power to form a confederation, France should 
allow the establishment of this union.  
 
Garbett thought that the suggested solution would absolutely be accepted by 
the Kurds; and the French would not object to these recommendations since 
economic concessions would be granted to them. However, he indicated that the 
largest obstacle to this schedule to be realised was slow action. He emphasized the 
necessity for quick action since the spread of Turkish activities among the Kurds was 
also rapid. There could not be a more appropriate period for these recommendations 
to be realised; and he claimed if it was missed such an opportunity would not become 
available again.293 
 
When the document is analysed in detail, it is seen that some of the 
recommendations contradicted the recommendations made by Major Noel, and some 
of them overlapped with his. Against the recommendation made by Major Noel, that 
major money and men losses would be prevented by the establishment of a central 
structure and by utilising the local leaders of the region he defined as Kurdistan, 
Garbett promoted the idea that it was impossible to realise these recommendations 
without spending money and men. However, a consensus, between Garbett and 
Major Noel, was achieved about the significance of the recognition of the Kurdish 
identity in the establishment of this structure. Although different opinions were 
asserted about these issues, it can be seen that some measure of Kurdish autonomy 
was in Britain’s interests in the region.  
 
In the meantime, related to the negotiations made with the Kurds Admiral De 
Robeck relayed the details of interviews between him and some Kurdish leaders who 
introduced themselves as sole arbiters on behalf of the Kurds in the telegram he sent 
to Lord Curzon on 3rd of February 1920.294 As it can be understood from the 
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document in the meeting the issue of relations between Kurds and Armenians was 
discussed. When Admiral de Robeck stated the necessity to fix the problematic 
Kurdish - Armenian relations, the Kurdish committee had at first showed negative 
reaction. 
 When Robeck mentioned the Paris Peace negotiations on establishing 
independent Kurdish and Armenian states in the Ottoman territory, the reaction of 
the Kurds changed.The Kurdish committee asserted that the Kurds had no problems 
with the Armenians and the Kurdish- Armenian relations were at an extremely 
satisfactory level. The Kurds stated that they would not object to being the neighbor 
of the Armenians. Şerif Pasha was asked about his ability to represent Kurds in Paris 
and his brother, who was on the committee, declared that there was no reaction (in 
the areas where the Kurds lived intensely), against Şerif Pasha for being 
representative of the Kurds. The delegation stated that they did not want to live 
together with the Turks anymore. It is claimed that, the reason of the some Kurds 
being loyal to Turks was to fend off the Turkish pressure. The committee also 
claimed that they have more influence than the caliph on the Kurds.295 As Webb 
detected successfully, at that time the influence of the representatives of the Kurdish 
separatist movement on the Kurds and the influence of the caliphate could not be 
compared. As it can be seen in the other British reports296 the Ottoman caliph had 
much more influence than the Kurdish separatist movement leaders on the Kurds.  
 
It can be claimed that this group was far from being sole spokesmen on behalf 
of the Kurds, because they were not even represented in the Kürt Teali Cemiyeti in 
Istanbul. The reaction of Sayyid Abdulkadir can be shown as a proof of that claim. 
Sayyid Abdulkadir, referring to the enmity between the Kurds and Armenians, stated 
his opposition to the declaration which was issued by Şerif Pasha and Boghos Nubar 
Pasha in February 1920. Sayyid Abdulkadir stated that such an agreement was 
unacceptable when 500,000 Kurdish were killed and expressed that they wanted an 
autonomous structure, although they were brothers with the Turks.297  
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A report was prepared on the security of Christians living in Turkey on 11th of 
March 1920.298 In the report the information about Sayyid Abdulkadir and Kurds was 
shared. Kurds and Armenians came to an agreement in December 1919 on the 
establishment of a non- nationalist autonomous structure under the leadership of 
Sayyid Abdulkadir. That came to mean that the plans of the Kurds, who were 
thinking to act in concert with Turks, failed. 
 
But interestingly, the information which Hohler shared with London, on the 
non-existence of such an agreement as mentioned above, had not been mentioned in 
this session. It can be claimed that it has two possible purposes. The first one is to 
keep the expectation that 'Kurds and Armenians would find the lowest common 
denominator' alive; the second one is to prevent the tendency of Kurdish interest 
towards Muslim Turks with whom they have lived together peacefully for years. In 
addition to the above given information it was indicated that Sayyid Abdulkadir had 
visited the İstanbul Embassies of America, England and France many times during 
the Paris Peace Conference, and negotiated with them on the creation of a self-
governing Kurdistan, but he was not given much support, except by Britain.299 
 
Curzon saw only the Turks as erroneous and he wanted a policy which 
secured Kurds without assigning counsellors to them and without detracting from 
their roles in British policy. The basis for Curzon’s decisions was the Mosul-Kirkuk 
oil fields but this was perfectly camouflaged. However, the most interesting parts in 
Curzon’s post were his commands to secure the Kurds and his emphasis that 
Kurdistan and Armenian issues must not be assessed as independent from each other. 
 
These suggestions and ideas of Curzon’s were discussed on 13th of April 1920 
in the Interdepartmental Middle Eastern Affairs Committee meeting. In this meeting, 
Curzon, who criticised Talbot Wilson, clearly stated that the promise of Kurdistan 
for Kurds must be postponed completely. Curzon said that postponement of the 
Kurdistan issue did not mean Iran and Turk dominance over the region as Wilson 
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thought, and as a matter of fact England would not have enough financial power to 
sustain its invasion in Iraq. In the meeting both the ideas of Curzon and Wilson were 
discussed and in order to find a middle way, R. Vansittart’s suggestions which would 
form the basis of Articles 62nd, 63rd and 64th of the Sèvres  Treaty in the future were 
accepted.300 
 
2.12 Report of William Rupert Hay 
 
Hay, who worked in Mendeli, Koi Sanjaq and Erbil as a deputy political 
officer and political officer between the years 1918 and 1920, published his 
memories about this period in 1921 in London with the title Two Years in 
Kurdistan.301  
 
He believed Kirkuk to be the main region where the Turkish population was 
high and stated that the Turkish population in Kirkuk was around 30,000 before 
World War I.302 This information is important because it verifies the general Turkish 
thesis on Mosul and Kirkuk. According to the Turkish annuals303 the majority of the 
population in these regions was Turkish; so the region should be kept under the 
Turkish rule. 
 
It is interesting Hay stated that the Turkish, Arabic and Persian states would 
be demolished once the Kurds unite.304 Hay, who believed that the Kurds would not 
be able to live in a modern and democratic order, stated that the Kurds could only be 
managed by force.305 I believe that if the information he provides on the warrior side 
of the Kurds is true, it would shed light on the importance of the military forces of 
the tribe. According to Hay, Kurds were guerrilla fighters and they were good at 
attacking military stations by ambush. When faced with a force that was equal or 
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higher in strength than theirs, they would show no resistance and run away to the 
mountains. The fact that they were ready to make peace after a short struggle and to 
continue fighting once they were back on their feet was a great advantage during the 
times of war.306 Hay probably wanted to put emphasis on the warrior side of the 
Kurds by stated that unless the tools to keep the Kurds under control were in place, 
the Kurds could have become Britain’s most dangerous enemy, as it was mentioned 
in many British reports.307 
 
In Hay's report, there were certain suggestions concerning the determination 
of the British policy. Hay stated that if the required conditions were fulfilled, 
agriculture would improve and with efficient use of the water resources in the region, 
irrigated farming and thus cotton and sugar cane production would be possible. 
Furthermore, if methods of agriculture were to be improved the region’s productivity 
would increase one hundred per cent, compared to previous years products by 
production.308 Hay clearly provided these details for a reason. Thus, I believe that it 
is a fair assumption that Hay wanted to emphasize the high tax revenue that might be 
obtained by Britain in this region.   
Rupert Hay, who met Major Noel on 7th of November 1919, stated that with 
Noel's assignment in the area and his orders concerning assigning Kurds to the 
positions previously occupied by the Turks being followed, the aim was for the 
Kurds to gain experience in government. 
 
According to Hay, thanks to a general amnesty the relations between the 
Kurds and British would be strengthened to Britain’s benefit. In order to be favoured 
in the region, certain activities such as improving the poorhouses in various 
provinces, putting key personnel in the region on the payroll309 including men of god 
and families of people who had died or were held captive in war, respecting the 
feelings of the people in the region on holidays and wishing them a merry holiday, 
                                                          
306 Hay, Two Years, p.75. 
307 Hay, Two Years, p.77. 
308 Hay, Two Years, p.107. 
309 Hay, Two Years, p.319. 
111 
 
and restoring religious student dorms in an attempt to be liked were carried out.310 
Here, it can be concluded that British administrators and managers who were aware 
of the importance of gaining the approval of the people in the region utilized all 
means to establish these fundamental aspects of British policy. 
 
2.13 The Invasion of Istanbul and Abolishing of the Ottoman 
Chambers of Deputies (16-18 March 1920) 
 
The Ottoman Parliament was annulled on 21st of December 1918 by Sultan 
Vahdettin and new elections ordered in accordance with the demands of the British. 
At the end of the elections, the last Parliamentary Assembly could only hold its first 
meeting on 12th of January 1920. 
With the gathering of the Ottoman Parliament, the Allied Powers thought that 
the national movement in Anatolia would be destroyed or be weakened. They also 
intended to facilitate the implementation of the peace treaty by controlling the 
parliament. However, the adoption of the National Pact by the representative 
committee (28th January 1920) would have nullified the expectations of the Treaty 
States. Then they started to pressurize the Istanbul government. Ali Riza Pasha, who 
could not stand this pressure, resigned on 3rd of March 1920. Ali Riza Pasha was 
replaced by Salih Pasha as the Grand Vizier. Sultan Vahdettin made it possible for all 
members of the government to be elected out of parliament, under the pressure of the 
Treaty of Agreements. 150 Ottoman intellectuals were arrested on 15th of March 
1920 and then Istanbul was occupied by the Allied Powers on 16th of March 1920 
and the Ottoman Parliament was by forcibly disbanded on 18th of March 1920 and 
parliament members were exiled to Malta. 
The protest notes to the representatives of the Allied Powers in Istanbul, to 
the United States political representative, to the foreign ministries of the neutral 
states, to the parliaments of France, England and Italy were sent by Mustafa Kemal 
Pasha. It was announced that the communication between Anatolia and Istanbul were 
cut off. Sending of correspondence and even taxation to Istanbul was forbidden. 
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Financial funds and all money in the government offices were recorded and 
confiscated by the National Movement. It was ordered to capture the Ankara-Pozantı 
railway and to arrest foreign troops on that route and other foreign officers and 
soldiers who serve in Anatolia. Under the direction of this order, officially the head 
of the British Armistice Mission in Erzurum, Lieutenant Colonel Rawlinson, and 
about 20 English people accompanying him were arrested by Kâzım Karabekir 
Pasha. 
2.14 San Remo Conference (19-26 April 1920) 
 
After World War I, an international conference was convened in San Remo, 
Italy between 19th and 26th April 1920 to share the Ottoman soil and to prepare the 
conditions of the Treaty of Sèvres to be signed with Turkey. The British Prime 
Minister Lloyd George, French Prime Minister Alexandre Millerand, Italian Prime 
Minister and representatives from Japan, Greece and Belgium participated in the 
conference. The conference discussed the sharing of the lands of the Ottoman 
Empire, which had come out of war defeated, and the sharing of the Middle Eastern 
oil; and the final form of the Treaty of Sèvres was determined.311 
Prior to the gathering of the San Remo Conference, the focus was on the 
question of the sharing of Mesopotamian oil. This attitude proved that the great 
powers were trying to achieve the highest national interests, and they were also 
looking for a mandatory state, away from the political, military and economic 
difficulties of the Armenian question. The British, French and Italian representatives, 
acting in the hope of meeting in an agreed text, had the first session of the San Remo 
Conference on 18th of April 1920. 
In the first meeting held in San Remo, Lloyd George suggested discussing the 
subject of Kurdistan.312 Then Lord Curzon took the floor and said that the solution 
was very hard and the region was attractive for European states since it was near 
Armenia and related to Assyrian-i Keldani Christians. He also announced that South 
Kurdistan part of the Mosul province would be under the mandate of the Britain; the 
French and British governments would be able to patronize some parts of the country 
but neither state wanted to take this responsibility. According to him, it would be 
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best to separate the country from the Turks and give autonomy to this country. Also 
Curzon stated that it was hard to foresee what the Kurds wanted and how they would 
provide a balance if they were given autonomy as a state, Curzon said that he 
personally understood the demands of Kurds; but following investigations in various 
places such as İstanbul and Baghdad, he claimed that it was not possible to find a 
Kurd whose representative credentials were widely accepted. According to him no 
Kurd would be able represent anyone except his own tribe. Even if Şerif Pasha 
volunteered himself as a representative of the Kurds, no one recognized him in this 
capacity. On the other hand, Curzon claimed that the Kurds give the impression that 
they could not survive without a powerful state behind them. 
As Lord Curzon declared if Kurds did not accept the auspices of England or 
France, they would revert to the auspices of the Turks, and it would be hard for their 
region to be split from Turkey. Since Kurds lived in the mountainous areas which 
were in the Mosul province, the region in South of Kurdistan was important for 
British interests in the event of the establishment of an independent Kurdistan. The 
Kurds in Mosul would leave and be included in a newly founded Kurdistan.  
At the end of the meeting this subject was left to be decided by England and 
France and they gave a break in the session in order to discuss the topic later.313 
When that session of the conference was over, ‘Revised Article for Kurdistan’ was 
prepared in the appendix of the meetings numbered 5.314 This draft was accepted as 
articles 62, 63 and 64 of the Sèvres  Treaty.  
Another meeting was held in San Remo in order to implement a trilateral 
treaty to the mandatory region.315 In this meeting the subjects generally related to 
‘South Kurdistan’ and problems related to the Mosul province were handled. Lord 
Curzon said that they were ready to accept not referring to domains in Kurdistan in 
the trilateral meeting and for him the only region England would request would be 
Sulaymaniyah and its surroundings which were an unbreakable part of Mosul, and 
England would never claim economic privilege in any other part of Kurdistan. Lloyd 
George interrupted him and said that as a result of this situation England would never 
hold any responsibility for providing security in the region. 
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Upon Barthelot’s question about the British requests and what the North 
borders of the Mosul province would be, Curzon stated that these borders would be 
the most recent borders of the Mosul province.316 This trilateral treaty, different from 
the one prepared in London, may be claimed to be prepared according to two 
assumptions. First, the autonomy of Kurdistan and second its being independent in 
the future. 
It is mentioned in the introductory part of a very secret record of the trilateral 
treaty draft dated 23rd of April 1920 ‘states in question accepted the necessity of 
Kurdistan’s being immediately or in the future independent and it would be better to 
clear away international competence for this issue in order to provide the necessary 
help this country will need in governance and to encourage development of this 
country.’317 In contrast to this, as it can be understood from the context of the treaty, 
this draft was established on the basis of protecting the interests of the countries in 
the question and solving the problems between them. This draft had presented 
nothing more concrete than promises of support for a Kurdish State. According to the 
trilateral treaty accepted in the conference; west of Tigris was given to France in 
compliance with the Sykes Picot treaty.318 Borders of Kurdistan were described as 
“East of Blue Region,319 South of South border of Armenia320 and North of North 
Iraq border. A Kurdistan autonomy plan was to be prepared by a commission to be 
gathered in İstanbul as it was later decided by provisions in the Sèvres Treaty. This 
plan was to include Nestorian and Keldani and other guarantees for saving other 
ethnicities and minorities in the region.  
The Kurdistan borders determined in the Conference firstly excluded some 
Kurds in Iran and the North. The Kurds in the South, who did not want to join the 
Independent Kurdish State, would be excluded from the State’s borders. Also it was 
declared in the conference transition from autonomy to independence was not a 
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necessity. Finally, due to the common draft, Kurdistan would be divided into the 
three regions in regard to economic and political domains.321  
Thus, the provisions relating to Kurdistan which appeared in the Sèvres 
Treaty, took their final version in the San Remo Conference. But these decisions 
were taken in fact under the effect of diplomatic cunning, implied words and recent 
conditions. On 24th of April 1920, Lord Curzon spoke to the Istanbul High 
Commissioner De Robeck during the Peace Treaty and stated that local autonomy 
plans were being drawn up for the regions where the Kurds were the majority.322 
After stating that it would be inappropriate to announce this to Damat Ferid Pasha 
and Sayyid Abdulkadir before the Turks, Curzon has explained that he was trying to 
avoid conflicts with the Kurds and if such a situation was to occur, Kurds would not 
refrain from killing each other. The concern here was the chaotic environment this 
situation would cause. Also it can be claimed that these decisions are known to have 
disappointed the Kurds, given their conception of Kurdistan. These decisions taken 
by allies may be claimed as the reason why Şerif Pasha decided to resign from 
representing the Kurds in the Paris Conference on almost exactly the same days.  
 
In the San Remo Conference, it was decided that the Ottoman Empire should 
abdicate all her rights over Arab soil in Asia and North Africa, and an independent 
Armenia and an autonomous Kurdistan would be established. It was also decided for 
two A-type mandates to be established on the old Syrian lands of the Ottoman 
Empire, and Syria and Lebanon be left for French dominance and Palestine for 
British mandate. The A-type mandate administration anticipated that the states in 
question would be recognised as independent, and would stay under that mandate 
until they reached sufficient political maturity to self-govern. 
 
Also, to gain French support, an oil convention was signed between Britain 
and France in the conference. With this convention, Mosul was ensured to be 
included in the British Mandate of Iraq, and a 25% share was to be given to France 
from Iraqi oil, and oil transportation conveniences to be provided.323  
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The most significant aspect of this convention for Britain was the inclusion of 
Mosul into the British Mandate of Iraq being established with the treaty, which had 
been thought to be left to France in the Sykes-Picot Treaty.324 It can be claimed that, 
the London Conference in February 1920 and the San Remo Conference in April the 
same year provided the Kurds with autonomy before the Treaty of Sèvres .325 This 
policy was later shaped with the Articles 62nd to 64th of the Treaty of Sèvres .326  
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CHAPTER 3  
 
THE TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ERA 
(TGNA) 
 
3.1 Opening of the Turkish Grand Assembly (23 April 1920) 
 
As mentioned before the National Pact had been adopted with unanimous 
approval in the Ottoman Parliament. The decisions of the National Pact were 
declared to public opinion on 17th February 1920.  Ali Rıza Pasha’s Cabinet was 
considered responsible for these developments and because of the pressure on him 
Ali Rıza Pasha resigned on 3rd March 1920. After Ali Rıza Pasha’s Cabinet, one of 
the short-lived governments, Salih Pasha’s Government was formed on 8th March 
1920. Salih Pasha was requested to condemn the National Forces but he had good 
relations with them therefore he did not want to condemn them. During his 
governance Istanbul was occupied by the Allied Powers on 16th March 1920 and 
most of the the Ottoman Parliament members were exiled to Malta.327 Salih Pasha 
was unable to cope with pressure of both Ottoman Sultan and Allied Powers 
anymore so he resigned on 4th March 1920. Despite his apparent failure Salih Pasha 
has taken place in history as occupied capital city, whose resistance to the occupiers 
contributed significantly to the Turkish resistance process which resulted in the 
opening of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. 328 
On 5th April 1920, Damat Ferit Pasha’s Government was formed. The 
Ottoman Parliament was officially closed on 11th of April 1920 by the sultan. Upon 
these developments, a new National Assembly was established in Ankara on 23rd of 
April 1920 with the participation of the deputies who could escape from the Ottoman 
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Parliament raid. However, this parliament, which was established in Ankara, would 
not be able to use its representation for a long time and would not be accepted as a 
government agency by the Allied Powers.  
Among the most important characteristics of the first period of the Grand 
National Assembly of Turkey is the fact that it has been operating under 
extraordinary conditions, it was a revolutionary council, and it was not based on the 
principle of separation of powers. Mustafa Kemal, who was the president of the 
Parliament, was also the head of the executive at the same time. 
In addition to its duties, the Parliament had democratic and parliamentary 
characteristics. The TGNA was a revolutionary council with extraordinary powers, 
as well as a constituent assembly so the Turkish resistance was managed by 
parliamentary system. 
The main activities during the period of the First Grand National Assembly 
(April 1920- April 1923) were:  The law of treason was adopted, the Independent 
Courts were established for the trial of the rebels, and the rebellions were suppressed. 
In West Anatolia, a regular army was established mainly against Greek forces. With 
the victories in the eastern, southern and western fronts, a large part of Anatolia was 
freed from occupations. 
Moreover, after the opening of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, 
especially good relations with Russia were tried to be established. As we know, 
during the First World War the Bolshevik revolution took place in Russia and Russia 
had to withdraw from the war. Russia did not want the Allies, in particular Britain, to 
gain power thanks to the economic gains and geopolitical positions from the 
Ottoman state lands. Therefore, Bolshevik Russia wanted to establish good relations 
with the Turks. Bolshevik Russia wanted to establish good relations with the Turks. 
The Parliament sent a note to Russia on 26th April 1920, inviting them to recognise 
the Ankara Government and asked for help to expel the imperialist states from 
Turkish territory, from Anatolia. In response to the note from the TGNA, Soviet 
Foreign Minister Georgy Chicherin reported that Russia recognized the National Pact 
and suggested that diplomatic relations be initiated. This rapprochement drew 
reaction from the other nations and worried about the Bolshevik threat. This can be 
seen the reports of the British officers. In the report prepared by Andrew Ryan for 
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the İstanbul High Commissioner,329 it was said that Hamdi Pasha, the First Lord of 
the Admiralty, came to the Office of the İstanbul High Commissioner and offered the 
support of the Kurds against the Bolshevist movement in Iraq. It is noted in the 
report that Hamdi Pasha said that the Bolshevist movement posed a threat both for 
Iraq and for the territory defined as Kurdistan, and that Sayyid Abdulkadir and 
himself would go to Mosul to prevent this situation. The basic principles of Sayyid 
Abdulkadir that it was important to suppress the Kemalist movement and prevent the 
growth of Bolshevik influence on the Turkish National Forces and Anatolian people 
was supported by Ryan. The Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire Damat Ferit Pasha 
carried Sayyid Abdulkadir's basic doctrine to the next stage and had offered to use 
Kurdish support to prevent and repress the progress of the Kemalist movement. 
When the report is examined it is clear that the most important part of Hamdi Pasha's 
demand was the realization of Kurdish unity with the British help. However, to repair 
the fragmented structure of the Kurds and to use Kurds against the Kemalists were 
considered as very difficult. This was a quite realistic approach. In a way, with this 
report, the İstanbul High Commissioner had realised the power of the rising national 
struggle in Anatolia and had to confess the difficulty of using Kurds against Turks.  
It can be said that the most important part in Ryan's report330 was the one 
related to Kurdish solidarity. According to the information given in this part, the 
solidarity of the Kurds in the Alexandrian Gulf and between Caucasus and Iran was 
not what the British desired. It was emphasized that if Bolshevists started to move to 
the inner parts of Mesopotamia and Iran in the beginning of 1921, a Kurdish alliance 
with the British might be an important element in preventing that.  A special part had 
been left for Sayyid Abdulkadir in the report, in which Hamdi Pasha's character had 
been mentioned as “shifty". It was emphasized that if Bolshevists started to move to 
the inner parts of Mesopotamia and Iran in the beginning of 1921, a Kurdish- British 
alliance might be an important precaution. Ryan indicated that there were two 
different tendencies among the Kurt Teali Cemiyeti. He categorized them as a group 
represented by the pro-autonomous group led by Seyit Abdulkadir, and the group in 
a pro-independence line represented by Emir Ali Bedirhan. 
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On 29th December 1920, Sir Horace Rumbold sent a message to Lord Curzon 
which was entitled ‘Kurdistan and Bolshevist Menace’.331 In the document it was 
emphasized that Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the leader of Turkish movement started in 
Anatolia, who regarded Mesopotamia as a redeemable part of Turkey, and claimed it 
as a Nationalist needed to be treated carefully. It was claimed that the Kurdish 
leaders in İstanbul, particularly Sayyid Abdulkadir, were ready to fight against 
Mustafa Kemal. But it was necessary to be cautious in this regard because there was 
no solidarity between Kurdish leaders.  
 
 
3.2 Treaty of Sèvres (10 August 1920) 
 
The Treaty of Sèvres is one of the First World War’s most controversial 
treaties. Despite the signing of a peace treaty with Germany332, Austria333, 
Bulgaria334 and Hungary335, the Allied Powers delayed to sign a treaty with the 
Ottoman State due to the disagreements among the Allied Powers. 
In fact, the real reason for the delay in the treaty was the disputes about the 
Allied Powers sharing Ottoman territory, especially disputes  between England and 
Italy arising from the giving of Izmir to the Greeks; and the situation of the 
Mesopotamian lands. Of course there were other reasons besides such as the 
potential reactions of the Turkish people to the Treaty of Sèvres. 
At the Paris Peace Conference convened on 18th January 1919, Allied Powers 
decided to break up the Ottoman State. During this conference it is possible to say 
that the objects of the disintegration of the Ottomans are seen as principles. 
Attending the San Remo Conference to be convened on 24th April 1920, Tevfik 
Pasha requested that the Allied Powers be sent a representative from the Ottoman 
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Empire to announce the articles of the agreement to the Ottoman State. He sent a 
letter to Damat Ferit Pasha on 17th May 1920. According to him, the Ottoman 
Empire would be a colony through this agreement and it was impossible to sign a 
peace agreement without changing the terms of the agreement. On 22nd April 1920, 
the Ottoman government was invited to a peace conference to be held in Paris. The 
Sultan sent a delegation to Paris under the presidency of the former Grand Vizier 
Ahmet Tevfik Pasha. The next day, the Grand National Assembly, gathered in 
Ankara, announced that, with a letter which was sent to the foreign ministries on 30th 
April 1920, a separate government from Istanbul was established. Tevfik Pasha 
stated that the peace conditions were unacceptable to an independent state and gave a 
memorandum to the Conference delegation and returned to Istanbul.  
Meanwhile, the Greek forces, demanded that the agreement take effect 
immediately, occupied Balıkesir, Bursa, Uşak and Nazilli on 22nd of June 1920. The 
Greek forces attacked the Ottoman lands as well through Thrace and invaded the 
land up to Tekirdağ. In this case, the Government of Istanbul decided to accept the 
treaty. Although this situation should be decided in consultation with the Parliament 
on the basis of the Constitution, since the Parliament was closed and disbanded, on 
22nd July 1920 the Parliament and the Grand Vizier convened the Parliament of the 
Chancellor for the initiation and acceptance of peace negotiations. 
32 states participated in the Treaty of Sèvres including America (as observer), 
England, France, Italy, Japan, Armenia, Belgium, Greece, Hejaz, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, the representative of the Ottoman Empire 
and other observers.336 It can be argued that the essence of the treaty was to 
determine how the Ottoman Empire would be break into pieces.337  
 
On these developments, Heyet-i Vukela (The Council of Ministers) gathered 
on 20th July 1920 recommended the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres. The Sultanate 
Council gathered in Istanbul, on 22nd July 1920, and in the meeting it accepted that 
signing the agreement was the only way for the Ottoman Empire to survive. 
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Therewith, the delegation of Hadi Pasha, Tevfik Bey and Bern envoy Reşat Halis 
Bey went to Paris and signed the Treaty of Sèvres  on 10th of August 1920. 
During a meeting with British High Commissioner Sir John de Robeck in 
Istanbul, the Grand Vizier Damat Ferit demanded Britain's help to fight against the 
Kemalists. After speaking with satisfaction with signing the Treaty of Sèvres, 
Robeck declared that after approving the agreement the British would help the 
Ottoman Government against the Kemalists.338 
This treaty, although signed by the Ottoman Delegation on 10th of August 
1920, took its place in the dusty pages of history as a stillborn treaty since it was not 
approved by the Assembly or Sultan Vahdettin. 
 
Erzurum, Trabzon, Van and Bitlis provinces and the territory where the Harşit 
River flows into Black Sea were included in the “Armenian State” founded 
according to Article 88-92 of the sixth part of Sèvres Treaty. Decisions about Kurds 
took place in Articles 62-64 of the Treaty. However, the relevance of the Articles 62, 
63 and 64 of the treaty to the Kurds, requires some evaluation, although the treaty did 
not enter into force.339First, let us quote the articles of the treaty340  that are relevant 
to our topic, and examine those.  
ARTICLE 62. 
“A Commission sitting at Constantinople and composed of three members 
appointed by the British, French and Italian Governments respectively shall draft 
within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty a scheme of local 
autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, south of 
the southern boundary of Armenia as it may be hereafter determined, and north of 
the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia, as defined in Article 27, II (2) 
and (3). If unanimity cannot be secured on any question, it will be referred by the 
members of the Commission to their respective Governments. The scheme shall 
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contain full safeguards for the protection of the Assyria-Chaldeans and other racial 
or religious minorities within these areas, and with this object a Commission 
composed of British, French, Italian, Persian and Kurdish representatives shall visit 
the spot to examine and decide what rectifications, if any, should be made in the 
Turkish frontier where, under the provisions of the present Treaty, that frontier 
coincides with that of Persia. 
ARTICLE 63 
The Turkish Government hereby agrees to accept and execute the decisions of 
both the Commissions mentioned in Article 62 within three months from their 
communication to the said Government. 
ARTICLE 64. 
If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the 
Kurdish peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to 
the Council of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of 
the population of these areas desires independence from Turkey, and if the Council 
then considers that these peoples are capable of such independence and recommends 
that it should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a 
recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas. 
The detailed provisions for such renunciation will form the subject of a 
separate agreement between the Principal Allied Powers and Turkey. 
If and when such renunciation takes place, no objection will be raised by the 
Principal Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion to such an independent Kurdish 
State of the Kurds inhabiting that part of Kurdistan which has hitherto been included 
in the Mosul vilayet.” 
 
Some ambiguous expressions attract attention in Article 62. Firstly, the 
borders of Kurdistan and Armenia were not certain. Some regions left by the 
Armenians years before and where now mostly Kurds lived ‘will not be inside the 
South border of Armenia which is to be decided later’ Thus, the North borders of the 
planned Kurdistan were not revealed. On the other hand, according to the prepared 
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autonomy plan, it is not certain under which state’s mandate Kurdistan would be. 
Whether it would be under the auspices of England or France or temporarily under 
the auspices of the Turks, or else an independent Kurdistan would be established is 
not certain. But in Article 64, separation possibility from Turkey is granted but it 
might be thought that temporary Turkish auspices could be possible. Also the 
speculation about future commission and plans in this article increases its ambiguity.   
Article 64 highlighted the challenges the Kurds must go through in order to 
gain independence. According to this, Kurds living within the borders drawn by 
Article 62 would need to show their desire to separate from Turkey and become 
independent within one year starting with the period which the treaty determined. 
But how this situation would be possible and to which degree it would have to be 
shown and who would decide this on behalf of the Kurds were left undetermined. In 
contrast to this ambiguity, if Kurds again wished to enforce this condition, they 
might apply to the League of Nations. After this, another challenge or condition was 
presented. Firstly the League of Nations would agree that this community had the 
potential to realize their aim to be independent and then support them realizing this. 
Under these circumstances Turkey would abdicate by following this advice. Of 
course it was not possible to understand why the most active member of League of 
Nations, England, would accept this request for independence although one year had 
passed since that treaty was signed and new balances for Near East were established 
and region was divided. Also when we take into consideration how attentively 
England followed the movements developing in Anatolia, the conditions presented 
within this Article might be thought of as something for gaining time. Apart from 
this, another subject for discussion is why England envisaged Kurds in Mosul being 
part of an independent Kurdish State despite giving so much importance to Mosul.   
It is seen that scholars adopted many different perspectives about the 
existence of a Kurdistan anticipated by Articles 62nd, 63rd and 64th of the treaty.341 
For instance, according to scholars such as Sherman342 and Jwaideh343, the Treaty of 
Sèvres  promised the Kurds an independent state; and this promise anticipated a 
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formation of autonomy first and then independence. According to scholars such as 
Hilmi344 and Cook, the Kurds could not make the best of the rights provided by 
Treaty of Sèvres’s and did not exactly understand what the treaty entailed. Albeit 
limited in number, scholars such as Lazarev345, Özalp346 and Kaymaz347 claimed that 
a promise for independence was not a matter for the Treaty of Sèvres, and the Kurds 
were deceived with this treaty. According to Olson,348 it was contradictory that the 
Sèvres Treaty presented an independent but disjoined “Kurdistan”. As we can 
understand from the treaty, large parts of Kurdistan would be included in Iran and 
Iraq. However, it is also contradictory that Kurdish leaders who supported an 
independent and united Kurdistan struggled to win the support of England. In fact 
this is another sign that Britain was in fact was not fully committed about founding a 
Kurdish State. 
Similar political targets can be seen in interesting comments in a telegram 
which was sent to London.349 According to this, the reason for founding such a state 
was to place a buffer state between Turkey, Armenia and Mesopotamia. It is evident 
that nationalist Kurds would not accept this. England’s aims were keeping Turkey as 
a powerless state in order to provide security in Mesopotamia. According to the 
telegram, Kurdistan’s independence depends on the condition of keeping Turkish 
nationalists powerless in order to provide security in Mesopotamia. In that case, if 
the British and the Turks agreed on the subject of Mesopotamia, there would be no 
need for such a Kurdish state.  Indeed, the foreseeing one year in this treaty was for 
understanding the tendency of the Turks, because as Yıldız also mentioned, 350 in fact 
the British and even all of the allies closely follow the actions of the Turkish people 
in Anatolia. The Allied Powers were determining their policy according to the 
reaction of the Turks. 
                                                          
344 Hilmi, Kurdistan, p.17. 
345 Lazarev, Emperyalizm, p.188. 
346 Özalp, ‘Tarihi Perspektifiyle’, p.7. 
347 Kaymaz, Musul Sorunu, p.139. 
348 Olson, Robert, Kürt Milliyetçiliğinin Kaynakları  ve Şeyh Said İsyanı, translated by, Bülent Peker 
and Nevzat Kıraç, ( Ankara,1992), p.49. 
349 Evans,Laurence, Türkiye’nin Paylaşımı 1916-1926, translated by Tevfik Alanay, (İstanbul,1972), 
p.276. 
350 Yıldız, Fransız, p.82. 
126 
 
According to the comments of Sasuni,351  the effects of the British and their 
long term aims draw attention. Since it was impossible to extend the Iranian border 
towards Malatya and Diyarbakır and dominate these regions, the British had to 
determine such a Kurdistan policy that the independency of the state was conditioned 
to time and circumstances and so they could continue their dominance over the 
region by means of the Kurds.  
When the articles of this treaty are considered, it can be argued that England 
made the promise of a Kurdish state with undefined borders on a small territory 
around Hakkari.352 However, it can be easily seen that the support to be provided for 
the Kurdish state was dependent on many conditions, especially when Article 64 of 
the treaty is examined. After all, a great number of ifs in the aforementioned article 
indicate that there were numerous problems in providing this support. The reality is 
that the victorious states sitting at the table in the Treaty of Sèvres , including Britain 
did not make any promise to give independence to the Kurds. Although the borders 
of a possible state were reflected on the maps, this was nothing more than a delaying 
tactic. Another aspect of the issue was that if the British really wanted to establish a 
state for the Kurds, why the Kurds living in Iraq and Iran were not positioned into the 
state as British officers had promised. 
 
In this respect, a few reasons for the victorious states’, including Britain’s, not 
wanting a Kurdish state in the region may be listed. The first reason is the 
distribution of the population. Turkish, Kurdish and Armenian people had lived for 
years in the mentioned region. The territories demanded by the Kurds coincided with 
the territories demanded by the Armenians; they put in claims for almost the same 
regions. As is understood from the activities of the Armenian lobbies especially in 
America and France, there was a heavy pressure on the great powers to establish an 
Armenian state in Anatolia.  
The main reason for failing to establish an independent Kurdish state after 
World War I was mostly hidden in the last section of Article 64, and is generally 
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overlooked. According to the last section of Article 64, "If and when such 
renunciation takes place, no objection will be raised by the Principal Allied Powers 
to the voluntary adhesion to such an independent Kurdish State of the Kurds 
inhabiting that part of Kurdistan which has hitherto been included in the Mosul 
vilayet." This article with its promise of an independent Kurdish state potentially 
conflicted with England’s presumed determination to create an oil-rich Iraq, 
including Mosul within it. 
Another reason was the success of the Kemalist movement in Anatolia in 
recruiting the Kurds to their cause. For we know that the Turks engaged in anti-
British propaganda activities which could be considered successful, especially 
around Mosul. For instance, as it would be remarked in the chapter 4.2, p.197, the 
organisations set up by Antep Militia Forces Commander Ozdemir Bey in Mosul on 
behalf of the Turks perturbed the British considerably. 
 
The use of the expression ‘independent Kurdistan’ in the Treaty of Sèvres  
should be considered as directly proportional to the Middle East order England 
wished to establish for her own interests.353 It can be claimed that Britain planned to 
achieve more than one aim with this promise. These aims were to cause conflicts 
between the Kurds and the Turks, to maintain the support of the Kurds who were 
living on rich oil reserves, and to limit, as much as possible, the potential areas of 
conflict during the establishment of the order they wished for in the Middle East. 
 
Some researchers wanted to legitimize the British occupation of the rich oil 
deposits in Mosul, after the Mondros Armistice was signed354, by basing their 
arguments upon the the treaty of Sèvres355. But this is an important mistake because 
the Treaty of Sèvres was not approved by either the Turkish National Assembly or 
Sultan Vahdettin. In other words, it was an unapproved treaty. 
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Although it was known by all historians that the treaty had not entered into 
force, some authors356  assessed the events which emerged after the Treaty of Sèvres 
as a missed opportunity for the Kurds to win an independent state. The Treaty of 
Sèvres was a chance for the Kurds to have their independent state, whereas the 
foremost deficiency of the treaty was not drawing a border between north Kurdistan 
and Armenia. Furthermore, it did not involve the western Kurdish zones,357 which 
the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 had allocated to France. Nevertheless, the 
western Kurds did not have any reaction for their exclusion with the possible Kurdish 
state.  
Nevertheless, as was stated by Yavuz358 this treaty had a phenomenon called 
the Sèvres syndrome, and a sensation that the Turkish territories would face a 
separation risk because of a potential independent Kurdish State. 
 
According to Kurubaş,359 almost all Kurdish leaders, especially Şerif Pasha 
and Sayyid Abdulkadir, positioned themselves on the Turkish side against the British 
by reacting to the borders and the establishment of the Kurdistan state outlined in the 
Treaty of Sèvres. It might be true that the aforementioned names had been 
disappointed; however, the possibility that they could have positioned themselves on 
the Turkish side over this is a matter that should be approached cautiously.  
 
Another issue about the treaty was the desire to change the treaty shortly 
afterwards even before the signatures on the treaty had dried. It can be claimed that 
not only the Turks but also the signatory states knew that the treaty had no chance of 
being implemented. Nevertheless, the promises provided by the Sèvres remained 
strictly deceptive in nature, as a lack of political will ensured that the terms of the 
treaty relating to the Kurds remained unstudied. However, we would not be mistaken 
in saying that, in the game played, the signatory states acted in a ‘what if it happens’ 
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manner; because, although it had not been long enough after the signing of the treaty, 
even Lord Curzon, one of the treaty’s masterminds, was obliged to state that the 
treaty could be changed. In fact, "Britain was the only one of the powers with more 
than a passing interest in seeing Kurdistan on the map." 360 It can be claimed that the 
main reason for the declaration of this statement was the success of the National 
Struggle in Anatolia and the fact that that struggle had not been defeated in a short 
time.  The Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) was also invited to the treaty 
talks just one day after the Ottoman government was invited to Paris. The TGNA 
issued a declaration saying that it was impossible to put into practice the provisions 
of the peace treaty which would be signed just with the Ottoman government without 
being approved by the Turkish Assembly. Furthermore, in the TGNA’s declaration, 
it was declared that if the Allied Powers want to sign a peace agreement with the 
Turks, it was obligatory to contact with the Turkish Grand National Assembly which 
was the sole representative of the country. Moreover, with a decision taken in the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara on 19th August 1920, those who ratified 
the Treaty of Sèvres and those who signed it were declared traitors.361 
 
The treaty did not cause the Turkish nation to drift into despair, but instead 
increased its struggle and determination. The treaty was legally void as it had not 
been approved by the Ottoman Parliament which was abolished by the Allied Powers 
after the invasion of Istanbul. It was not also approved by the TGNA because it was 
contrary to the National Pact and it was a threat to the independence of the nation. 
The TGNA had declared that it did not recognize the treaty. Also, in the TGNA 
meeting dated on 19th August 1920, signatories of the Sèvres Treaty were declared as 
traitor. Thus, the treaty became the only treaty that could not be put into practice 
after the First World War. 
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3.2.1 The Reactions to the Sèvres Treaty 
 
The Kurdistan plans that were finalized at the end of the San Remo 
Conference on 26th April 1920 were moved to the Sèvres Treaty. A prepared letter 
was presented to the Ottoman Empire on 11th May 1920 and the Turks were given 
one month to answer. The Ottoman Empire applied for a 15 day extension before this 
time finished. Meanwhile, Greek troops attacked on 23rd June in order to force 
acceptance of the treaty by the Turks. Tevfik Pasha, who was the head of the Turkish 
delegation in Paris, expressed his opposition to the treaty with the letter he sent to 
Damat Ferid Pasha on 17th May and emphasized the necessity for the change in the 
text.362 The İstanbul Government concluded their discussions about the letter of 
agreement on 25th June. The Allies presented a final version of the treaty on 16th July 
to the Ottoman delegation and their delegation answered on behalf of the 
government.363 According to their response, the Kurds had never wanted 
independence and would never want it. But if the people came up with the request 
for independence, the Istanbul government was ready to accept local autonomy. In 
the rest of the text it was suggested that since the borders shown in Article 62 did not 
comply with true race statistics and it claimed that some regions were populated with 
Turks when the Kurd population was dense there; particularly the provinces of Bitlis 
and Van and some parts of Mosul. If a conflict broke out about realistically executing 
‘the principle of nationality’ an international commission would have to investigate 
the situation. 
Upon this, the Allies gave an answer which served as an ultimatum to the 
Ottoman government on 21st July 1920. Although in the answer Kurdistan was not 
expressly mentioned, it was stated that the Allies had decided to save the regions 
which were not densely populated by Turks from the domination of Turks. It was 
also mentioned in the answer that the Istanbul government was given until 27th July 
to declare that the agreement was totally accepted. As a result of this, the Ottoman 
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Sultanate Council decided on the acceptance and approval of the treaty on 22nd July 
1920.364  
The Ankara Government which was founded on 23rd April 1920 harshly 
opposed signing of the treaty by the Istanbul Government. The Ankara Government 
saw Sèvres Treaty not as a Peace Treaty but as a War Treaty. The Allies, who 
understood from the harsh and strict opposition from Ankara government that the 
provisions of the treaty might not be implemented, tried to get on intimate terms with 
the Ankara government and moderate them. After this, England increased its contact 
with the Ankara government, but they decreased their interactions with the Kurds.  
The Sèvres Treaty was a complete disappointment for some Kurdish leaders. 
After the appearance of the treaty draft, some Kurdish leaders like Serif Pasha, lost 
hope in the British and took the side of the Turks.365 Serif Pasha was not the only one 
who was disappointed. Sayyid Taha met with Major Nalder and Captain Hay in Iraq 
in autumn 1920.  In these meetings Sayyid Taha demanded arms and ammunition to 
act against the Turks. However, the British rejected his demands due to the 
continuing rebellion in Iraq;366 therefore he was disappointed. Sayyid Abdulkadir, 
the head of the Kürt Teali Cemiyeti and former member and chairman of the Council 
State, was too, and so were, Cibranlı Halit Bey one of the old commanders of the 
Hamidiye Cavalries; İhsan Nuri, the  leader in the Bitlis uprising and Yusuf Ziya the 
Bitlis MP. Some Kurdish leaders sided with the Turks and supported the National 
Independence movement because of the dissatisfaction caused by the Sèvres 
Treaty367.  Consequently, one important aspect of the treaty for the Kurds was that it 
turned allegiance towards the Turks. It may be claimed that since Britain's 
Mesopotamia policy did not match the recommendations of Major Noel, Major 
Soane was appointed to conduct British relations, in May 1919 after the end of the 
war period. 
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3.3 Captain Ely Banister Soane and the Kurds 
 
Ely Banister Soane, who served after Major Noel, wished to establish a more 
authoritarian approach in his relations with Sheikh Mahmud, but could not reach an 
agreement with Sheikh Mahmud and responded aggressively to the events that 
occurred. 368 Some authors have argued that Soane and Sheikh Mahmud were 
enemies and the rebellion of the Sheikh was due to Soane’s authoritarian practices.369 
Soane’s greatest supporter concerning these interventions was A. Talbot Wilson, the 
Baghdad Civil Officer of Britain. Wilson, spoke highly of his actions, stating that 
Britain gained a lot with Soane being assigned in the region.370 Talbot Wilson stated 
that Soane was an officer who spoke perfect Kurdish and it was not difficult to 
mistake him for a Kurd due to his competency in the language and the authentic way 
he dressed.371  
  
It can be observed that apart from Soane’s many activities in Sulaymaniyah, 
he also ordered Kurdish to be accepted as the official language in the works of the 
local government. He published a Kurdish newspaper (Têgeyashtinî) in September 
20, 1920 and took the first steps for a British-Kurdish dictionary to be prepared.372 It 
can be claimed that the reason Soane ordered Kurdish to be accepted as the official 
language in Sulaymaniyah could be to encourage the ethnic identity of the Kurds.373 
Soane’s activities are extremely important as they reflect how multifaceted the 
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approach adopted by Britain was.374 During this time Soane received the support of 
many people in the region. His greatest helper was the landlord Babekr and Soane 
clearly talked about him. 375 
 
Based on his research and observation on the Kurds, Soane stated that it was 
highly probable that the Kurds were Eastern Europeans rather than Asians, based on 
their dances and lifestyles.376 Again, in Soane’s study titled ‘Mesopotamia and 
Kurdistan in Disguise’, it can be seen that his perspective on the Kurds was different 
to the views in the past, and that he rejected the view that they lived in the hills, that 
they were uncivilized, cruel traitors, and that he aimed to prove this point.377 
 
In his works Soane aimed to show that Kurds were good and Turks were bad 
people. He stated that the Turks have spread their terrifying rule in Diyarbakır, 
Mosul and Baghdad, like the other regions of the Empire. 378 It can be argued that 
this perspective was important as it reflected the mentality of the officers sent to the 
region from London. 
 
Again, the language Soane used in his work, showing Turks and Kurds as 
enemies, reflects his general perspective on the matter. An interesting example of 
this perspective can be seen in a story he tells about himself wearing a red cap. He 
stated that the Kurds started to keep away from him and argued that the main reason 
for this was their hatred towards Turks.379  
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3.4. Treaty of Alexandropol (Gümrü) (3 December 1920) 
 
For the first time in the Erzurum and then Sivas Congresses, the necessity of 
foreign aid was emphasized by the Turks. At that time, there were two foreign states 
from whom aid might be obtained. These were the United States of America and 
Soviet Russia. Russia was not directly interested in Turkey's interests, but the end of 
the Turkish War of Independence would affect them because the states occupied 
Turkish lands were also enemies of Russia. The failure of the Turks in the war in 
Anatolia would endanger of the security of the southern borders of Russia.  For this 
reason, Russia approached positively the Turkish requests for help. Moreover, the 
possibility of a Turkish-Russia rapprochement, which emerged in the late 1919 and 
early 1920s, was met with great concern in the UK. During negotiations of a Soviet-
British agreement in London in May 1920, Prime Minister Llyod George wanted to 
impose the condition of not helping the Kemalists but his request was rejected by 
Russians.380 According to the Russian officers, such as Mutischev, the Turks could 
play an important role in spreading the socialist regime. Since Turkish movement 
was fighting against imperalist powers so their success would be example of the 
success of the social revolution.381 
After the signing of the Mondros Armistice, the Ottoman State had to 
withdraw its troops from the Caucasus despite the clear provisions of the Brest 
Litovsk peace treaty. The Armenians, in support of the Bolshevik regime, occupied 
some parts of the Eastern Anatolia region in 1919. At the same time, the Parliament 
had sent a delegation headed by Bekir Sami Bey to Moscow. The delegation 
identified some aspects of the treaty between the TGNA and the Soviets in the light 
of the Brest Litovsk agreement. Positive negotiations were started between the two 
states on 20th August 1920. However, the treaty was abandoned when the Soviets 
wanted some of the territories belonging to the TGNA government in the Caucasus 
region to be given to Armenia. If the Armenians declared in favour of Bolshevism, 
they would be stronger with support of Russia so that they could try to invade 
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Eastern Anatolia.382After these developments, the Eastern Front Commander Kazim 
Karabekir invaded Gümrü by taking Kars, Sarıkamış, Ardahan, Batum, Artvin and 
Igdir, which were accepted as Turkish lands by the National Pact. On 22nd November 
1920, peace negotiations were launched in Gümrü. As a result of the treaty signed 
between the TGNA and Armenia on the 3rd December 1920, the on-going operation 
against Armenians in the east came to an end. Due to the treaty: the international 
agreements already made by Armenians against Turkey would be cancelled; treaties 
such as the Treaty of Sèvres , which were against the interests of the TGNA, would 
not be approved by Armenia; the Turkish and Armenian people living on the border 
of Turkey and Armenia would have equal rights. 
The Alexandropol (Gümrü) Agreement was the first treaty that the Grand 
National Assembly of Turkey signed with the Democratic Republic of Armenia in 
the international arena during the War of Independence. Thanks to the treaty signed 
on 3rd December 1920, Armenia became the first state to recognize the TGNA and 
the National Pact. The Eastern Front was closed with the treaty, where the soldiers 
and weapons were sent to Ankara. At the same time, it is a treaty which is accepted 
as the political and military success of the Grand National Assembly. 
 
3.5 The First Battle of Inonu (6-11 January 1921) 
 
The fact that the Turkish forces in Western Anatolia, when it came to the end 
of 1920, were dealing with the revolts initiated by Circassian Ethem provided the 
Greek government and Greek forces with a suitable military opportunity. The 
massive Greek military campaign launched on 6th January 1921 failed and the Greek 
forces went on the defensive on 11th January 1921. Upon this success of the Turkish 
forces, the British High Commissioner sent a letter to Curzon. In the letter it was 
reported that Mustafa Kemal was not a rebellious but a respected leader who needed 
to be taken seriously, and was supported by Turks and Muslims.383 This development 
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shows the British officers would recognize the National Forces as an interlocutor and 
want to keep in contact with the TGNA. 
The first success of the regular army established by the TGNA on the 
Western Front was the Battle of Inonu I. As a result the authority of the Turkish 
Government in Anatolia increased. The government gained confidence with the First 
Inonu War. As a result, the tax and military enforcement procedures could be 
implemented to a certain degree. The First Inonu Victory also increased the 
reputation of the new Turkish state in international public opinion. As a result, the 
Moscow Treaty with Soviet Russia was signed on 16th March 1921.384 The Allied 
Powers organized the London Conference to discuss the new situation that emerged 
after the First Inonu War, and the Turkish Grand National Assembly was also invited 
to the conference. 
 
3.6 London Conference (21 February – 12 March 1921) 
 
Over time, opinions about the Treaty of Sèvres had begun to change. The 
TGNA did not accept the Treaty of Sèvres, and sought to expell the Allies forces out 
of the country. During the National Struggle, Turkish forces stopped Greek progress 
in Western Anatolia and the National forces were successful against the French 
forces in the Southern Anatolia and the TGNA had initiated the Turkish-Soviet 
negotiations and the First Inonu Battle was won by the Turks.385 Following these 
developments in order to make some changes in the Treaty of Sèvres the Allied 
Powers decided to hold a conference in London, in which Greece and Turkey would 
also participate. 
At the end of the negotiations in Paris, the Supreme Council decided that 
representatives of the TGNA were required to attend this conference. It was stated 
that the Ankara Government should be informed by the Istanbul Government not by 
the Allied Powers.  The government of Ankara was informed by a telegram sent by 
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Grand Vizier Tevfik Pasha of Istanbul on 27th of January 1921. On 28th of January 
1921, Mustafa Kemal Pasha sent a telegram to Istanbul and stated that the conference 
invitation should be given directly to the TGNA by the Allied Powers.386 As a result 
of great discussions, the Government of Ankara was invited by Lloyd George to 
attend the London Conference via Italian Foreign Minister Sforza.387 
Apparently there were two Turkish administrations, one the Istanbul 
Government under the control of the England and the other the TGNA which was 
fighting for fully independent Turkey. Rumbold believed that he had to force the 
Istanbul administration to implement the ceasefire, and if this could not be done, the 
nationalist administration in Ankara would not accept the ceasefire.388 
The conference began and the Turkish delegates strongly opposed to requests 
that to make minor changes on the articles of Sèvres Treaty which were made by the 
Allied Powers. Turkish delegates declared that they rejected entirely the articles of 
the Sèvres  Treaty.Grand Vizier Tevfik Pasha, representative of the Ottoman 
Government, declared that the only delegate who had right to talk for the nation was 
Bekir Sami, who was the chief delegate of the TGNA. Then the Allied States had to 
make all kinds of negotiations with the delegation of the TGNA. The TGNA 
delegates informed the Allied States that based on the National Pact; they would not 
accept the Sèvres Treaty in any way. After the discussions, the London Conference 
disbanded without any decisions. 
 
The London Conference was an important diplomatic achievement in terms 
of formally recognizing the TGNA by the Allied States despite the failure to obtain a 
decision. The TGNA was now officially recognized by the Allied Powers. The 
TGNA succeeded in announcing the principles of the National Pact and the righteous 
struggle of the Turkish people to the world public.  
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After the London Conference, Winston Churchill389 sent a report, about the 
Kurds, to the Prime Minister Lloyd George on the 16th March 1921. In this report390 
he claimed that the practicability of the 62nd Article of Sèvres Treaty ceased. 
According to him an opportunity for Kurds living in that region to be united with the 
region called North Kurdistan was lost. Thus, Churchill stated that the existence of a 
Kurdish State was impossible as of March 1921. However, a short explanation is 
necessary here. The Kurdistan State expressed in Churchill’s post was Kurdistan as 
an independent structure, mentioned with North and South together. Otherwise, in 
Churchill’s mind, that autonomy might be provided to the Kurds in the Iraq border as 
a buffer state was always one of the alternatives of British policy.391 
 
Churchill continued his report392 pointing out that until March 1921 British 
policy was not only about Kurdish regions. Churchill stated that the Kurds would 
certainly oppose any British policy whereby they would be united under Arab 
domination.And according to Churchill, this opposition would not be limited to only 
opposing to Britain but also would cause more events to break out leading to Britain 
retreating from the region in the wake of much chaos and rebellion. Churchill 
advised that it was proper to provide an explanation, taking these issues into 
consideration, of recent conditions of Iraq and the Kurdish government which will be 
decided upon later.393 Churchill stated that benefits of a definite decision about 
Kurds’ living under the auspices of Iraq which would be under control of the British. 
He foresaw that this situation would result in Turkish dominance returning to the 
British region, while some Turks would retreat from some regions.394As can be 
understood from the sentence the aim of the British officials was not to help Kurds to 
establish a Kurdish state. Britain's aim was to undermine Turkish domination in the 
vicinity of Iraq and Eastern Anatolia and achieve British dominance there. 
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Except for the aforementioned comments, Churchill declared in his 
telegram395 to Cox that until England had decided its policy and events became 
clearer, the Kurd tribes must be stalled.396 Although the stalling of progress of 
National Independence in Anatolia left a question mark in people’s minds and  
Churchill asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whether a meeting would be held 
with the Ankara government to stop rebellions against England or not, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs found the policy of “wait and see” suitable.397  
 
3.7 Treaty of Moscow (16 March 1921) 
 
The Moscow treaty was signed between the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly and Russia on 16th of March 1921 in pursuit of mutual benefits. Following 
the withdrawal of Russia from the Word War One after the Bolshevik revolution, the 
Allies had reacted by beginning to occupy Anatolia. Allied Powers, as the enemies of 
both countries, caused the Turkish Parliament and Russia to get close to each other. 
Russia, who wanted to secure itself in the South and the Bosporus, went into a search 
a friendly country. 
Due to the victories of the Grand National Assembly against the Armenians 
and the Greeks, Russia regarded the Turkish Grand National Assembly as the 
country it sought. The two countries were close to each other, as the Parliament was 
struggling with the imperialist countries. For this reason, the Moscow treaty was 
signed between the Russian government and the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s 
delegation to Russia. By the treaty important decisions were taken and TGNA was 
officially recognized by a European country.  
According to the treaty, Russia and the TGNA would not approve an 
agreement that was not approved by the both sides. Russia would recognize the 
National Pact and would accept the removal of the privileges. It was accepted that 
the treaties signed by the Ottoman Empire and Tsarist Russia were null and void. 
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New financial and economic agreements would be signed with the TGNA and 
Russia. The Russian Parliament would accept the Turkish borders determined by the 
treaties signed by the TGNA with Armenia and Georgia on condition that Batum 
would be given back to Georgia.398 They also agreed that Turkey would use the 
Batumi port. A conference would be held with the states that had coasts on the Black 
Sea to open the Straits to the commercial vessels without jeopardizing Turkey's 
sovereignty in Istanbul. In addition to that, on 16 March 1921 People's Commissar 
for Foreign Affairs Çiçerin, declared that ten million rubles here would be given to 
the Turks to support Turkish economy but this promise was not kept.399 
3.8 Koçgiri Rebellion (6 March 1921-17 June 1921) 
 
This revolt which took place in Sivas, Tunceli and Erzincan regions was 
supported by Kürt Teali Cemiyeti. The forces of Alişan Bey (the leader of the 
Koçgiri tribe) began to control the Kangal-Zara region. In August, they attacked a 
military unit linked to Ankara. Then Alişan Bey Refahiye and his brother Haydar 
Bey took control of İmranlı. Mustafa Kemal Pasha tried to persuade Alişan Bey by 
explaining that the Erzurum Congress decisions included the Kurds and suggested 
that he be a Sivas deputy. Alişan Bey initially had accepted the offer, but after he met 
Baytari Nuri who was in charge of establishing the Kurdish State in the name of Kürt 
Teali Cemiyeti, he refused the proposal. After a meeting they decided to ask for 
some requests from the TGNA. They requested to the TGNA to approve the Sèvres 
Treaty and to establish an independent Kurdish state consisting of Diyarbakır, Van, 
Bitlis, Elazığ and Tunceli. In addition, they requested the release of the Kurds in 
Elaziz (Elazığ), Malatya, Sivas and Erzincan prisons and withdrawing Turkish civil 
servants and troops from the regions where the majority of Kurds lived. They also 
declared that if the TGNA would not accept their request they would act by force of 
arms. Rebels attacked a military unit that was following the fugitives, two regiments 
were sent to repress the revolt and the rebellion was suppressed in June 1921. This 
rebellion was important because its aim was to force the TGNA to approve the 
Treaty of Sèvres thus a Kurdish State that would be established. 
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3.9 The Second Battle of Inonu (23 March- 1 April 1921) 
 
In order to force the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres to be accepted by the 
Ankara Government a second massive military campaign was launched by the 
British-supported Greek Armies on 23 March 1921.400 The Second Inonu War 
resulted in the victory of the Turkish Army, despite the fact that the Greek forces had 
more ammunition and superior weapons.  
As a result, the victories against the Greeks in the Inonu Battles put the 
British into a difficult situation. By that time, support for the British attitude behind 
Greece, had begun to change and immediately the Allied Powers issued a declaration 
that they were impartial in the war. France de facto recognized the TGNA 
government and began to negotiate with its representatives. Thanks to the victory in 
the war people's confidence in the TGNA Government and its army had increased, 
and the spirit of national struggle has been strengthened. Italy gradually began to 
withdraw from Anatolia after the Second Battle of Inönü. 
 
3.10 Cairo Conference (12 – 25 March 1921) and Its Influence 
on the Kurdish Policy 
 
Winston Churchill attended the Conference held in Cairo on 12-25 March 
1921 and the chairman and the attending members of this conference were Sir Percy 
Cox, Miss Gertrude Bell, Colonel T. E. Lawrence, Major H. W. Young, Major E. W. 
C. Noel and Major R. D. Badcock.401 
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The agenda of the conference was to make decisions on the appointment of a 
ruler in Iraq, the determination of the position of British soldiers in the Middle East 
and the determination of the essentials for the British in this region and how to obtain 
them. Although it was not in the main agenda of the conference, the Sèvres Treaty 
and its regulations were subjected to evaluation. But the main issue was the future of 
the Iraq. In the conference, where Faisal was designated as the best candidate for 
being the King of Iraq and the decision to make this announcement was made,402 the 
4th session was reserved for the Kurdish issue.When the minutes of this session are 
analysed,403 we can see how British policy concerning the Kurds and the region 
called Kurdistan, as well as its future state was determined. 
 
During the 4th session404 carried out to determine the Kurdish policy of 
Britain, the final status of the Treaty of Sèvres was reviewed by the Britain’s experts 
on the Middle East Bell and Cox.405 In this framework, the suggestion to refrain from 
including the Kurds who lived in the southern regions of the state of Iraq was 
discussed. Percy Cox stated that the Kurds were entitled to some rights with the 
Treaty of Sèvres and that he personally dealt with the Kurds to gain these rights.  In 
addition to that, he stated that the position of the Kurds in British policies should be 
reviewed again as the one year term would have come to an end.406  
 
During the conference, it was stated that Kurds were the majority in Kirkuk, 
Sulaymaniyah, and the northern regions of Mosul, and that Kirkuk and Mosul were 
governed by Kurdish officers under the supervision of British consultants at that 
date. It was stated that Fettah Pasha was well received by the Kurds despite his 
Turkish nationality, when he was assigned as the governor of Kirkuk. He also 
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believed that the regions where the Kurds lived as the majority were an integral part 
of Iraq and that these regions should remain part of the country considering the 
economic benefits. After Cox explained that the people of Kirkuk wanted to take part 
in the elections to be held, like Gertrude Bell, he expressed the need for including the 
Kurds in the parliament of Iraq to be established with these elections. Cox admitted 
that he had serious doubts that the Kurds in Sulaymaniyah shared the same opinion 
with him concerning the issues discussed. It was claimed that if it was possible to 
talk about how willing the Kurds were to take part in elections, the Kurds in Kirkuk 
could be vested with the rights they were entitled to. 
 
Major Young stated that407 Kurds were waiting for the results of the elections 
to be held in Iraq before they expressed their expectations. It was argued that it was 
critical for the sustainability of British dominance in the region for the elections to be 
held as soon as possible. Moreover, it was emphasized that a Kurdish state 
established under the Iraqi High Commissioner’s Office should not be under British 
dominance but this responsibility should be undertaken by the government of Iraq.408 
 
During the meeting, in response to a question409 by Churchill, Major Noel 
conveyed that the Kurds believed that the promises made with the Treaty of Sèvres 
were not kept. Noel also stated that although the Kurds had not attacked the British, 
the British had started to retreat from the region. It was argued that if the retreating 
after continued, the Turks could even conquer the region up to Sulaymaniyah. Noel 
expressed the view that the Kurds wanted to be governed locally and autonomously 
and that they did not favour the dominance of an Iraqi government. Major Noel 
suggested the foundation of a Kurdish state against any potential Turkish activities in 
Iraq under these circumstances, and that a certain share of the revenues to be gained 
from Iraq could be reserved for the Kurdish, if customs requirements allowed.410 
Major Young commented that the situation with the Kurds was similar to the 
situation between Jordan and Palestine. It was because under those circumstances 
Jordan had been allowed to establish a local authority that the same solution was 
promised to the Kurds. As was also emphasized by Major Young, it was desirable for 
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Britain to keep the Kurds under control; 411 however, it would cause great problems 
for the British if a Kurdish state under British control was to be founded.412  
 
The meeting was also discussed whether the Kurds would agree accept to live 
under Arab dominance.413 In the meeting the most experienced person on the issue of 
Arabs was Lawrence. He took the floor and claimed that it was not possible for the 
Kurds to accept Arab dominance under any circumstances, and this would not even 
be achieved even if it was required by Arabs.414 Lawrence argued that the Kurds 
should not be entitled to a principality or autonomy, and instead of assigning two 
governors to the Kurdish regions, one would be a better option. Gertrude Bell 
objected to Lawrence's suggestion and suggested that Britain should wait for six 
months for all matters to settle; then it should be clear after this period whether it was 
reasonable to include the Kurds in the Iraqi government. Major Young stated that at 
that time that it was possible to capitalize on the situation. Preparations to establish a 
separate election region for the Kurds were on-going and it was not necessary to send 
British troops or Arabian forces to the region. If it was necessary to take security 
measures, it would be appropriate to utilize the Kurdish troops when taking such 
measures.415 
 
Churchill agreed with the suggestions put forward by Major Young. Churchill 
stated that financial support might be given to the important Kurdish leaders for this 
would increase the conflict between the Kurds and the Turks, and ensure the support 
of the Kurds in the order to establish a new order. Churchill stated that the Kurds 
would not to take part in the Iraq elections. Churchill argued that even if one member 
of the Serif family, who enjoyed good relations with the British, had agreed to the 
constitution and its requirements, there would always be the potential to cause 
challenging situations in the future. According to Churchill, it was possible that the 
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person to be elected, backed by the Arabic army, would have to put pressure on the 
Kurds to a great extent.416 In this situation, Britain would face new problems. For this 
reason, Churchill argued that considering these circumstances, establishing a buffer 
Kurdish state between the Turks and Iraq would be the best solution for British 
interests.417 
 
After Winston Churchill’s speech, Percy Cox stated that the tax revenue 
obtained from Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah for the government of these regions would 
be extremely sensitive. Cox claimed that it would be more favourable to wait instead 
of intervening in this situation and see how the Kurds would collaborate with Iraq 
and whether they would have good relations. 
 
When Major Noel was asked how he would draw the border between Iraq and 
the Kurdish regions, he claimed that it was necessary for the borders to be set at the 
foot of the mountains. He also asked if there were any articles in the Treaty of Sèvres 
concerning the future of Amedia, and if it was to be included in the British region. 
The chairman of the meeting, Winston Churchill, stated that the matters suggested by 
Percy Cox on Iraq and the Kurdish state to be established was similar to the relations 
between the South African government and Rhodesia. He emphasized that it was 
necessary to refrain from the appearance that the British policies were supporting the 
Arabs completely and the Kurdish were patronized, and that it was possible to 
establish two different Kurdish regimes in the regions of Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk. 
According to Churchill, the administrative structures in the region called Kurdistan 
and Armenia might work closely together and even found a single state in the future. 
The Baghdad Civil Government was assigned the task of governing the 
developments concerning a future Armenian-Kurdish state. 
 
In response to another question put by Churchill, Gertrude Bell suggested that 
Mosul should definitely remain within the borders of Iraq. However, Churchill stated 
that the idea put forward by Young about establishing natural borders could be the 
ideal option. Churchill ended the meeting by stating that Kurdish unity could be 
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achieved under the supervision of British officers and the chairmanship of Major 
General Ironside and Major Noel and that this matter could be discussed by a sub-
committee.418 
 
It would not be wrong to say that Cox and Bell exerted their authority in the 
Cairo Conference, because if the decision made is analysed, it was decided to leave 
the issue suggested by Cox to time; and the suggestion of Britain establishing a new 
system in places where the Kurds live was accepted.419Also the suggestions put 
forward by Cox against Churchill’s ideas of establishing a buffer state, could be due 
to the fact of his greater experience of the region. Cox was claiming that having 
Kurds in Iraq would always be a source of potential chaos, and this would give the 
British a chance to intervene any time they wanted. 
 
When the opinions expressed above are analysed, this conference manifests 
proof that Britain had given up the idea of a Kurdish state that they had promised as 
part of the Treaty of Sèvres. The Kurdish state suggested in the Treaty of Sèvres did 
not have clear and concise lines. When even Churchill’s suggestions to found a 
Kurdish buffer state made during the meeting, was not accepted,420 it would not be 
reasonable to believe that Britain still wanted to establish a Kurdish state after that 
date. Again, here the Sulaymaniyah government re-established by Sheikh Mahmud 
has a different position. This government established by the Sheikh was a temporary 
government seen as a way out of the challenges Britain faced. Britain had shown the 
strongest reaction when Sheikh Mahmud declared himself as the King of Kurdistan. 
The events and the documents clearly show that this period starting with the Cairo 
Conference proves that the ambiguous promises made with the Treaty of Sèvres were 
never meant to be kept. Here, it is also possible to conclude that Britain was 
detaining the Kurds by making uncertain promises in order to get their support for 
their policies on Iraq. It was decided to keep the environment ready for utilizing 
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Kurds when necessary, and for Arabs to remain in Mesopotamia, within the borders 
determined by the British, by establishing a solid British government in the region 
called Southern Kurdistan which was rich in oil reserves.  
 
As a result of both the discussions above and the decision reached in the 
Cairo Conference, the government of Southern Kurdistan was shaped.421 During the 
Conference it was decided that the Mosul military brigade would stay in the main 
region of Iraq; a system would be established for the brigade of Mosul under the 
supervision of British officers; the lower management in this brigade was to consist 
of both Kurds and Arabs; the Iraq High Commissioner was to be in charge of all 
assignments; British consultants were to be assigned to Erbil, Koi Sanjaq and 
Rawanduz; and Sulaymaniyah should be governed by a governor assigned by the 
High Commissioner who would assign a separate governor to Kirkuk. 
 
Churchill, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, expressed in his telegram422 
to the Iraq High Commissioner Percy Cox on 13th June 1921 that he had seriously 
pondered on the issues covered in the Cairo Conference but he still had not changed 
his mind. Thus Churchill still thought that it was possible to establish a buffer state 
between the Turks and the Arabs and this must be reassessed taking the reactions of 
the Turkish and the Arabs into consideration. 
When we analyse the telegram sent to the Iraq High Commissioner by 
Winston Churchill on 24th June 1921 about British government’s Kurdish policy, 
Churchill understood that it was realized that after Cairo Conference he acquired 
different ideas, and by mentioning this in his telegram, said that it was possible to 
reach a middle ground between the two suggestions made in the Cairo Conference.423 
Churchill, who built this middle ground according to the necessity of giving a firm 
decision in Mesopotamia, identified that this region could be developed in parallel 
with direct control by the Iraq High Commission.  
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Churchill declared that his decision concerning whether local levies    in 
Kirkuk must stay as part of the region or as part of Mesopotamia was to exclude 
Kirkuk local levies from Mesopotamia. Churchill stated that this was very 
advantageous for England and the aim was to found a buffer state composed of 
people who were not Arabic.424  
 
Churchill emphasized in the telegram that he was aware of local challenges, 
and wrote that he was opposed to the suggestions previously made by Cox since 
those suggestions included some issues that he could not accept. In his dispatch 
Churchill criticised Cox for not explaining about the second group of Iraq Kurds that 
were divided into four groups.  Churchill said that Erbil, Kirkuk and Kifri that had 
been invaded by England were not completely Kurdish or completely Arab. 
According to Churchill, when the military post in Kirkuk retreated, it left a structure 
in the region formed of British counsellors rather than Arab forces, and these were of 
the utmost importance for the protection of British interests.  
 
Churchill reported to Percy Cox that troops formed of non-Arab subjects 
under the direction of British officials, namely, Kurds, Turks and Assyrians were to 
be deployed on specified borders. Churchill reported to Cox that England must 
follow a ‘wait and see policy’ because he believed that if Faisal built an authority 
based on both Iraqi and British authority brought together, England would have a 
unique opportunity to have more control in the region. 425 
 
In this telegram426 Churchill also suggested possible borders from the 
Mashora Mountain to Tegana, surrounding Mosul and running across to Kala Neft 
near the Iranian border. Three independent regions were to be governed in this 
structure. According to Churchill’s proposals the borders of Sulaymaniyah province 
may be extended by including Kurd subjects in Middle Diyala located in North Kızıl 
Rabat; Arabs living in Kirkuk may be divided into two regions, Samarra and Mosul; 
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and each one must have a governor in contact with the Iraq High Commission and an 
British counsellor should be assigned in Sulaymaniyah and Kırkuk; an administrative 
structure by which the North regions could be controlled by Mosul under the 
supervision of an British counsellor must be established immediately in order both to 
promote a more efficient system and meet the needs of the Iraq High Commission. 
Churchill believed that his suggestions were the best available options for 
establishing British dominance over the region. These three regions mentioned in 
Churchill’s suggestions have a constitutional structure and would be immediately 
independent from each other. Churchill believed that a province formed in the region 
called South Kurdistan would play a central role in this system and in order to enable 
Percy Cox to connect with non-Arabs, a suitable official must be assigned. To help 
with developing interactions between Arabs and British Military Officers he would 
be assigned to Kırkuk or to a non-Arab region. It can be claimed that Churchill was 
expecting that the assignment of such a person would be very efficient in providing 
British dominance over the region. Also, Churchill must have thought that if his 
suggestion to exclude Sulaymaniyah was accepted, it would not pose a challenge to 
existing British policy. However, these suggestions made by Winston Churchill were 
not realized and no Kurdish buffer state was established.   
 
Cox’s correspondence with Churchill about the Cairo Conference between the 
dates 9-24 June 1921 discussed whether the Kurds must leave Iraq or not, following 
discussions about the Kurds in the Cairo Conference. Correspondence between Cox 
and Churchill continued until Cox’s idea of accepting Kurds as part of Iraq was 
accepted, a policy which was confirmed in 1922.427  
 
To sum up, for the most part two different opinions were discussed at the 
meeting: the first, represented by Percy Cox proposing, the Kurds' inclusion in Iraq; 
second, the independence of Southern Kurdistan, as expressed by Churchill. Both 
sides claimed that they offered a solution to the two issues: 1) to defend Britain's 
position in Mesopotamia and Southern Kurdistan in the long run; 2) to prevent the 
movements of Ankara towards Mesopotamia. Cox and Gertrude Bell - contrary to the 
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information given by other diplomats - suggested that Kurds outside Sulaimaniya 
region wanted to join Iraq. Churchill and the asistant secretary in the Middle East 
Department Hubert Young claimed that an independent South Kurdistan would 
balance the parliamentary government in Ankara on the one hand and the Arabic 
kingdom on the other hand, but Baghdad would be better suited for British interests. 
The decision in the Cairo Conference was to separate the administration of South 
Kurdistan from Iraq and to establish a separate state in the future. However, the 
decisions of the conference were not immediately implemented by the Colonial 
Ministry, which faced the election of Faisal as king in Baghdad and the 
establishment of a new colonial rule. Thus, Cox opposed to the decisions taken by 
the conference. He formed the British administration with officers who completely 
agreed with him. In October 1922, with the fall of Lloyd George's coalition 
government, Churchill would lose his position and decisions taken in the Cairo 
Conference would be completely ignored by Cox. 
 
3.11 Battle of Kutahya – Eskişehir (10 July-24 July 1921) 
 
The battle, between Greece and the forces led by the Ankara Government of 
the Turkish government, started with the attack of the Greek forces on 10th July 
1921.428 The Ankara Government forces had to withdraw to the east of the Sakarya 
River without losing the battle which ended on 24th July 1921. The Kütahya- 
Eskişehir War was the first and only military failure of the Ankara government. This 
situation caused the national struggle supporters to fall into despair for a short time. 
It was proposed to move the assembly to Kayseri. The ‘Commander-in-Chief Law’ 
was issued on 5th August 1921, as the seriousness of the situation necessitated 
immediate decisions. Mustafa Kemal Pasha was selected as the Commander-in-Chief 
by this law. In addition, the Assembly transferred all the powers to Mustafa Kemal 
Pasha.429 
 
                                                          
428 Baytok, Taner, İngiliz Kaynaklarında Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı, (Ankara,1970), p.139. 
429 TBMM (TGNA) Zabıt Ceridesi, V.12, 5 August 1921 Ankara, p.19-19., Yaman, Ahmet Emin, Türkiye 
Büyük Millet Meclisinde Büyük Zafer, Ankara Üniversitesi Dergisi, p.151. 
151 
 
 
3.12 Assignment of Faisal as the King of Iraq  
 
In accordance with the decision taken in Cairo Faisal was acclaimed King of 
Iraq430 with the approval and recommendations of Churchill, Bell, Lawrence and 
Percy Cox.431 Faisal ascended the throne on 23rd of August 1921 with the result of a 
96% yes vote from a referendum.432 Faisal, who started acting together with the 
cabinet he formed, implemented policies largely decided upon by England following 
their joint-treaty of 1922.433 Nearly all the expectations of the parties signing the 
treaty were met,434 since they signed the treaty with the belief that realizing this plan 
corresponded to endorsing an Arab nationalism.  
 
It may be said that developments starting with the establishment of a 
government in Iraq under the authority of King Faisal, negatively affected the 
mission of establishing a Kurdish state in the region. The suppressing of the Koçgiri 
Rebellion which started in Anatolia by the Ankara government was an example of 
another issue contributing to a real break down in the progress of founding an 
independent Kurdistan. Faisal’s opposition to splitting Kurdish regions from Iraq 
also affected this.  In contrast with this opposition Faisal never opposed having good 
relations with the Kurds and thought that the communication between Baghdad and 
the Kurds should be close because it would benefit Iraq. Believing in good relations 
was only based on protecting the unity of Iraq. Faisal in this context never allowed 
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Kurdish separatist movements. Also, except for the mission of protecting territorial 
unity, the fact that most Mosul Kurds boycotted the election during Faisal’s 
accession to the throne became one of the facts Faisal never forgot.435  
Cox, sharing the same idea as Faisal, thought that having local autonomy for 
the Kurds in Iraq was the best idea for British policy too. But another issue to be 
underlined here is Cox‘s suggestion of assigning British counsellors to this 
autonomous structure. And this may be explained as classical British policy which 
necessitates having far-reaching control in all matters.436 
 
Within the administrative structure shaped by Churchill’s and Cox’s 
suggestions, the places where Kurds were densely populated, especially I 
Sulaymaniyah and in Kırkuk, the idea of recognizing Arab domination was never 
approved.437 Their opposition could be understood from both the breaking out of 
rebellions and from their largely boycotting the referendum over the choice of Faisal 
as king.438 
 
During the period when Faisal was assigned as king, Percy Cox and Halil 
Bedirhan, were in correspondence. The letter bearing the signature of Halil Bedirhan 
and dated 28th of October 1921 is very important.439 Halil Bedirhan in his letter 
claims that Kurdish people who had refused to pay taxes for the last two years as a 
proof of not submitting to Turkish domination in the Dersim, Diyarbakır, Bitlis and 
Van regions, were waiting for the Bedirhan Family to put the Kurds together. Halil 
Bedirhan also declared that they, as the Bedirhan family, wanted to found a buffer 
state with the help of England under the mandate of England between the states of 
Arabia and Turkey. Halil Bedirhan, who issued a guarantee of living in security and 
peace for Christians and Armenians in this newly founded state, also had some 
requests from England. The first and most urgent of these requests was that military 
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officers like Major Noel must come to the region and arbitrate between the Kurds 
and British government, while the second request was for armaments, including 
machine guns and 5000 infantry weapons. Cox mentioned that Halil Bedirhan came 
to Baghdad and held negotiations there in November 1921. There is not enough 
information about which topics they talked about during Halil Bedirhan’s 
negotiations in Baghdad. But Cox’s opinion was not changed from the course of 
following events.440 
 
3.13 Battle of Sakarya (23 August - 13 September 1921) 
 
The Greeks wanted to make a final attack and go to the east of the Sakarya 
River and to occupy Ankara after destroying Turkish forces. Therefore they started a 
military campaign on 23rd of August 1921. The war lasted until 13rd of September 
1921. With the order of Mustafa Kemal, “there is no defence line, but a defence 
territory, and that territory is the whole of the homeland. Not even an inch of the 
homeland may be abandoned without being soaked in the blood of its citizens..." 
Greek forces were defeated. 
The Sakarya Battle was a war of live or death for the Turkish nation; In the 
War of Independence, destiny was determined. The war ended with the victory of the 
Turkish army. It was the last defensive battle of the National War of Independence. 
The enemy's attack power has been exhausted; the desire to seize the Turkish lands 
had been defeated and the homeland defended. This victory helped to the TGNA to 
gain power and new treaties were signed with Russia and France.  
3.14 Treaty of Kars (13 October 1921) 
 
After the victory of the Sakarya Battles resulted in the victory of the Ankara 
Government, the Treaty of Kars was signed on 13th October 1921 between the three 
Soviet Republic, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia and the Parliamentary 
Government represented by Kâzım Karabekir via Soviet Russia. According to this 
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treaty, all three republics regarded the Moscow Treaty as valid for them as well. 
Thus, the eastern border of Turkey became definitive and the Armenian Question 
ended.  
Because the problems of the East were solved completely for that period, the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly found the opportunity to concentrate on the west, 
where it was now able to achieve its goals more easily. Possible border problems 
with the Armenians were avoided. Since then, the treaty has not been altered, and the 
eastern borders have been preserved. The only article of the Treaty of Kars that may 
be defined as a failure was that Batum, which was accepted within the borders of the 
National Pact, was left to Georgia by making concessions from the National Pact 
principles.441 But this was a logical compromise in the name of politics and the idea 
of permanently solving the problems in the east in order to concentrate to the west. 
 
3.15 Ankara Agreement (20 October 1921) 
 
France had started bilateral relations with the Turks by signing a temporary 
truce with the TGNA 3 months before the Treaty of Sèvres  was signed.  The French 
sent Henry Franklin-Bouillon, one of its former ministers, informally to Ankara on 9 
June 1921. He met Mustafa Kemal, foreign minister Yusuf Kemal and Chief of 
General Staff Kazım Karabekir and engaged in negotiations. However, the French 
did not want to sign an agreement without seeing the result of the Battle of Sakarya. 
The victory of the TGNA in the Sakarya Battle also affected Turkish-French 
relations positively. And the Ankara Agreement was signed on 20th October 1921 to 
end the military activities on the Turkish-French Front. Departing from the original 
political decisions in the Treaty of Lausanne, the two sides agreed on the settling of 
the southern boundary of the territory under the TGNA administration. 
Thanks to the Ankara Treaty the military activities between French and 
Turkish forces were ended so the TGNA had an opportunity to transfer its military 
power to the Western Anatolia to expel the Greek forces from the homeland. With 
the Ankara Agreement, the Syrian border was secured. And for the first time a 
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member of the Allied Powers, France, accepted the National Pact. It was the 
beginning of the dissolution among the Allied Powers. 
3.16 Henry Rawlinson’s Report on the Kurds and the Reactions 
to this Report 
 
Henry Rawlinson prepared a report on the Kurds upon Churchill's request 
dated on 4th March 1922. This report is important in the sense that it explains the 
situation of the land unoccupied by the British briefly and succinctly. When 
Rawlinson's report is analysed, it can be seen that it focuses on three questions; how 
the politics of the Allied Powers was influenced by the combination of Turkish 
nationalist forces; to what extent Allied aims had been undermined by the changed 
situation in Turkey; what were the expectations and wishes of the Turkish 
nationalists regarding the peace agreement. 
 According to Rawlinson, it is not possible to answer these questions in one 
sentence. The reason was that the process initiated with the congresses held in 
Erzurum and Sivas were a complex, elegant and interwoven one. It is difficult to talk 
about a consensus amongst Turkish nationalists in the beginning. Similarly, the 
opinion of the Allied forces concerning the way the Ottoman land is to be shared 
after the war had begun to change as well. Just as developments such as the 
occupation of Istanbul and Izmir and the announcement of the Treaty of Sèvres 442 
caused the differences between Turkish nationalists to decrease, so the difference of 
opinion among the Allied forces started to increase.  
 
According to the report Rawlinson prepared, there were two main issues 
concerning Turkish nationalists that Britain has to deal with. The first issue was the 
mobility of the Turkish population; this population was a great advantage to the 
occupation of Kars by the Turkish nationalists and their attack against the Greeks. 
The second issue was growing liaison of the Turkish intelligence officers (trained by 
the Germans) with religious leaders in Iraq, Palestine and Egypt and with the 
revolutionary Muslim leaders in India.443 As the Allied forces were unable to reach a 
consensus, Rawlinson expressed his concern that the Turkish nationalists would take 
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steps to unite all Sunni Muslims from the Straits to the Caspian Sea; from Dagestan 
to Baku. 
 
It is important that to see one British officer confessing that the Turks still 
have power in above mentioned regions so Britain could have difficulties making up 
policies as the occasion demanded. This is important as it reflects how serious British 
concerns were, regarding what was waiting at the end of the road as the Turkish War 
of Independence continued. I believe that it would be wrong to assume that these 
concerns stated by Rawlinson related only to Britain. Developments have shown that 
after a while each Allied state failed to create a policy looking after their own 
interests and this caused the unity amongst them to fail. 
 
Rawlinson pointed out the policies for Britain need to follow to achieve its 
own political goals, if it would be necessary to follow a political path different from 
the one the Allies were on.  According to Rawlinson, a choice needed to be made 
between using force to weaken the Turkish nationalists or to follow a moderate path. 
According to Rawlinson, in order for Britain to achieve its goals, it should not be 
against Islam, should employ a wait and see policy, not spend too much money and 
follow a sustainable policy. 
Rawlinson believed that all four requirements would be fulfilled if the 
uncontrolled Kurdish population in the Eastern cities of Anatolia were to be taken 
under control. According to Rawlinson, it would not really be difficult to take the 
Kurdish population under control as they have managed themselves for years. On the 
other hand, as the Kurds had an advantage in terms of population in the Eastern 
cities, this could be used as a weapon against the Turks. Considering all these facts, 
he stated that it was possible to cause many simultaneous Kurdish rebellions and if 
this was achieved, the position of the Turkish nationalists would be weakened and it 
would be easier for Britain to achieve its goals within the region. Rawlinson’s 
proposal supports the thesis that British officers encouraged Kurds to revolt against 
the Turks.444 
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Rawlinson believed that producing many simultaneous Kurdish revolts would 
both help to weaken the Turkish nationalists and to ensure British interests in the 
region. According to him, to give arms and money, to each Kurdish tribal leader to 
trigger Kurdish revolts against the Turks would not be so expensive. The Black Sea 
coast, which would be bombed in the night by a British destroyer could be used to 
establish the British dominion over the region and propaganda activities would be 
made by spies in order to break Turkish resistance. Rawlinson stated that if more 
focus was placed on espionage activities on land, he would be able to show how 
weak the position of the Turkish nationalists was and the west and the east could be 
disconnected.445 
 
It may be claimed that the suggestion of Rawlinson was misguided. Because, 
the use of British destroyer to attack Turkish lands, to trigger Kurdish rebellion, 
would have provoked a strong reaction in the Muslim world. Also, even if a Kurdish 
rebellion would be triggered as a result of an attack, it would be expensive to 
manipulate this rebellion and this would make it less likely to maintain the rebellion 
within the limits desired. Also the idea of using a British destroyer to attack Anatolia 
would contradict the above mentioned criteria put forward by Rawlinson for Britain 
to achieve its goals. Also, this action could cause the Kurds and Turks to unite 
against Britain because of the religious sensitivity of the nations, and put Britain in a 
worse position.  
Rawlinson also made three important suggestions to the London government; 
the assignment of the Kurdish Eyup Pasha in Oltu as the governor of Erzurum, the 
assignment of Hussein Pasha of Eleskirtli as a manager in Kara Kilise and Bayezıt 
and encouragement of the Kurds in Dersim for a rebellion. When these 
recommendations of Rawlinson’s are analysed in detail, it can be claimed that they 
were the elements of the part of the ‘divide and rule’ policy.  
 
According to Rawlinson, an environment in which the Kurdish rebels could 
act freely would be achieved if the Pontic Greeks rebelled and the conflict between 
the Turkish nationalists and the government in Istanbul was used to advantage, as it 
was possible to occupy Erzincan at any moment.  
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The report of the Rawlinson was discussed in the meeting dated on 8th March 
1922 with the participation of Colonial Office Assistant secretary John Shuckburgh, 
Middle East officers Reader Bullard and Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen and 
military adviser T. E. Lawrence. The outcome of this meeting was presented to Sir 
Percy Cox, British High Commissioner of Iraq by John Shuckburgh. John 
Shuckburgh has also expressed to Cox that Rawlinson’s suggestion concerning a 
rebellion of the Kurdish population against the Turkish has been disregarded in the 
Colonial Office. However, Cox added an annotation that it would not be reasonable 
to completely disregard Rawlinson’s opinions and these should be reviewed again in 
the future. 
 
Lawrence had also prepared a report on the Kurds and Turks on March 
1922.446 In this report, Lawrence explained that manipulating the Kurds to act against 
the Turks would not result in stopping the Kemalist movement and those agents who 
were to provide guidance for the Kurds should be sent to the area immediately as in 
the Hejaz operation. In addition, Lawrence believed that the right decision would be 
to assign to office the candidates the Kurds themselves elect; and that this assignment 
needs to be handled with precision as it was difficult to access the regions where the 
Kurdish population lived, especially Dersim. It can be seen that Lawrence believed 
the idea of manipulating the Kurds with a warship, causing them to fall out with the 
Turks, and ultimately negatively affecting the Anatolian movement was far from 
rational. According to Lawrence, it was difficult to get the Kurds to rebel even if the 
conditions stated by him were fulfilled.  
Actually, when Rawlinson’s and Lawrence’s ideas are compared, it can be 
seen that Rawlinson approached the issue without any consideration of the region or 
the Kurds but Lawrence's approach was from a perspective that accurately defined 
the situations of both the Kurds and Turks. 
 
Lawrence emphasized that the economic aspect of causing a Kurdish 
rebellion should be analysed, considering the amount spent on the Arab revolt. In the 
report he stated that the British had to provide 8 ships, 50 British agents, £5 million 
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of capital and £16 million as cautionary reserves.447With this reminder, Lawrence 
concluded that a Kurdish rebellion would require even more pecuniary resources and 
the outcome of the rebellion should be analysed in detail. Lawrence believed that if a 
Kurdish rebellion was to be triggered, this should not only be about a conflict 
between the Turkish and Kurdish but should also include the Armenians and 
ultimately trigger a conflict between the Kurds and the Armenians. It can be seen that 
Lawrence tried to expand Rawlinson’s opinion by stating that only this kind of a 
conflict would ensure British domination of the region. 
 
Overall, the report of Rawlinson may be considered as an overview of the 
policies implemented by Britain until the beginning of 1922.  Although the plans to 
provoke the Kurds against the Turks in 1921-22, as explained in Rawlinson's report, 
caused heated arguments to arise from time to time, especially after the second half 
of 1921, the ideas of those who objected to Rawlinson gained more acceptances in 
British policies. It can be said that the reason why these ideas gained acceptances in 
British policies was the success of the Turkish nationalists in Anatolia, especially 
against the Greeks. It can also be argued that the treaties signed with France, Italy, 
Soviet Russia and Afghanistan was effective in this context.  
 
3.17 Cecil John Edmonds (1889-1979) and His Activities   
 
Cecil John Edmonds448 suggested449 the existence of two alternatives to the 
administration planned to be established in 1921 in the Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk 
region. 450  The first of them was to include Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah in Iraq with a 
unilateral decision, whether the people liked it or not; but it was anticipated that this 
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might cause some problems. 451 The second of them was to establish an indirect 
administration under the leadership of some eligible Kurdish leader who would get 
the support of the people and not easily be fooled by Turkish propaganda. Edmonds 
expressed an opinion within the context of this policy, that the Baban Family would 
not be a good alternative since according to him, although the family were popular in 
the region, even the doyen of the family did not know what Kurdish was and because 
of their only being concerned about the history of their family rather than political 
issues of the period.    
 
In his telegram to Major Noel and Captain Lyon on 2nd November 1922452 
Edmonds noted that Sayyid Taha had already stated his plans for reoccupying the 
Rawanduz and that therefore learning information about the total amount of his 
forces was important for the British forces. Edmonds mentioned that Sayyid Taha’s 
position would mean the British accepting his invitation to Erbil and him isolating 
himself from both Turks and Iranians. Most interestingly, Edmonds said that if 
Sayyid Taha and Simko were in contact with Turks and Iranians, it would not be a 
problem for the British since Sayyid Taha and Simko played an active role in the 
Kurdish policy of Iraq. Edmonds claimed that if the British did not make use of 
Sayyid Taha, he could claim the return of Mergavar, Tergavar and Urmiye from the 
British, since he was close to the Iranian government, and his British representative 
must be asked what he thought of the idea. When Edmonds asked Sayyid Taha 
whether Simko would settle in Merga or not, Taha said it was possible, but after 
learning that it was dangerous because of the existence of rioters in Merga, he 
foresaw that the best place for Simko would be around Erbil.  
 
Edmonds stated that the opportunity to use two powerful Kurdish leaders like 
Sayyid Taha and Simko was unlikely to crop up again and this twosome must be 
used for the benefit of the British.453 Edmonds’ views are useful for showing British 
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officials’ attitude to the Kurds. Edmonds spoke about Sayyid Taha saying that 
although he had never met with him, from British military officers’ reports about him 
being sober and moderate and having a modern mentality, he thought that Sayyid 
Taha would be the most suitable candidate for implementing that system.454  
 
Edmonds criticized the limitless powers over their tribes exerted by Kurdish 
Aghas. 455 Edmonds claimed that Sheikh Mahmud’s dissatisfied attitudes and actions 
caused him to rethink the idea to take back Rawanduz and referred to his anxiety 
about the possibility of the Sulaymaniyah problem flaring up again. He also 
commented on Goldsmith’s suggestion for Sheikh Mahmud’s being assigned to his 
old position again, saying that Major Noel shared his ideas with him, but since 
Sheikh Mahmut had a defiant personality, this suggestion would not provide positive 
results.  
 
According to Edmonds; it was easy to influence the Kurds of the South, 
because they easily ran or surrendered in the face of irresistible force. But if the 
troops sent to them were insufficient or indecisive, the Kurds might turn into a force 
that should not be underestimated. Indeed the Turks in 1918 and the British in 1919 
and 1922 experienced this reality. Edmonds believed that it took time to solve 
problems caused by tribes but that the way to success lay in quick response. If the 
problems were solved decisively at the beginning and immediately removed, small 
forces would be enough to provide security.456 After mentioning that using force is 
so important for controlling the Kurds but displaying force in the correct proportions 
was also crucial, he emphasized that any problem with Kurds might be easily 
handled if resolved at the very beginning but if too much time passed, it might turn 
even into a bloody feud.457 
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3.19 An Evaluation of the Allegations that the Ankara 
Government Gave Autonomy to the Kurds 
 
The birth of the claims that the Ankara government led by Mustafa Kemal 
Pasha gave the Kurds autonomy is based on a parliament session claimed to be held 
on 10th February 1922. It is understood that British Ambassador Horace Rumbold 
who was in İstanbul gave information about this session to Lord Curzon on 29th of 
March 1922.458 Also Robert Olson in his work called ‘The Emergence of Kurdish 
Nationalism and The Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925’459 provided information 
about a draft autonomy which was claimed to be prepared by TGNA, as a result of 
his research in British archives.460 According to the information presented by the 
aforementioned sources, the draft aimed at giving autonomy to Kurds was discussed 
in a closed session held on 10th February 1922 and was passed into law with 373 aye 
vote against 64 black ball. But researches in Turkish archives reveal that there was 
no session on the claimed date. For this reason the context of the draft which was 
claimed to be accepted by TGNA must be discussed in the light of the information 
presented in the British archives. The decision which was claimed to be passed into 
law may be summarized like this; 
 
TGNA accepted establishing a Kurdish autonomy. According to this, Kurdish 
leaders would be able to choose a governor general, deputy general governor and an 
inspector in places where mostly the Kurds lived. TGNA would decide whether these 
persons were to be from Kurds or Turks. TGNA would assign someone thought by 
the Kurds to have enough experience of administration to serve as a Kurd governor 
general for 3 years. At the end of this period, if the Kurds did not request an 
extension, a new governor general would be assigned. Although the TGNA would 
decide to assign a Turk or a Kurd for the deputy governor a general position, the 
governor general would be chosen by the Kurdish Committee. But appointment of a 
governor general, deputy governor general and inspector would be realized with 
approval of the Ankara Government. The Kurdish National Assembly would be 
founded for 3 years with a general election in the Eastern provinces. This parliament 
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would gather on 1st March for 4 months every year. If the parliament did not 
complete its work within this time, the time of the session would be extended upon 
request of the net majority of members. The Kurdish general assembly would have 
the right of supervising the income budget of the Eastern Provinces Administration 
and inquiring about injustices experienced by officials working under their 
administration. The Assembly would be the decision maker for resolving all 
conflicts. All these decisions were to be transmitted for the information of the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly. The Turkish Grand National Assembly would be 
the decision maker for solving all conflicts between the Governor General and the 
Kurdish Assembly. Both parties were obliged to obey the decision of the Assembly. 
Until the borders were decided upon by a mixed commission, the Kurdistan region 
would be formed of Van, Bitlis, and Diyarbakır provinces with some townships and 
districts of Dersim Shire. Jurisdiction organization in Kurdistan would be in 
compliance with local traditions for special regions. Half of this organization 
committee would consist of Turks; the other half would consist of Kurds. Any 
Turkish officials who resigned would be replaced by Kurdish officials. As of the date 
of enactment of this law, taxes under the name of war obligations or any other 
similar issues would not be levied. Taxes would be received once a year. The income 
tax to be paid to the Ankara Government would be decided by a commission formed 
of representatives coming from the TGNA and Kurdish National Assembly. A 
military unit would be established in order to provide security in the Eastern 
Provinces. The law regulating this military unit would be prepared by the Kurdish 
Assembly. But the main command post of the gendarmes would be administered by 
high ranked Turkish military officials until the date deemed necessary. Kurdish 
military officers and soldiers in the Turkish army would continue at their posts until 
peace was achieved but after that date if they wished, they would have the option to 
return to their own hometown. After peace, prices of all animals and materials 
collected from people during war or after war would be paid back to their owners 
within 12 months. Kurdish would be only used in the Kurdish Assembly, in 
governorate and government administration. Kurdish would be taught in schools. 
The first duty of the Kurdish Assembly was to found a university including 
departments of law and medicine. The Kurdish Assembly would not implement any 
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taxes without approval of the governor general and the TGNA. They would not give 
any privileges without consulting and getting approval of the TGNA.461 
 
There is no evidence that these articles were discussed in the TGNA. Robert 
Olson who made this claim shows British archives462 as evidence for his claims and 
gives no information about his making researches in Turkish archives. Some Turkish 
politicians and researchers who presented Olson’s claims explain the fact that no 
document was found in the Turkish archives relating to the issue due to the fact that 
there were many documents that did not come to light in the Turk archives. It is true 
that there are many documents that did not come to light but it would be better to 
approach this issue with suspicion until such documents do come to light. In addition 
to this, it must be mentioned that the official holiday in Turkey was Friday until 
1935, and the date when this draft was claimed to be discussed coincides with 
Friday. Making any session on that day is of low probability. A few sessions made 
on a Friday were because of a ‘state of emergency’ during the Turkish Independence 
War. To illustrate this, the “bill of law about creating a supreme military command 
position and assigning Mustafa Kemal Pasha to this position in order to transfer the 
troops faster” was accepted in the ‘closed session’ held on 5th August 1921, on 
Friday.463 Another possibility which comes to mind is the possibility that the date of 
the session on which the draft of autonomy law was claimed to be discussed was 
modified in British archives. In order to explain this, Turkish archive records were 
analysed but there is no information about Erzurum representative Salih Bey and 
Mersin Representative Selahaddin Bey taking floor in a session for discussing 
Kurdish autonomy in any record including the Turkish Assembly records. For 
example, in the closed session dated 6-7 February 1922 that these two representatives 
attended, “custom taxes for corn and corn flours to be imported to Black Sea 
harbours and cereals to be imported to Izmit Shire” were discussed. In the closed 
session dated 9 February 1922, budget law was discussed. In Turkey until 1935 legal 
holiday was on Fridays and 10th of February 1922 was on Friday so there was no 
session on that date. The next TGNA session held on Saturday 11 February, started 
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with the issues about people working as spies for Greece and then continued with 
budget talks. No other issues concerning Kurdish autonomy were discussed later that 
day. Further evidence to prove that no sessions were held in the parliament for giving 
autonomy to the Kurds is the implementation of a sequence number given for each 
session of the TGNA. In secret session minutes, the numbers of the sessions in 
question follow each other. For example, the session dated 9th February 1922 was 
numbered ‘Meeting 157’ and the session dated 11th February 1922 was numbered 
‘Meeting 158’ and there is no information about the existence of another session 
made between these dates.464 
 
Also it is claimed that 437 representatives claimed to attend the session in 
question, which was the number of members of the First Parliament on paper , who 
were in service between the dates 23rd of April 1920 -15th of April 1923 and it is seen 
in the records that on average only 365 people attended any session. Even if we do 
not take the number of representatives into consideration, since there were also 
Kurdish representatives among them, it is very interesting that none of Kurdish 
representatives talked this issue later or mentioned about this in their memoirs. 
Incidentally, another reference point of research claiming autonomy was 
given to Kurds by Ankara Government was an interview with Mustafa Kemal, the 
leader of Turkish National Movement, which was given in January 1923. In a press 
conference by Mustafa Kemal Pasha in 1923, in Izmit, his answer to Mehmet Emin’s 
question about the Kurdish problem is of utmost importance.   
“Those in our national borders are only a Kurdish majority in limited places. 
Over time, by losing their population concentration, they have settled with Turkish 
elements in such a way that if we try to draw a border on behalf of the Kurds we 
have to finish with Turkishness and Turkey, for example in the regions of Erzerum, 
Erzinjan, Sivas and Kharput, — and do not forget the Kurdish tribes on the Konya 
desert. This is why instead of considering Kurdishness in isolation, some local 
autonomies will be established in accordance with our constitution. Therefore, 
whichever provinces are predominantly Kurd will administer themselves 
autonomously. But, apart from that, we have to describe the people of Turkey 
together. If we do not describe them thus, we can expect problems particular to 
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themselves . . . it cannot be correct to try to draw another border [between Kurds 
and Turks]. We must make a new programme.”465 
Some researchers such as Bruinessen466 representing the separatist movement 
try to deduce from Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s words that Kurds must have an 
independent state but this is hard to deduce. Bruinessen supported the idea that 
Mustafa Kemal Pasha carried out his promise for autonomy for the Kurds but after 
the Turkish Independence War was over, he renounced these ideas. The claim for 
firstly promising Kurds autonomy but then renouncing it may cause Kurds and Turks 
to be hostile towards each other and Kurds who felt the psychology of being misused 
started separatist actions.  
 
 Considering the explanation from the perspective of the system foreseen by 
the 1921 Constitution, it must not be wrong to say that Mustafa Kemal Pasha did not 
foresee the autonomy as being for the founding a separate state, but the system in 
which mayors of the region were elected by the people of the region. In fact, when 
Mustafa Kemal held this meeting the 1921 Constitution was in force and he referred 
to the provisions of the constitution. Indeed, According to the article 10, Turkey was 
divided into provinces in the terms of their geographical location and economic 
situations, the provinces were divided into districts. Moreover, according to the 
article 11, provinces had legal personality and autonomy in regional affairs. 
According to the laws legistated by the TGNA, the administration of foundations, 
schools, education, health, agriculture, public works and social welfare were within 
the competence of provincial councils. However, Internal and external politics, 
shari'a, justice, military affairs, international economic relations and the general 
taxation of the government and the cases damage the beneficies of the other 
provinces were exception. The region would have power to make decisions 
autonomously in the above mentioned issues and they would implement such 
decisions autonomously. This was the potential system which Mustafa Kemal 
outlined in his interview. In this case to claim that 'absolute autonomy' was given to 
the Kurds would be the false evaluation. 
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3.20 Armistice of Mudanya (14 October 1922) 
 
At the beginning of 1922, the most important task of the national forces was 
to remove Greek occupation forces from Western Anatolia and Thrace and to 
establish peace according to the principles of the National Pact. In 1922 Mustafa 
Kemal attempted to obtain a bloodless victory before he made his last military strike. 
For this purpose, in order to come into contact with Allies again and to ensure a 
peace that was compatible with the principles of the National Pact, if possible, the 
Deputy Foreign Minister Yusuf Kemal Bey was sent to Europe in February 1922. 
The Sakarya victory (13th September 1921), in line with the positive results 
obtained from the outside political direction, provided positive political and internal 
results. After the Sakarya victory, Western states began to change their thoughts 
about Turkey and their attitudes towards the Greeks. Even the British, who always 
supported the Greeks, did not underestimate the Sakarya victory and saw that they 
would not be able to fulfil their wishes in Anatolia with the help of the Greeks. The 
British press also wrote that the first condition of peace was the withdrawal of the 
Greek army from Anatolia.467  
On October 3, the Mudanya Conference was opened. Ismet Pasha represented 
Turkey. On the other side were British, French and Italian representatives. Turkey's 
intended aim was to seize Eastern Thrace as soon as possible and to go to the peace 
conference but to keep Eastern Thrace out of negotiations. Despite the fact that most 
of the Greek army was destroyed in Anatolia, Allied Powers tried not to accept this 
Turkish superiority at Mudanya. Lloyd George stated that they would launch a war 
against Turkey if negotiations in Mudanya did not result by the following day. But 
actually the British, especially General Harrington were against war. The truce talks, 
where tense moments were experienced and which almost reached breaking point, 
were concluded on 11th October 1922 with an armistice. The Greek government did 
not want to accept a truce and had to sign the treaty on 14th October when it could 
not find the support it expected from Britain, France and Italy. Refet Pasha was 
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assigned by the Turkish Grand National Assembly to take over Eastern Thrace and 
establish a Turkish government in Eastern Thrace. Refet Pasha, who came to Istanbul 
on 19th October 1922 as a representative of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, 
was met with great interest and love. 
The main factors that forced Britain to announce an armistice with the TGNA 
were the fact that the Greek army had been heavily defeated by the Turkish army, its 
allies abandoned the occupation of Anatolia, the British army did not want to join the 
war during a turbulent period in Britain's internal affairs, and Mustafa Kemal's 
influence on the growing public opinion in favour of the Turks. 
With this agreement, Turkish dominance was regained in Eastern Thrace 
without fight, and the lands determined in the National Pact were recaptured to a 
great extent. The developments that resulted in favour of the Turkish side in the 
Mudanya Armistice were the end of the Turkish-Greek conflicts and the rescue of the 
Eastern Thrace region, but the government of the TGNA failed to establish the 
desired dominance over Istanbul and the Straits.468 
 
3.21 Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923) 
 
It is understood from the bargains made with the French during the Paris 
Peace Conference convened on 18th January 1919 that Britain had regretted leaving 
the region to the French after they had occupied Mosul. At this conference the 
French agreed to give Mosul to Britain, and established the mandate system over 
Syria, Damascus, Aleppo and Iskenderun. Also on 18th April 1919 an agreement was 
signed between British politician Walter Long and French Petroleum Products 
General Commissioner Henry Berenger. With this agreement, Britain decided to take 
Mesopotamia's mandate with 70% of its oil revenues while France decided to buy 
20% of its oil revenues and 10% oil revenue was left to local governments.469  
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However, France was uncomfortable with the sharing made and at the San 
Remo Conference France wanted 50% of the Mosul oil.  And finally, with the San 
Remo Agreement signed on 25th April 1920 France had 25% of its crude oil 
production and 25% of Mosul oil shares.470  
The border between Turkey and Iraq, especially the future of Kirkuk and 
Mosul, was one of the leading problems that caused the disruption of the Lausanne 
Conference talks. As mentioned earlier, Britain, who wanted to have oil reserves in 
the Middle East, invaded Mosul on 1st November 1918, just a few days after the 
signing of the Mondros Armistice Agreement of 30th October 1918. Thus, in 
Lausanne the hard discussions took place between the British and the Turkish 
delegations who claimed that Mosul was in their own territory when the Armistice of 
Mondros was signed. 
The Colonial Office believed that if 20% of the petroleum supply would be 
abandoned to the Turkish government, they would leave the Mosul province to 
Britain.471 Because of the decisive attitude taken by Ismet Pasha the Turks could not 
be persuaded about Mosul by Curzon. The issue was described as a failure of Curzon 
in the British Parliament and a campaign against Curzon was launched.472 While on 
the one hand attempts were made to overthrow Curzon in Britain, the British Foreign 
Office Undersecretary Sir Eyre Crowe wanted to communicate with the Turkish 
delegation on the Mosul issue without Curzon's knowledge and with Rickett's 
invitation to representatives of the Turkish delegation.473 Ismet Pasha, who realized 
that he could not agree with Lord Curzon on Mosul, wanted to settle this issue 
directly with the British government and sent two officers to London. After giving 
information about the contacts of the Turkish delegation, Andrew Bonar Law, the 
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (23 October 1922- 22 May 1923) stated that 
Britain did not want to fight the Turks for Mosul, especially without French support, 
and emphasized that there should be no London-based interruption in Lausanne 
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negotiations.474 Between 11th and 21st January 1923, a showdown took place between 
Curzon and Long.475 
Tension was also reflected in the conference and the Mosul issue started to be 
discussed by the Land and Military Commission on 23rd of January 1923 under the 
presidency of Lord Curzon. Since the results of the talks between Lord Curzon and 
Ismet Pasha could not be resolved, the subject was brought to the agenda in this 
session. Despite Ismet Pasha's claim that Kurdish and Turkish populations were in 
the majority, Lord Curzon summarized the reasons for appealing against the demand 
of leaving Sulaymaniyah, Kirkuk and Mosul to Turkey: There are many Arabs in 
Mosul province. The Kurds did not want to live together with the Turks, as can be 
seen from the events in 1914 Bitlis. The British government took responsibility for 
the Arabs after the Mondros Armistice, and the Arabs also were loyal to Britain. 
British armies having defeated the Turks in World War I gave Britain the right to 
conquer Mosul. 
The response of Ismet Pasha was clear. He claimed that in the Mosul 
Province, the Arabs could not demand that they were bound to Iraq because they 
were minorities. However, if such a request were made, Turkey would demand that 
this region be included in its territory because of the presence of a much larger 
Turkish population in the north of Baghdad. It was not true that the Kurds did not 
want to live with the Turks. The presence of many Kurdish deputies in the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly clearly demonstrated that Kurdish citizens were in great 
service during the War of Independence. Turkey thought that Iraq did not need the 
British mandate and that it was not aware of it, even if such a mandate had been 
given. In order to justify the capture of Mosul by the United Kingdom, the right of 
conquest was unheard of in this century. Geographically and politically, Mosul was 
an integral part of Anatolia.476  
As a result of the resistance of the Anatolian people to the Allied Powers and 
the Treaty of Sèvres by preferring death to implementation of the Sèvres Treaty with 
the catchphrase “either freedom or death”, the Treaty of Sèvres had never been 
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approved. The Treaty of Lausanne took the place of the Treaty of Sèvres as a victory 
of the Turkish resistance.477 The most important factor in the signing of the Treaty of 
Lausanne was the victories Turkish troops had won against the Greeks supported by 
the British. After all, this situation has been stated loud and clear in many studies in 
Western literature on the issue.478 
 
In the Treaty of Lausanne many issues, held over from the Ottoman Empire, 
were resolved. The liveliest debate, with regard to our topic, was experienced over 
the Mosul-Kirkuk issue.479 With regard to the Mosul-Kirkuk issue, one of the most 
important issues in the Peace Treaty, the local governors in Iraq requested from 
London the announcement of the fact that there were no plans to provide autonomy 
for the Kurds. Henry Dobbs, in a telegram sent from Baghdad, stated that such a 
declaration would provide a movement area in the Treaty of Lausanne.480 
 
When the scope of this thesis is considered, it is not possible to elaborately 
discuss here the debates in the Lausanne Conference. However, there are one or two 
issues which we are inclined to highlight. While Mosul-Kirkuk was the first priority 
for the British at the Conference, this was a secondary priority for the Turkish 
delegation. The critical statistics and the demand for a plebiscite brought to the 
Conference by Ismet Pasha were rejected categorically.481 
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The definition of minorities expressed in Lausanne encompassed the non-
Muslim citizens. 482 But the demands that within the Treaty of Lausanne to put the 
Kurds in the minority status was an intentional interpretation that aim at to damage 
the present order.483 The point that the Republic of Turkey had promised to protect 
the rights of the minorities, non- Muslim citizens, should be assessed with regard to 
this context.   
 
The statistics about Mosul, presented by Ismet Pasha at the Lausanne 
negotiations, were met by a serious reaction from the British, and mutual claims 
about vital data were formed to refute each other’s thesis and to occupy Mosul.484 
After evaluating the Treaty of Sèvres  and the Treaty of Lausanne Gunter 
expressed the view that the Kurds were deceived because the promises of 
establishing an independent Kurdistan, that promised in Sèvres  Treaty (1920), was 
abandoned in  three years with the signing of the Lausanne Treaty (1923).485 
 
Actually when both the Treaty of Sèvres and the Treaty of Lausanne are 
considered together, it can be seen that England did not clearly promise a Kurdistan 
state in the Treaty of Sèvres. Sèvres was a scheming study for establishing British 
dominance over the Middle East by setting the Kurds and Turks against each other 
over a promise for a Kurdish state in a geography with unclear borders and on an 
unclear date. The views we express here were not stated this clearly by Edmonds; 
however, Edmonds summarised the situation stating that the Treaty of Lausanne 
mentioned neither an independent Armenia nor an independent Kurdistan.486 
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Another important point about the treaty was the fact that Lord Curzon did 
not make any attempt other than Mosul-Kirkuk, in favour of the Kurds.487 Of course 
the attempt mentioned here was the definition of language right and some cultural 
rights as stated. However, it can be easily understood how the British could abandon 
some promises made in Sèvres, by looking at the attitude of the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs Lord Curzon, who served as the British representative at 
Lausanne.488 
 
Lord Curzon, giving a speech at the session on the protection of the 
minorities on 12th December 1922, while defending to the Christian minority in 
Turkey, considered the Muslims as a block; and handled the issue from a religious 
perspective. Lord Curzon did not make any mention of the Kurds, while he did 
mention Jews, Greeks, Armenians, and Nestorians.489 
 
The Turkish Government saw itself as a party to the protection of the rights of 
the Muslim minorities in the Balkans countries such as Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, 
rejecting the concept of a ‘Muslim Minority’ in the borders of National Pact490; and 
raised the issue about the Kurds during debates on the Mosul issue.491  
 
Dr. Rıza Nur, who represented Turkey in the subcommittee convened under 
the chairmanship of the Italian representative Montana, claimed that the principle for 
the protection of minorities should be considered on the basis of the European 
minorities. Also, it is understood that Rıza Nur stated that there were only the Turks 
and the Kurds in Turkey, and the fate of the Kurds was common with the Turks’; and 
the Kurds did not want to be in the minority status.492  
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Upon the acceptance of the articles about the minorities by all parties, Ismet 
Inonu, representing the Turkish government, stated that the minority rights would 
only be accepted with the condition that the Muslim minorities living in the 
neighbouring countries benefited from the same rights based on the same principles 
stated by the treaties recently signed in Europe. It is understood that this view of 
Inonu was a reflection of Article 5 of the National Pact. On the other hand, Curzon’s 
statement could be accepted as an attempt to form a conscious reconciliation with the 
Kemalist government by the British who approved the decisions of the National Pact 
in general. 
 
There were many concessions and privileges for the western states which had 
been obtained in Sèvres, but lost in Lausanne.493 However, this does not mean that 
they could not obtain anything they wished. The scope of this thesis does not allow 
for elaborating upon this point; because, Lausanne is a topic that should be 
considered all by itself. While the Lausanne negotiations continued, activities of 
Ozdemir Bey in Rawanduz and its vicinity disturbed the British.494 As a result of 
this, Ankara was constrained to select one of the two options: either the war would 
continue, and the consequences, including the loss of all the achievements up to 
1923, would be faced; or the road to some kind of compromise would be taken. 
When the facts of the period were considered, Ankara took a stand towards the 
second option. The conditions of the period were the most important factor in 
making this decision. It is possible to clearly see the reflections of this choice both in 
the Lausanne negotiations and the decisions made about Mosul-Kirkuk.495 
 
When the post-World War I years, especially 1922 and 1923, are examined, it 
is seen that the Allied Powers, including England, did not want to fight anymore. 
When the Turkish side is considered, it is seen that Turkey had got out of a ten years 
period of battle, starting from the Balkan Wars, continuing with World War I and 
which come to an end with the War of Independence. The army was in a very bad 
                                                          
493Brown, Philip Marshall, ‘From Sèvres  to Lausanne’, The American Journal of International Law, 
Vol.18, No. 1, J anuary 1924, p.114. 
494 Ali, The Kurds, p.522. 
495 Israel T. Naamani, ‘The Kurdish Drive for Self-Determination’, Middle East Journal, 20(3), 
Summer,1966, p.288. 
175 
 
condition. The troops would have to be transferred from the Western front to Mosul 
in case of a potential battle there. In such a case, İzmir and Trace would be exposed 
to another Greek threat. Also, it is thought that British intelligence was reading the 
telegrams between Ismet Pasha, Rauf Bey and Mustafa Kemal. It is understood that 
information was provided to Lord Curzon, by British intelligence, about the closed 
sessions at the National Assembly. It is also thought that the information stating that 
the Turks could not take the risk of a battle was transferred to the British authorities. 
On the other hand, it is understood that the Turks had no any information about 
whether the British and the French would risk a battle. Therefore, it can be argued 
that the Turks could not risk a battle.  
 
The Treaty of Lausanne, signed on 24th July 1923, has become a turning point 
for the Kurds during the period. With this treaty, the Kurds, in accordance with the 
demands of the Turkish delegation, were accepted as a part of Turkish society. 
Therefore, they would not benefit from the minority rights because they were 
considered as a Muslim community, not minority; although the Greeks, Armenians 
and Jews, which were recognised as minorities, benefited from these rights.  
 
However, it should be immediately stated that Ismet Pasha’s basic thesis, 
while the Lausanne Conference continued, was the emphasis that the Turks and 
Kurds were brothers and there were representatives from these two brother societies; 
and they were at the conference as a sign of this brotherhood.496The statement “We 
Kurds are together with the Turks” by the deputy of Diyarbakır Pirinççizade Fevzi 
Bey and Zülfüzade Zülfü Bey, members of the delegate with Ismet Pasha, found its 
expression implemented in the Treaty.497As has been ascertained, similar views were 
expressed by the Dersim deputy Diyap Agha.498 Diyarbakir deputy Pirinççizade 
Fevzi Bey and Zülfüzade Zülfü Bey, members of the delegation participating in the 
conference talks with İsmet Pasa, also stated that they were Kurds and they were 
together on the Turks side.499 
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According to Hasan Yıldız, there were two countries to make the most benefit 
from Lausanne. These were England and Turkey; because both states achieved their 
main aims, although they had seemed to be irreconcilable since the beginning of the 
conference. Again according to Yıldız, France and Italy, who could not perceive the 
situation in time, were far from understanding what was happening.500  
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CHAPTER 4  
Anti-British Activities and Britain’s Response to Them 
 
As mentioned before, Mesopotamia was ruled by the Ottomans for about five 
hundred years. But then the First World War broke out and the Ottoman Empire was 
defeated. That was a great opportunity for England to establish dominance in the 
region. Eventually, two weeks after the Armistice of Mondros, signed on 30th of 
October 1918, Britain landed troops in Mosul on 15th of November 1918. The local 
communities of Mosul, the Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia felt uneasy about the 
occupation of Mosul. An important part of the populations of Iraq, the East and 
South-East of Anatolia comprised of Turks and Kurds who had lived in tribes under 
Ottoman rule. In addition to that, most of them were related to each other. Therefore, 
an event occurring in one of these regions resulted in a reaction in others and anti-
British activities began spreading in waves. Due to this characteristic of the region, 
after annexing Mosul and reaching the borders of South-eastern Anatolia, the Eastern 
parts of Anatolia became more important than ever. Hence, in order to consolidate 
British domination especially in the Mosul province, Britain started to show more 
interest in the regions of Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia. Therefore England 
landed troops in Kilis on 27th of December 1918, in Antep on 15th of January 1919, 
in Kars on 12th of January 1919, in Maras on 24th March 1919, and in Urfa on 24th of 
March and took control of these provinces.501  
According to Turkish sources, in order to carry out these annexations, British 
officers tried to use Article 7 of Armistice of Mondros. Because in reference to 
Article 7, if Allied Powers consider any incident as threatening to their safety they 
would have the right to occupy any strategic region. In order to realise this purpose, 
some Kurdish tribes and Armenians were used to create unrest in the region.502 In the 
cable dated 17th of January 1919, Haydar Bey stated that for the last 7-8 months 
British officials in the region had been trying to disturb the peace and provoke the 
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local people against the Ottomans.503 Moreover, Ottoman officers in the region 
reported that some Armenians and Kurds they arrested, allegedly for causing trouble, 
were released on the orders of some British army officers. These incidents 
strengthened the suspicion that the British wanted unrest in the region and 
contributed to the unfolding of the events that took place in the region.504 
In a telegram sent by the Governor of Urfa to the Ottoman Home Office on 
29th March 1919, the Governor asserted that the British policy makers wanted to 
move towards Harput (Elazığ) by passing Siverek – Mardin – Diyarbakir – Malatya. 
It was also reported that the British stored up supplies and military materials which 
were brought to the region every day.505 So it can be understood from the 
information given by Turkish Authorities, that public service offices were brought 
under the control of British military forces and the connection between the Ottoman 
administrative authority and the occupied cities was broken.506 Thus the local 
inhabitants were gradually disinclined to heed the Ottoman administration. Besides, 
according to reports from the region, the British authorities were attempting to 
change the balance of population in the regions under their control and for those 
purpose Armenian immigrants started to be placed in certain areas.507 Ottoman 
authorities were powerless in the face of all these events and British activities in the 
region, but circulated propaganda against Britain’s activities.508  
It can be argued that as well as the Ottoman Empire’s propaganda, French 
propaganda in the region also had an influence on the emergence of the revolts in 
Iraq and Eastern Anatolia. Apparently French officers took part in various 
propaganda activities in the region. The reason for this was that, although the Mosul 
province and the Eastern Anatolia territory were promised to France by the British 
authorities as a buffer zone between Britain and Russia, upon the withdrawal of 
Russia from the World War I, British policy makers changed their mind about taking 
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advantage of the economic and strategic benefits of Mosul province.509 But France 
did not want to leave the region to England just like that. To this end, French secret 
agents disseminated the news that the control of Mosul and Eastern Anatolia would 
be given to the French authorities.510 
On the other hand rumours were increasingly being heard about deported 
Armenians.  According to these rumours Armenians would be settled in Eastern and 
South-eastern Anatolia and the control of the region would be even given to an 
Armenian administration.  As mentioned before, Antep was captured on 15th of 
January but on the 1st of April, control of the city was given to the French army 
which was comprised of Armenian legions.511 Furthermore, on 15th of April, the 
administration of Kars was given to the Armenian forces in a similar way, hence the 
local people started to believe these kinds of rumours. Due to the Antep and Kars 
examples, the people living in eastern lands of Ottoman Empire began to worry 
about their future. If the Armenians who were forced to immigrate in 1915 came 
back and settled down in Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia, people living in these 
areas would lose their lands. British officials had not taken decisive steps to refute 
this, causing Kurds to suspect these rumours were true. Because of the failure of the 
promised Kurdish State, some pro-British Kurds became anti-British. One of these 
revolts was launched by the leader of the Şırnak tribe Abdurrahim Bey. Despite not 
being a huge disturbance, his riot was particularly important in terms of its content. 
Because of the revolt, British authorities had a hard time and they blamed the Turks 
and Damat Ferid Pasha’s Government for it and the incidents that followed. But it 
can be claimed that Mustafa Kemal might have played an important role in the 
initiation of this uprising. It is known that Mustafa Kemal sent many letters512 to the 
other tribe leaders asking for their support on the issues of avoiding the fall of 
Caliphate and Sultanate; protecting the people in Turkey from being captured by the 
Armenians, and preventing the spread of British policies. According to our enquiries, 
Abdurrahman Agha of Şırnak was one of tribal leaders who received a letter from 
Mustafa Kemal. In the letter513 Mustafa Kemal asserted that, the caliphate and the 
sultanate were to be destroyed, and the land of the motherland was under Armenian 
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threat and the Ottoman government was incapable. He stated that he had gathered a 
congress in Erzurum for the emancipation of the country and he sent him a copy of 
the declaration and regulations given at the congress. Mustafa Kemal also demanded 
him to struggle against the British danger in the region.It is understood that after this 
letter Abdurrahim Agha suddenly became anti-British, although earlier he was 
reported as being a British supporter. Of course Britain’s harsh policies could be the 
reason for this alteration but the letters sent by Mustafa Kemal might be another 
reason for this changing. 
 
4.1 Sheikh Mahmud and Relations with British Officers 
 
At the beginning of the British invasion of Iraq during World War I, Sheikh 
Mahmud514 entered into a relationship with the British. It is understood that indirect 
contact with the British started in 1917; 515  the first direct contact was dated 1918.  
Sheikh Mahmud had been captured by the Turks during the British invasion of 
Kirkuk in May 1918,516 but later he was appointed as the governor of Sulaymaniyah 
by the Turks.517According to Elis, Sheikh Mahmud, just after the end of World War 
I, invited the British to Sulaymaniyah, and sent a letter stating that he would 
surrender the city to Britain in the event that he became the governor and 40 Kurdish 
tribes supported this. The British were pleased by the letter.518  British officers had 
thought to appoint him as governor to Kirkuk; however this appointment could not 
be made with the Turks’ claim upon the region. Later, with the British invasion of 
the region, Sheikh Mahmud was appointed governor of Kirkuk in December 1918.519  
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Parallel to the expansion of the British dominance over the region in 1918, 
encounters with local leaders increased and this had an effect on Sheikh Mahmud’s 
British relations. This time he was appointed to Sulaymaniyah as governor by Major 
Noel. 520 
It is understood that Sheikh Mahmud was subject to pressure from British 
counsellors. They wanted to redirect his decisions. The British did not want to allow 
him to be recognized as a leader in the international arena. It has been ascertained 
that Sheikh Mahmud wanted to send a delegation of two persons Reşid Kaban and 
Sayyid Ahmed Barzanji to the Paris Peace Conference where the new borders would 
be designed after the end of the First World War. This attempt remained inconclusive 
as the British did not allow this to happen and they arrested his representatives. 521    
There is an intelligence report,522 in the British archives that includes 
information about Sheikh Mahmud. When the report is examined in detail, it is 
obvious that Sheikh Mahmud’s daily life, his relations with his wives, his houses’ 
position and the status of the secret passages were reported in their finest detail. 
Preparing this report would not be so difficult with today’s technology; however, a 
report containing this much detail, in an era without mass-communication 
technology, appears before us as a product of the extensive work of the British 
intelligence. As mentioned before the report includes the information that if a big 
bomb was to fall on Sheikh Mahmud’s home it would be destroyed completely 
together with the surrounding buildings. It is possible that these details in the report 
were given to protect Sheikh Mahmud against a possible enemy attack. But more 
likely it was given in advance to plan a British RAF (Royal Air Force) attack against 
Sheikh Mahmud in the case of his getting involved in anti-British activities. 
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4.1.1 The First Rebellion of Sheikh Mahmud against England (20 
May 1919 – 28 June 1919) 
 
After Major Noel’s assigning Sheikh Mahmud as governor of 
Sulaymaniyah523 on 1st of November 1918, the Sheikh524 attempted to expand his 
dominance and started to develop policies to procure acceptance of his dominance 
over Kifri and Kirkuk.525 To achieve this expansion of dominance, the Sheikh 
removed all Turkish and Arab officers in the region and manned all units with his 
own men all the way to the villages and districts; he announced Kurdish as the 
official language and formed a mercenary unit under the counsel of British 
officers.526 
 
This expansion of dominance was not received well by the British. The first 
Sheikh Mahmud rebellion527 broke out with the raid by Mahmud Han Dizli on 20th of 
May 1919.The deputy foreign political officer Greenhouse, who tried to limit the 
Sheikh’s authority to the Sulaymaniyah region, was arrested on 23rd of May 1919, 
the Sheikh raised the Kurdish flag instead of the British one, confiscated the treasure, 
imprisoned the British serving in Sulaymaniyah, destroyed the telegraph lines, and 
broke off with the British. This posed a serious problem for the British. 528 
After the rebellion broke out, Talbot Wilson stated that repression of the 
rebellion immediately and mercilessly was of vital importance. If the intervention 
was to be delayed there was a possibility that the impartial Kurdish leaders would 
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take sides with Sheikh Mahmud.529  He requested that immediate action be taken 
since the realisation of this possibility would yield negative results not only in 
Sulaymaniyah but also in Mosul-Kirkuk and even in the Iranian region; and  that it 
would be easy to repress the rebellion while  it was still small and it would also be 
perceived as a sign of British strength. 530 
 It is known that the British had concerns about a possible attack on Iran by 
Russia during the days in which Sheikh Mahmud rebelled against the British. 531  The 
immediate repression of Sheikh Mahmud’s rebellion had vital importance, just as 
Talbot Wilson had stated, for the functioning of the system the United Kingdom 
wanted to establish in the Middle East. 
Because of the importance of the issue British forces were sent against Sheikh 
Mahmud. Sheikh Mahmud was captured, wounded, near a rock around the Baziyan 
Pass on 18th June 1919, as a result of a British forces raid supported by the Jaff, 
Pindar and Talabani tribes. In the Observer newspaper it was stated stated that the 
day when Sheikh Mahmud was caught, 100 Kurds and 3 rifles were also captured, 
and all the British captives at the Sheikh’s headquarters were released that evening. 
After Sheikh Mahmud's capture the British did not encounter any serious 
opposition during the Sulaymaniyah invasion and the Halabja was occupied on 28th 
June 1919. 532 A strict system was put in to practice in the region.  Many telegrams 
were sent, from Sulaymaniyah and various places, to the Ottoman administration, 
seeking ways to evade British dominance that went beyond mere complaint. 533 
Following his capture, the Sheikh was taken to court accused of causing 
casualties and material damage via a rebellion against the British government and 
raising the Kurdish flag instead of the British one.534 After the trial, Sheikh Mahmud 
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was sentenced to death; however for the British interests he was not executed and he 
was exiled to India.535 
 
The British, who wished to find the source of the unrest in Iraq both in 1919 
and in 1920, conducted serious studies. Interestingly, the Şerif family members had 
become a pillar of strength for the British, who established mechanisms which 
carefully processed all kinds of information. The encounters between the members of 
the Şerif family and the British, based on mutual interest, were later used for the 
establishment of dominance in the region of both parties.536 
 
A crucial document537 about the participants of the first Sheikh Mahmud 
rebellion on 20th May 1919 was detected in the British archives. As far as I can 
ascertain, this information has not been published by either the British or Turkish 
academics. Information on the Kurdish tribes who participated in this rebellion will 
be summarized. When the document is analysed it can be seen that, 118 Kurdish 
notables were mentioned in the list; 27 of them were listed as ringleaders.  They were 
the Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji family members such as Sheikh Kadir and Sheikh 
Mohammed. The current situation of the listed people is also reported in the 
document. According to the document some of these insurgents fled and some of 
them were captured by British forces. 
 
Another report about the latest situation of the participants in the rebellion in 
June-July 1919 was prepared by the British Air Ministry.538 By comparison with the 
aforementioned report, although 45 people were listed in the report, the Air Ministry 
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report had much more detail such as their current health status, detention status and 
penalties they had received. 
 
The developments following the Sheikh Mahmud rebellion and the harsh 
intervention of the British over the issue was only the beginning of the conflict in 
Sulaymaniyah against the British.539 The British had positioned a considerable 
number of forces in the Kirkuk, Chamchamal and Kalisan regions on 30th July 1919, 
to maintain order and obviate the chance of any new disorder. An archival document, 
540  giving information about the personnel of the military units stationed in Kirkuk, 
Chamchamal and Kalisan, was detected in the British archives. As can be understood 
from the document, because of the uprisings many of the military units in the region 
requested more staff. When the document is analysed in detail it can be seen that the 
military units needed eight more agents and two more interpreters. Furthermore as it 
is specified in the report that the military unit had seven treasurers and five of them 
were redundant. These treasurers could be sent to other military units. 
 
Further events along with the Sheikh Mahmud rebellion had disturbed the 
British. The Goyan tribe in the northern part of Iraq and most of the Kurdish tribe 
leaders at the southern parts of Turkey between 1919 and 1920 called against British 
dominance and this placed the British in a difficult situation.541  
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4.1.2 Sheikh Mahmud’s Second Rebellion 
 
Following Sheikh Mahmud's exile, and after the failure of the British to 
prevent public disorder arising from the Kurdish tribes, as well as the failure of 
preventing Ozdemir Bey's campaign the British were forced to reconsider their 
opinions about Sheikh Mahmud. The aim of the decision not to execute Sheikh 
Mahmud but to exile him to India was proven with developing events. The British 
brought the Sheikh back from exile to help to suppress the events in 1922.542 But in 
order to limit Sheikh Mahmud’s influence and ensure they had a powerful hand in 
Mosul and Kirkuk the British wanted to use Sayyid Taha. Sayyid Taha was 
considered as a leader who could control the Kurdish tribes in Semdinan and 
Rawanduz. Sayyid Taha was doing his best to minimise the influence of Turkish 
propaganda.543 In the meeting headed by Bell, on 12th July 1922, it was decided that 
Sayyid Taha was to be the King of Southern Kurdistan.544 But this decision never put 
into practice. It can argued that the Armistice of Mudanya which was to be 
negotiated with the Turks, was influential in this decision; because, any direct 
counter attack by any of the parties would mean the end of the peace negotiations 
before their beginning, and all parties wished to avoid this situation. At this point, it 
can be argued that the British, following a policy differently from the Turks, forced 
Sayyid Taha into play and tried to give an impression that they did not directly 
intervene. Thus they would both limit Sheikh Mahmud’s influence and ensure they 
had powerful hand in Mosul and Kirkuk.  Nevertheless the return occurred with the 
Sheikh’s grand entrance into Sulaymaniyah with a proud welcoming ceremony, 
accompanied by Major Noel, on 30th of October 1922. 545 
 
                                                          
542 Elphinston, William Graham, ‘Kurds and The Kurdish Question’, Journal of The Royal Central Asian 
Society,Vol.35, No:1,1948,p.98.  
543 Kaymaz, Musul Sorunu, p.158. 
544 Edmonds was authorised about the issues; however this meeting could not be realised since 
Sayyid Taha went to support Simko, after Simko’s defeat by the Iranian forces. Kaymaz, Musul 
Sorunu, p.195. 
545 Lazarev, Emperyalizm, p.200. 
187 
 
A few days after his arrival in Sulaymaniyah Sheikh Mahmud requested that 
the independence of Southern Kurdistan be recognised. According to his demands, 
all territories on which the Kurds lived in Iraq should be annexed to this independent 
state, a joint commission must be established to determine the borders of this state 
and the state of Iraq, and he himself should be acclaimed as king.  However, the 
British did not consider this request appropriate, and tried to neutralise the growing 
rebellions movement using bombings. Meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire sent 
telegrams to the Turkish local authorities in Iraq telling them to protest British 
military activities. Meanwhile, leaflets were distributed by British planes along with 
the bombings. The British announced the bombing would continue until the 
rebellions came to an end. 546 
 
Before his return to Sulaymaniyah, Sheikh Mahmud contacted with Ozdemir 
Bey547 in September 1922. The British, informed about the Sheikh’s new activities, 
started meeting Sayyid Taha and Simko to reduce his dominance. Sheikh Mahmud, 
seeing this, announced the Kurdistan Kingdom with Sulaymaniyah the capital, and 
acclaimed himself as king on 18th of November 1922,548and sent a telegram549 to 
Ozdemir Bey on 5th January 1923. In his telegram Sheikh Mahmud stated that British 
spent a lot of effort trying to impress him. He also claimed that he had received two 
telegrams; one for him, one for Tahir Effendi. He noted that he sent a copy of the 
telegrams as evidence. He asserted that in order to ensure Kurdish support for British 
forces British officers spent huge amounts of money. According to him, their aim 
was not to help the Kurdish people; it was to secure British interests in the region. He 
emphasized that although Ozdemir Bey was desperate to establish Kurdish 
independence, they should unite forces to do this. He stated that their relations with 
the British were not good and they could clash with them at any moment; that is why 
he requested immediate troops, weapons and ammunition. He expressed that if there 
was anyone who could provide ammunition they should notify him with an 
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encrypted message. He added that he could go outside Sulaymaniyah to collect it. As 
it mentioned by Güztoklusu550, on 29th January 1923, a congress was held in 
Süleymaniye with the support of Özdemir Bey, accompanied by tribal and religious 
leaders. According to the decision taken at the Congress the struggle carried out in 
South Kurdistan against the British occupation, was continued for four years. It was 
more appropriate to try to obtain legitimate autonomy from the Turkish Government 
against the illegitimate independence that the British wanted to give the Kurds; if the 
Turkish government would approve their request, they would be ready to fight any 
kind of war against the British. Their requests were not accepted. With regard to this 
point, the Kurds living in Sulaymaniyah followed a different path and preferred to 
resolve the hostility between Sheikh Mahmud and the British, and to be conciliatory. 
With this purpose in mind, a telegram from 42 Kurdish notables was sent to the High 
Commissary of Iraq on 25th February 1923.  
 
In this telegram it was declared that five months ago the British had decided 
to establish a government centre under Sheikh Mahmud’s governance for the sake of 
the Kurds; and since the British retreat from Sulaymaniyah, the Kurds had not done 
anything against previously agreed rules. In addition, they had no political stance 
opposing British policies and they were ready to act in line with these politics. The 
Kurdish notables expressed that they believed that this readiness would result in the 
clearing of the way for the Kurds, for their national feelings and development. In this 
respect they also declared that they were ready to repel any attack from outside, and 
promised to oppose Turkish activity in the region. 
 
These Kurdish notables demanded to be informed about three subjects, while 
expressing their trust in the British government for its readiness to let the Kurds live 
together, despite British threats due to the misunderstandings between Sheikh 
Mahmud and the British government. The three points were that if there arose any 
hostile attitude towards the British caused by Sheikh Mahmud’s forces they promised 
to fix it; that if they had participated in any anti-British movement they promised not 
to repeat it in the future; and finally if any British officer had any doubt as to their 
governance they would make an effort to rectify the matter. The Kurdish notables, 
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who asked for forgiveness for the idea of advancing towards Baghdad which had 
been due to Sheikh Mahmud’s weak administration, concluded their telegram by 
saying ‘we, the undersigned Kurdish notables, as helpless and indigent individuals, 
promise to adopt any policy as determined by the British government’. 551 
 
As maybe seen from the document, the Kurdish notables did not want 
problems in their relations with the British and made suggestions about resolving the 
present difficulties. In this telegram, expressing that Sheikh Mahmud’s movement 
was caused by national feelings, it was stated in plain language that it was possible to 
compensate for some of the unfavourable events that had happened. Another 
important aspect of the document was the Kurdish notables’ trust in Sheikh Mahmud 
and their not mentioning any problems about his leadership. 
 
The British authorities could not be satisfied by the assurance given by the 42 
Kurdish notables and a notice, summarised below, was thrown from airplanes to the 
Kirkuk region in March 1923. In the notice it was declared that the people of the 
region would hear news about an airstrike in Sulaymaniyah, but they need not be 
afraid of this, and there was no change in the Kurdistan policies of the British and 
Iraqi governments. The notice continued explaining that Sheikh Mahmud, who had 
been assigned to establish Kurdish rule in Sulaymaniyah had made some 
extraordinary claims and demanded the government of the whole Sulaymaniyah 
province, and this demand was against the will of people of Sulaymaniyah. 
 
Also, the notice claimed that Sheikh Mahmud had committed certain 
operations in Sulaymaniyah and caused cruelty and would not stop to contact with 
the Turks in his own interests.552 The notice asserted that Sheikh Mahmud had 
promised the Turks he would attack the British government, and included the threat 
that if this attack did take place, it would bring both punishment and disaster to the 
region. The ones who participated with the Turks in this foolish plan would be 
punished severely, and it was announced that if Sheikh Mahmud continued to act 
against England he would jeopardise both the development of Kurdistan and the 
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prosperity of the region. In the following parts of the notice, it was stated that 
although he had been invited by Percy Cox to speak on these matters, Sheikh 
Mahmud had refused to go to Baghdad, and had continued with his actions. In the 
last part of the notice, Cox wrote that Sheikh Mahmud had received enough warnings 
and now they were out of patience and would start to punish Sheikh Mahmud and his 
supporters. However, the ones who followed and worked for the order of the British 
government need not be afraid.553 
 
After this notice, dated 2nd March 1923, the British started to bomb 
Sulaymaniyah and the Sheikh, as in the first rebellion, was obliged to leave 
Sulaymaniyah. The policy for expanding the area of invasion parallel to the bombing 
of Sulaymaniyah reached Rawanduz, and Ozdemir Bey’s forces, which were not 
supported enough by the Ankara government, and were obliged to retreat towards the 
Iranian border. The British captured Rawanduz with the retreat of Ozdemir Bey. 
Now a new leader who could loyal to the British and protect their interests needed to 
be found. At that point the report of Major Noel was received by the Baghdad High 
Commissioner. It was claimed that Sayyid Taha had more influence on Central 
Kurdistan and North-western Iran than all other Kurdish notables. 554 It was also 
reported that all the people who could have lead the Kurds in the region had already 
either been killed or defeated. According to the report Kurdish notables such as 
Ismail and Suleyman Bey would come together under the leadership of Sayyid Taha 
who had the largest lands in Rawanduz. Also it was noticed that if the British 
Government aimed at capturing Rawanduz, it was important that Sayyid Taha stayed 
in Rawanduz because no one could rule there without a powerful British garrison in 
the region. It would be a big mistake to promote any incentive for, or to apply 
pressure to the Iraq central government to establish a Kurdistan state, leaving Sayyid 
Taha outside it. The Arab government was not powerful enough to control the Kurds 
or make them accept their wishes. According to Noel, if the British removed their 
troops from the region, a structure would be established in Rawanduz under rule of 
the Turks or the Kurds. He claimed that the Iraqi government would absolutely 
prefer the Kurds in such a case, so Sayyid Taha must be supported. According to 
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Noel, Sayyid Taha was ready to accept both Arab dominance and other regulations 
made by the Iraqi government. 555 So that they both gained advantage against the 
Turks and won a supporter of the order there they assigned Sayyid Taha as the 
district governor in Rawanduz in 1923. 
 
The events during this assignment were reported by the Kirkuk political 
administration to the high commissariat of Iraq on 21st August 1923.556 In this report, 
it was stated that Captain Chapman had returned to Kifri and Kerim and Ahmed Bey 
from the Jaff tribe had waited for him to organise a meeting with him in Kifri. Later, 
it was stated that Sheikh Mahmud assigned Sayyid Muhammad to Penjwin as mufti, 
and he could not establish a successful system to collect duties; in fact Sheikh 
Mahmud had just come to Sulaymaniyah still without success. Captain Chapman 
reported that Sheikh Mahmud and 70 Turks from Sauj Bulagh (Mahabad) had 
arrived, having come to Kifri from Sulaymaniyah, and this was just the beginning; 
there were rumours among the people that soon Ozdemir Pasha would also go there, 
and declared that the source of these rumours was perhaps be Sheikh Mahmud 
himself. 557  
 
Sheikh Mahmut appointed Sheikh Ali’s son Sheikh Mahmud to Khormal, and 
Jelali Tevfik Agha to Warmata, and complained that no taxes could be collected 
from the Halabja district. Other interesting information encountered in this document 
was found in the part where Adile Hanım asked questions about when the tax 
payments for both June and July would be made to the British authorities. It can be 
understood from this statement that Kurdish leaders were not given information 
about the details of tax payments. The cause of this situation can be asserted as the 
payments, for the tax arrangements were discussed only by the British authorities. 
 
In the telegram, after stating that Mullah Tevfik, Sheikh Mahmud’s 
representative, carried letters written to the tribes near Baghdad and this person 
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carried special letters for the Sheikh, it was noted that he was also the person who 
undermined Major Noel’s Sulaymaniyah mission.  
 
Sheikh Abdülkerim complained about the revival of Turkish propaganda in 
Sulaymaniyah, and gave his own thoughts, about the Turkish propaganda in 
Sulaymaniyah.558 According to the rumours in Sulaymaniyah, the British would 
leave these regions to the Turks and retreat. The effects of this propaganda started to 
surface noticeably even in Kirkuk. 
 
It was reported, based on the information provided by the district governor of 
Chamchamal that Sheikh Mahmud had collected the tobacco tax, and appointed 
Sayyid Muhammad Müftizade as the district governor to Halabja, and Fettah Effendi 
had returned from Ankara with two Turks and was welcomed ceremonially. At the 
same time, it was recorded as an interesting intelligence notice that Mustafa Kemal 
Pasha testified that Sheikh Mahmud’s dominance over the region would be 
recognised from Sulaymaniyah to the Hamrin Mountains. 
 
In the telegram,559 the rumour that Sheikh Mahmud had agreed with Ali İhsan 
Pasha in Sulaymaniyah that the Turks would come into the town is also reported. It 
was further mentioned that Hamid Bey Jaff was in contact with Sheikh Mahmud and 
hoped to come to Sulaymaniyah soon; that Sheikh Faris Agha560 had accepted to be 
assigned as a director to Karadağ; and the total number of Sheikh Mahmud’s cavalry 
was about 130-150. 
 
The British, upon discovering these notes explaining the situation of the 
persons closest to Sheikh Mahmut and describing the latest developments, received 
the intelligence in February 1923 that Sheikh Mahmud was preparing for another 
rebellion. The British acted swiftly and did not allow the preparatory phase of this 
rebellion to be completed.  
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Edmonds prepared a plan to keep Sheikh Mahmud under control; and if there 
was no possibility of keeping him under control, to make the rebellion break out 
immediately. According to his plan,561 the High Commissioner of Iraq would send a 
telegram to Sheikh Mahmud and request him to come to Baghdad. If Sheikh 
Mahmud did not obey this call, the airplanes would make an appearance over 
Sulaymaniyah, and drop leaflets saying that Sheikh Mahmud was dismissed from 
duty and he had five days to go to Baghdad and report. . If there were any problems, 
support would be received from the Indian troops. If Sheikh Mahmud did not leave 
the city, the city would be bombed. Besides, as mentioned above detailed 
information was given about the place that Sheikh Mahmud lived. In the report it is 
emphasized that although his house could be demolished easily by bombing there 
were lots of hidden tunnels in his house. So, the British officers who considered 
everything in depth realized the danger of the Sheikh's betrayal and prepared a 
bombing plan in advance.562 In order for the plan563 to be successful against all odds, 
alternative policies were thought up and it was decided that Edmonds would meet 
with Simko and make him offers to ensure that he would not support Sheikh 
Mahmud. 
Sheikh Mahmud, who had been invited to Baghdad as part of this plan, 
objected to the order to go to Baghdad and proclaimed himself as king of 
Kurdistan.564Sheikh Mahmud, who had fought in Sulaymaniyah until 4th of March 
1923, abandoned the city taking the money in the treasury. As a consequence of this, 
the British responded harshly to this rebellion considering it a potential disturbance 
of the order they had established up until that time and would establish in the 
future.565 
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The report prepared by the officer of Koi Sanjaq on 23rd of May 1923 shows 
Sheikh Mahmud’s forces before and after the revolt.566 The information given in the 
report can be tabulated as below. When the figures are analysed it can be seen that 
Sheikh Mahmud’s loss of soldiers was about 24.000 men. The figures corresponded 
to ninety per cent of Sheikh Mahmud's army. It would seem that in the struggle 
against the British forces Sheikh Mahmud suffered huge losses. 
 
 
Name Rank City Military 
Forces Before 
Revolt  
Military 
Forces After 
the Revolt 
Kerim Gaffur Sergeant Major Sulaymaniyah 3.286 369 
Mirza Mulan Corporal Sulaymaniyah 3.303 132 
Arif Haji Mahmud Private Sulaymaniyah 3.621 666 
Ferej Nadir Private Sulaymaniyah 3.542 347 
Ahmed Aziz Private Sulaymaniyah 6.130 231 
Sayyid Suleiman Private Koi Sancaq 3.088 388 
Mahmud Ahmed Private Siwak 3.575 379 
Total   26.545 2.512 
 
However, the repulsion of the British by Sheikh Mahmud’s forces in the 
Taslica conflict in May 1923 caused serious concern to the British. The British 
responded brutally to this rebellion because it jeopardised the whole system that they 
had created after the First World War in the Middle East. 567  
The British authorities who had called out the RAF to repress this rebellion, 
ordered that all settlements supporting Sheikh Mahmud, particularly Sulaymaniyah, 
to be bombedd heavily.568As part of this order, nearly all people living in 
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Sulaymaniyah left the city and were obliged to move to the surrounding villages, 
towns and mountains.569 
 
According to Refik Hilmi,570 the British never meant to establish an 
independent Kurdish state.571 Sometimes they trusted Sheikh Mahmud due to 
developments and made mention of establishing an independent Kurdish state; 
however they did not abstain from bombing the Kurds when appropriate, in 
accordance with a change in their policies.572 
 
It is possible to ascertain signs that British policies were prioritised over 
Kurdish interests in Refik Hilmi’s memoirs. Refik Hilmi mentioned that it was ill-
treatment by the British which drove Sheikh Mahmud to rebellion. Refik Hilmi, who 
explained that he could tell whether the British were in an advantageous position or 
not when they arrested him after the rebellions, since if the British were in an 
advantageous position they treated him badly; if not, they treated him well.573 
 
According to Refik Hilmi, there was only one reason Sheikh Mahmud did not 
get along well with the British; that was the Sheikh had an ambition to establish an 
independent Kurdish State and this ambition had no overlapping ground with British 
interests.574 For this reeason, Sheikh Mahmud initiated the rebellion movements 
against the British which have been elaborated above.  
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4.2 Ali Şefik Özdemir Bey (1885-1951) and His Resistance 
Against British Forces 
 
 
The second most important rebellion against British forces was ruled by 
Ozdemir Bey. During the struggles against Ozdemir Bey British forces loss a 
significant number of soldiers, military materials, weapons and even aircraft. 
 
Indeed, in a revolt in Rawanduz in 1920, the tribes in the region asked help 
from the Ottoman Government but the Ottoman government could not help. After 
that the TGNA did help the tribes attempting to take control of the region. 
Meanwhile, there was a weak military unit in Elcezire. On 9th August 1921, Major 
Şevki Bey was appointed to the command of Süleymaniye and 3 officers and 100 
soldiers were sent for assistance. Due to the small number of this force and the 
difficulty of supplying ammunition, an order not to conflict with the British was 
given to the unit.575 Despite this order, from time to time they faced British attacks. 
On 16th December 1921 numerous British infantries attacked to Rawanduz with the 
RAF support but the British forces had large numbers losses in Babacicek channel.576  
Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the government of Ankara made various attempts 
in the period leading up to the Lausanne Conference on the Mosul issue. Following 
on the British attacks in Arbil and Rawanduz against the Sürücü tribe that supported 
the Turks in January 1922; Mustafa Kemal Pasha ordered troops to be sent military 
to the region in the telegram carried to the Ministry of National Defense in 1 
February 1922.577  As a matter of fact, in order to engage in a more fundamental 
action in the region upon the insistent desires of the people in the Mosul Kirkuk 
region actions were taken to prepare a mobilization force to establish a Turkish 
command center. This military force would struggle with the British forces supported 
by Iraq soldiers.578Finally a military letter of instruction was preparedand Özdemir 
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Bey, the lieutenant-colonel in the national forces, was appointed to the region; as its 
commander.579 
 
The attacks on Rawanduz led by Ozdemir Bey in 1921580 had popularised the 
thought among the people that this region would soon be captured by the Turks and 
the old order would be re-established, and spread the fear in the British that the Turks 
would carry out an attack on Mosul.581 
 
In the process which started with Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s order on 1st 
February 1922 to reinforce the troops in Rawanduz, Ozdemir Bey talked it over with 
Cevat Pasha, commander of the Al-Jazirah Front at Diyarbakır on 22nd of April 1922 
and arrived at Rawanduz again in May 1922.582 With the orders he received, 
Ozdemir Bey expanded his activities towards Rawanduz, Diyarbakır, Mosul, Van 
and their periphery. Ozdemir Bey’s activities, aimed at removing British forces from 
the region by overcoming the British invasion with the Islamic brotherhood, were 
closely followed by the British. The greatest shortcoming of Ozdemir Bey was the 
numerical inadequacy of the troops he brought along, comprising only 129 people. In 
other words the purpose and the forces of Ozdemir Bey were disproportionate. 
Despite the situation, Ozdemir Bey scored historic victories over the British.  
 
The information on Ozdemir Bey’s trip to Van in June 1922 and the troops he 
had gathered there was expressed in a telegram in the British Secretary of State for 
Air archives. According to the British documents583 Ozdemir Bey travelled to Van at 
the beginning of June 1922 with a small unit accompanying him, and continued on to 
Rawanduz on 23rd of June 1922 with the troops he had gathered there. In fact, before 
Ozdemir Bey’s arrival, a small armed convoy of his troops entered Rawanduz. This 
troop carried out the propaganda requested by Ozdemir Bey, and expressed that the 
reclamation of Mosul was very close to encourage the local people to join them. In 
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this telegram it was stated that the 1,000 to 1,500 armed men brought from Van had 
the potential to cause trouble in Rawanduz.  
 
It was seen that Ozdemir Bey’s forces were not only efficient in Rawanduz, 
but also in Rania and Kala Diza. The British made the best of the failure to utilize the 
opportunity that had arisen during their retreat from Sulaymaniyah, and recuperated 
quickly, re-establishing their dominance over the region. 
 
During all these events, Ozdemir Bey’s troops were transferred from the 
command of Al-Jazirah Front Command to the command of the Eastern Front 
Command. As Kaymaz maintains, not enough support was provided to Ozdemir 
Bey’s forces by the Eastern Front Command just like the Al-Jazirah Front 
Command.584 As mentioned above, this lack of support meant a failure to make the 
best of the British retreat from Sulaymaniyah.  
 
Ozdemir Bey sent a letter to the Dizai tribe Resul Agha on 26th of June 1922, 
offering him the chance to struggle together against the British. He stated that the 
British were against the Caliph and the Sultanate; it was their religious duty as 
Muslims to challenge the British; issues about Mosul were by gone and they were 
slowly dominating the region again; and he awaited their support.585 
 
Ozdemir Bey, who had efficiently succeeded in turning the anti-British 
reactions into pro-Turk feelings, conspired effectively with the Surchi, Zibar, and 
Barzan tribes; and moderately with the Hemavend, Jebbari, Pindar, Avroman, 
Khosnaw, Zangana, Bayat and Daudi tribes. These tribes listed above promised to 
provide support and cooperated with Ozdemir Bey.586 
 
As a result of the British bombarding of their tribal settlements, inflicted due 
to their support to Ozdemir Bey, the Bayat and Daudi tribes ended their support. 
During these events, the elimination of Simko Sikak by Iranian forces and his taking 
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refuge in Turkey, the support of the Kurds near the Iranian border, and the 
cooperation of Ozdemir Bey with the Neftçizade family in Mosul changed the 
balance in favour of the Turks.  
 
Upon these activities by Ozdemir Bey, the British founded the Kurdistan 
League led by Nemrut Mustafa Pasha, and started to publish the newspaper named 
Bang-i Kurdistan. In August, thinking that he had started to gather force in the region 
they started planning to completely end his activities.587 
 
Ozdemir Bey had followed the movements of the British closely, as they set 
out to prepare the local levies    in Erbil, Kirkuk and Hanikin for a counterattack in 
his headquarters.588 The British efficiently used a 1,000 soldier Assyrian levies   ’ 
force, an Indian-British brigade and the Royal Air Force in addition to 4,000 Arab 
soldiers for the counterattack against Ozdemir Bey.589 
 
The attack on 31st of August 1922, with the force of the tribes that had 
declared their loyalty to Ozdemir Bey, was expected by the British. However, 
although the British proceeded with a counterattack with the Kurdish and Assyrian 
levies    the next day, Ozdemir Bey’s forces defeated these troops in a short time and 
captured first Rania and then Koi Sanjaq. Percy Cox, the British High Commissioner 
of Iraq, fearing the rapid advancement of events, evacuated the city by removing the 
British and Christians in Sulaymaniyah and left the administration to Sheikh Kadir, 
brother of Sheikh Mahmud. The British partially retreated from Mosul, but at the 
same time as this evacuation, and quickly prepared a counterplan aiming first at 
breaking up Ozdemir Bey’s forces, and then at forcing Ozdemir Bey to completely 
retreat from the region using the Royal Air Force. 
 
Cox, in line with this plan, asked Churchill to assign Sheikh Mahmud as 
governor to Sulaymaniyah. The main reason behind Cox’s offer was that it was 
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possible to argue that some of the tribes supporting Ozdemir Bey had ended this 
support when Sheikh Kadir was commissioned to Sulaymaniyah. Cox calculated that 
the Sheikh’s brother having such an effect would be multiplied if the Sheikh was to 
be brought to Sulaymaniyah, and reported his policy in this regard to the central 
government. With the approval of the policy by London, Sheikh Mahmud was 
brought back from exile. Major Noel accompanied Sheikh Mahmud during his 
transfer to Baghdad first and then to Sulaymaniyah. Ozdemir Bey had carefully 
followed Sheikh Mahmud’s transfer to Sulaymaniyah; then he sent a letter to Sheikh 
Mahmud on 22 September 1922 and told him that he had wished to cooperate with 
the Sheikh just after the World War I but did not find the opportunity. Ozdemir Bey 
expressed that590 Sheikh Mahmud had a prestigious position not only among the 
Kurds but in the entire Muslim world, and cooperation against the British was 
beyond a mere request, but a necessity.  
 
Sheikh Mahmud, who replied in the affirmative to Ozdemir Bey’s wish for 
cooperation, requested a guarantee from Ozdemir Bey that his own autonomous 
dominance would be recognised by the Turks, and a supply of arms and ammunition 
provided. Sheikh Mahmud, negotiating with the Talabani and Jaff tribes at the same 
time, fell into a historic error by believing the Talabani leader Sheikh Abdulkerim’s 
promise that he would support him as long as he would side with the British. 591 
Talabani leader’s word was no more than an offer prearranged with the British. After 
Sheikh Mahmud accepted this offer, the pro-Turkish tribes supporting Ozdemir Bey 
took sides with the British. Thus, the British who balanced Ozdemir Bey’s forces 
with Sheikh Mahmud also balanced Sheikh Mahmud’s forces with the Talabani 
Tribe. 
 
In addition to the strategic plan of bombing, the regional levies who were 
supported by British Air Forces took an active role of Ozdemir Bey's forces.  At that 
moment, with the beginning of the Armistice of Mudanya negotiations, all Ozdemir 
Bey’s activities were left unfinished with no possibility of an agreement.  
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On 28th March 1923, the positions and numbers of the Turkish forces sent 
from Erbil and stationed at Rawanduz region were described in a report.592According 
to the report the Kurdish supported Turkish forces had a total of 240 riflemen; 
including 30 in Rawanduz, 150 in Betwata; 30 in Zibar, and 30 in Serdaşt. Also, the 
Kurdish supported Turkish forces had a total of 6 machine guns and 3 heavy 
weapons, including 5 in Betwata and 1 in Zibar. 
 
In the following pages of this document, the anti-British forces with a high 
probability of supporting the Turks are listed.593The information given can be 
tabulated as; 
 
Name of the Tribe Armament Name of the Leader 
Hoşnu Tribe 500 Kadir Bey 
Mir Yusuf 300 Kadir Bey 
Bagok 200 Ahmed Bey 
Balikan 200 Molla Yusuf 
Neodeşt 150 Gafur Khan 
Serat Herki 150 Tahir Agha 
Dola Akhan 100 Muhammad Emin Bey 
Horan 15 Salih Bey 
TOTAL 1415  
 
At the bottom of this table, there is additional information about two local 
Kurdish tribes which might help the Kurds against the British. According to the 
given information Surchi Kurds would support Turkish forces with 200 men, unless 
they were repressed. Additionally, Dole Hauti Kurds would join the Turkish forces 
with 400 men. The four possible plans of action by the Turkish forces in the case of a 
British invasion of Rawanduz were outlined in the document. These four possible 
actions are listed as; Retreat back into Iran via Riyadh, to Neri, Retreat to Zibar, or 
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staying in the Sulaymaniyah region, which was under the influence of Sheikh 
Mahmut.594 
 
Captain B. E. Littledale, who had prepared the document, added the 
information that the most likely option for the Turkish retreat was the fourth one. In 
other words, at that time, the Turks and Sheikh Mahmud were still influential and 
Sheikh Mahmud was supported by the Turks, and in return, the Sheikh was poised to 
support the Turks in dire straits. 
 
It is wrong to think of all the anti-British Kurdish tribes listed in the 
document as pro-Turkish. In fact, the tribes described as pro-Turk would be better 
classified as those who simply opposed British policies in the Middle East. 
Notwithstanding that, the majority of the tribes listed here were pro-Turkish, and 
some of them cherished the thought of an independent Kurdish state, and a few of 
them had opted for making an alliance with a third-party other than the British.595 
 
The telegram from Mosul to the High Commission of Baghdad on 7th of April 
1923 stated that, according to the information obtained from the district governor of 
Amedia on Ozdemir Bey’s activities at the region, Sheikh Ahmet Barzan596had 
started to rule the local council at the request of Ozdemir Bey. However, despite the 
situation, it was stated that Sheikh Ahmed had a tendency to work for the British, 
unless the Turks helped him more.597 
 
In April 1923, according to an archive document by the Secretary of State for 
Air on the operation to Qoikol, Ozdemir Bey’s allies planned to cut all the roads to 
Rawanduz before the operation. The forces acting for this purpose can be listed as; 
İbrahim Bey and Hasan Bey with 75 men in Betwata, Naci Bey with his 30 men and 
Rania district governor Sayyid Abdullah, Gafur Khan and Pindar tribe who held the 
Sehidan passage. 
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With Ozdemir Bey’s arrival in Rawanduz, considering the effect of Kaka 
Emin who held an influential position over the Kurds, Ozdemir Bey decided to 
immediately act against the British. As a result of the implementation of this 
decision, Ozdemir Bey’s forces suffered considerable losses.598 
 
In a telegram599 sent from the Iraq Air Headquarters to the British High 
Commissioner in Baghdad on 11th of August 1923, after the failure of Ozdemir Bey’s 
operations, and the conclusion of the Lausanne peace negotiations, it was stated that 
Basri Bey from the Mikaili tribe had arrived at Semdinan 15 days ago to receive 
instructions. It was stated that, until that time, Van, Saray, Başkale, Colemerik, Diza 
and Semdinan were in the administrative domain of the Eastern Front Command, but 
it was understood from the visit of Basri Bey, that Semdinan was now in 
administrative control of Cizre Command. The telegram stated that the positioning of 
the Cizre front had two purposes. These were protection of the Iraq border, and 
attacking Iraq via Mosul, Baghdad and Basra. The telegram stated that the Turkish 
government positioned Van under Cizre; and it included the information that, 
according to an unacknowledged report, Turkish forces had been moved from Cizre 
to Van. 
 
The prevailing opinion in British academe about Ozdemir Bey is that 
Ozdemir Bey was supported by Ankara; and this is a correct evaluation. The precise 
nature of this truth varies according to the perspectives taken by each scholar. While 
some scholars state that he was commissioned by Ankara600 to organise the Kurdish 
tribes against the British, some sources601 asserted that his movement was 
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independent (individual). However, Ankara followed a policy which would enable 
him to make the best of the situation.  
 
Mosul was the part of the Turkish National Pact thus in his statements in 
various dates Mustafa Kemal Pasha repeatedly stated that Mosul was an inseparable 
Turkish homeland. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Fevzi Pasha and Ismet Pasha held 
discussions to organize a military operation to Mosul at various times. Even a top 
secret operation plan was prepared by the Turkish General Staff.602 The military 
operation to be organized in Mosul would be commanded by Kazim Karabekir Pasha 
but this plan could not be put into practice.603 Thereupon, M. Kemal Pasha accepted 
the granting of the necessary support to Ozdemir Bey, who would act in an informal 
manner in the region.Ozdemir Bey's unofficial operation failed due to the lack of the 
sufficient logistic support from the Ankara Government. Therefore the Turkish 
government focused on to find a diplomatic solution to the Mosul Question. 
 
4.3 Peaceful Reactions to the British  
 
France wanted to settle with the Turks because of the French Muslim 
colonies. The struggle of the Allied Powers and the Turks caused discomfort, 
especially in North Africa. Curzon claimed in a memorandum circulated on 4th of 
January 1920 that France was supposed to create a Western Islamic world from Syria 
to Morocco in exchange for the Eastern Islamic world under the influence of 
Britain.604 France did not take much role in the implementation of the Treaty of 
Mondros. The British occupied the most important role in the occupation of Istanbul 
and the Straits, and the occupation of Izmir by Greeks also increased the influence of 
Britain in the Near East. As a result, the French thought that to fight against the 
Turks would not provide any advantage to France.605  
The anti-British demonstrations and activities of Indian Muslims after the 
occupation of Izmir were another factor which caused the British to reconsider their 
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Turkish policy. Sevket and Muhammad Ali, known as the Ali brothers, organized a 
series of Caliphate Conferences in India in the last months of 1919. An Indian 
Caliphate Council was established and some delegates sent to Europe to convey their 
ideas to allies. This and similar delegations met with British statesmen during the 
years 1920 and 1921 and requested that the Caliph’s status should be protected, and 
his sovereignty should continue just like before the war.606 Apart from this, the whole 
Indian Muslim Alliance, the Madras Presidency Muslim Alliance, the Council of the 
Muslim Alliance of the Provinces of Punjab607 and the Muslims of the Young 
Indian608 sent warning telegrams that Britain should respect the territorial integrity of 
Turkey. Meanwhile, aside from in India, in South Africa, Southeast Asia and even 
England Muslims were protesting against the Turkish policy of Britain.609  
The relations between Ankara and Moscow during the 1920s also disturbed 
England. Churchill and the Ministry of War indicated that some concessions must be 
made to Mustafa Kemal in order to prevent this relationship and the Ministry of War 
also reported that now the greatest danger in the East was Bolshevism and that the 
Turkish-Greek war pushed the Turks into the arms of the Bolsheviks. According to 
Churchill, Lloyd George had stated that the British Empire was the greatest Muslim 
power in the world and that the hostile reactions of Muslims would be exacerbated 
by the prolongation of anti-Turkish politics.610  
Meanwhile, the pressure of Indian Muslims, Muslim groups in Britain and the 
opposition on the British government continued increasingly. Lord Northcliffe wrote 
that after a 10-day trip to India, Hindu and Muslims were acting together for the first 
time in India's history and wrote that even moderate Muslims claimed that no peace 
could be achieved in India unless the three conditions were fulfilled.  
                                                          
606 Toynbee, Arnold, Survey of International Affairs 1925, (London, 1927). p. 49; PRO., F. O. 800/151, 
Private Papers of Lord Curzon, from M. H. Kidwai to  Mr. Montagu, 14 May 1921. 
607 PRO, FO. 371. E114022/275/44, E121111/275/44, E121114 / 275 / 44, E121236/275/44, 
E128924/275/44, E128965/275/44, August - October 1919. 
608 Hehir, P., ‘The Near East Crisis’, 19th Century and After, No: 149, November, 1922, p. 832. 
609 PRO, F. O. 371. E 156222 /275 /44; 15 October, 1919; PRO, F. O. 686/71, The Caliphate Question, 
British India, 29 July 1920. pp. 206-209. 
610 Gilbert, Martin, Winston S. Churchill, IV, 1917-1922, (London, 1975), p. 1260-1261. 
206 
 
The following three conditions were British approval of the Ottoman Sultan 
as the guardian of the Holy Lands and the head of the Muslims; the restitution of 
Edirne to the Turks and the abandonment of all Anatolian lands, including Izmir, to 
Turkey. 611  With the approval of Indian Secretary Montagu, a very close friend of 
Lloyd George, the Viceroy of India, Lord Reading, made a message to Montagu via 
the press on 8th of March 1922, to allow these pressures to be effective on the 
government. According to this message, Reading wanted the Government of India to 
fulfil the following three elements in order to protect the neutrality of the Straits and 
the Muslim minority: the evacuation of Istanbul by the Allied Powers, the 
recognition of the sovereignty of the Ottoman Sultan over the Holy Land and the 
restitution of Rumelia and Izmir to the Turks. This event led to controversy between 
the British government, especially Curzon and Montagu, and resulted in the 
resignation of Montagu on 10th of March 1922.612  
In May 1922, both the British and the Greeks understood that the Greek army 
had to be withdrawn from all Anatolia, including Izmir.613 Mustafa Kemal sent 
Ambassador of the Interior Ali Fethi Bey to London as ambassador to London in 
order to learn about Britain’s thoughts on peace before a final and definite attack 
against the Greeks.614 The British authorities did not welcome Ali Fethi Bey and did 
not want his participation in peace talks. The Daily Express newspaper criticized the 
lack of interest in Fethi Bey, by saying, 'people want peace and British forces to 
withdraw from the Near East'. The same day, and also on the next day, it suggested 
that the British people had declining confidence in Lloyd George's pro-Greek policy 
which had been criticized.615 Ali Fethi Bey reported on a telegram he sent to Ankara 
on 25th of August that Lloyd George and Lord Curzon were working for the 
disintegration of Turkey and that diplomatic initiatives would no longer provide any 
benefit and that the Greeks would not give up Britain's policy without a definite 
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defeat. Then the Great Offensive commenced on 26th of August and ended on 9th of 
September with the Greeks being thrown out of Izmir.616  
 
For the British government, what really mattered was to take the Straits under 
British rule. In a British cabinet meeting on 7th of September 1922, Lloyd George 
said that Gallipoli was "the most strategically important region of the world."617 
Curzon claimed that the Istanbul and Gallipoli peninsula would never be allowed to 
be captured by the Turks.618 Because Churchill thought that if the Turks could get the 
control of the Straits, again both England would lose its benefits in the region and a 
new Balkan war would be inevitable.619 Therefore the British cabinet decided not to 
withdraw British soldiers from the Anatolian side of the Straits after long 
discussions, but to resist and fight if Turks attempted to cross into Europe.620  
 
The crisis was discussed at the British cabinet meeting on September 15th. 
Lord Curzon opposed the military path to the advance of the Turkish troops. But 
Lloyd George and Churchill convinced the other ministers to make the decision to 
reinforce the forces in the Straits and to prevent the Turks from crossing to the 
European side.621 At the same time, it sought for ways to cooperate with France, 
Serbia, Romania and British colonies.622 With the full support of Lloyd George for 
this purpose, Churchill pointed to Britain's intention to reinforce the Harington forces 
but Canada and Australia rejected Britain's request for military support. South Africa 
did not even answer.623 Only New Zealand supported the new policy of Britain.624  
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The British public was also against a war with Turkey.625 On 18th of 
September, the Daily Mail published with "Stop this New War!" headline.626 Also 
there were news in the Daily Express and the Times newspapers that warned the 
British Cabinet to avoid war. The Daily Mail was published with the headline of 
"withdraw from Canakkale" on 21st of September and people were called to protest 
against the war.627 The same day the British Trade Union Congress reported to Lloyd 
George that the working class was "absolutely against the war" and would declare a 
strike if there was a war.628 British High Commissioner Horace Rumbold suggested 
to London that a conference could be arranged between the parties as soon as 
possible, arguing that Turks would not want to fight.  
Lord Curzon went to Paris on 19 September to meet with French Prime 
Minister Poincaré and Italian Ambassador Count Sforza in order to restore relations 
between the Allies. Curzon said to Poincaré that the issue of land in Anatolia was 
solved spontaneously by the last Turkish victory. He mentioned the Thracia issue and 
claimed that the solution of the Straits and Istanbul was so important that it could not 
be left to the Turks and reminded him of the French government's note on 14th of 
September stating the importance of preserving the neutral territory under the control 
of the Allied Powers. He asked why the French troops were retreating from the 
Turkish lands in Anatolia. Poincaré responded that France could not fight the Turks 
in Asia Minor for two reasons. Firstly, France could not ignore the fact that it was a 
Muslim power, and the growing disturbance in the Muslim colonies from Tunisia to 
China. Secondly, because of financial problems, the French could not send their 
forces to Asia Minor. Under these circumstances, neither the French Prime Minister 
nor the French Parliament could think of a war against the Turks. The only thing he 
could to recommend to Curzon was to withdraw the British troops from the 
Chanak.629 For the cease-fire negotiations, the parties announced that they would 
meet in Mudanya or İzmit.630  
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During the year 1922, the coalition government was also criticized not only 
for Lloyd George's foreign policy, but also for internal affairs such as the decision to 
hold an early election, Liberal-Conservative contests within the government 
disagreements over agricultural policy, and the Irish problem. But the Chanak crisis 
was the last straw to overflow, and eventually the Conservative Party MPs gathered 
at the Carlton Club to talk about the future of the coalition. Although Chamberlain 
spoke in favour of the coalition, MPs led by Bonar Law decided that the 
Conservative Party would enter the general elections as an independent party from 
the coalition.631 Lloyd George, on hearing this news, resigned the same day as prime 
minister. In the general elections held on 15th of November 1922, the Conservative 
Party won 344, the Labour Party 138, and the Liberals under Asquith 60 seats. The 
Liberals under the leadership of Lloyd George had suffered a major defeat by taking 
only 57 seats.632  
4.4 The Cost of Rebellions to England:  British Casualties 
 
The Britain that had first started to capture Iraqi lands with the invasion of 
Basra, later rapidly expanded her territorial dominance. With the expansion of the 
invasions, the British were obliged to develop mutual encounters not only with 
Arabs, but also with all societies living in Iraq. When we consider the matter with 
regard to our topic, the British tried to build their relations with the Kurds upon the 
foundation they had established since the 1800’s. This establishment process was 
built generally by winning the Kurdish notables with promises of money and posts, 
and if this did not work, by threatening. An attempt to explain how well these threats 
worked will be made in various sections of our thesis. The parties’ struggles for this 
purpose were mentioned in many news reports in the British media.  
 
In a news report published on 15th of September 1919,633 it was stated that the 
Kurds’ rebellious attacks against the British were punished. According to this news 
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report the British engaged the Kurds around Mosul and Zaho in August 1919. 
Although there was no information about the casualties, it is very interesting that the 
newspaper published the information that the region had been bombed. 
 
As a result of both the unrest between the Kurds after Sheikh Mahmud, and 
the unrest between the Arabs and other elements in Iraq and the public disorder, the 
British suffered heavy losses.  
 
When the information collected from different sources about British forces 
losses is examined, the number of dead, wounded, lost and captured British officials 
in 1920 can be determined. Accordingly, a total of 425 officers who served in British 
forces were killed in the clashes in 1920, including 54 British, 354 Indian and 17 
auxiliary forces officials. A total of 1228 officials were wounded634; including 100 
British, 1079 Indian and 49 supporting forces officials in the conflict in 1920s. A 
total of 451 officials missing; 141 British, 282 Indian and 28 supporting forces 
officials,  and a total of 164 officials were taken captive, including 136 British, 74 
Indian and 11 supporting forces officials in the clashes in 1920.635 
 
Despite such a table being available, it is interesting that during the debates in 
the House of Commons about the Kurdestan, on 10th March 1920, and  no 
information were stated to inform an attack against Christians in the regions heavily 
populated by the Kurds.636 However, it is seen that a report on the position of 
Christian inhabitants of Turkey was prepared on 11th March 1920.637 
 
The relationship of the Kurds with the British was always superficial. As can 
be seen, this relation was generally built on mutual interest. In other words, both the 
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Kurds and the British approached each other to obtain the maximum benefit from 
each other. The answer to the question ‘who made the most profit in this relation?’ 
would be, definitively, the British. However, the answer to the question ‘at what 
price was this benefit?’ is complicated. Thus, ‘the British Officers’ part of the price 
will be discussed briefly in this section. 
 
The confident and moderating attitude of the British authorities, and their 
confortable wandering among the Kurds with the confidence that nothing would 
happen to them yielded unexpected results. The first loss for the sake of realising 
British Kurdish policy was, as far as we could confirm, Captain Pearson, a British 
officer murdered in 1919. 638 Captain Pearson was murdered by the Goyan tribe on 
4th April 1919.639 
 
Apart from the writings about Captain Pearson, it is possible to find 
information about assassinations against the British in very few studies and archive 
documents. Among these, Gowan’s study, differently from others, asserted, when 
mentioning the murdered British, that the Kurds cut their ears off and sent them to 
other tribes around aiming at spreading terror in the region.640 
 
In the telegram, sent from the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force to General 
Headquarters on 7th April 1919, it was stated that the dead body of the captain was 
found in Zaho. It is seen in the document that the source of the information was the 
Mosul political officer. Humphrey Bowman, in his book641, included the criticism 
that the British did not observe the delicate balance in the region, and in mentioning 
the deaths in Zaho; we agree with this opinion. British officers thinking that they 
could act as they liked in the region, with their moderating attitude, paid the heavy 
price for it. 
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Cunliffe and Owen in their 1922 article titled “The Assyrian Adventure of 
1920” asserted that at that date Surchi tribe and Zibar Kurds were inimical to the 
British policy;642 they argued against the British politics to resettle the Assyrians to 
the region; and they were responsible for the murder of Mosul political officer J. H. 
H. Bill in 1919. It is likewise reported that Captain Scott, accompanying Mr. Bill, 
was also murdered near Bira Kapra by the Zibar tribe.643 
 
On 18th of February 1920, a meeting the Central Asia Society was organised 
at Burlington House in London. In the briefing at this meeting, given by Captain W. 
Ormsby Gore, member of parliament, Lord Carnock and some other British 
authorities, it was stated that five of the political officers assigned to the northern 
parts of Mosul had been murdered by the Kurds in the last five months and this 
outrage eliminated the picture of a friendly future with the Kurds.644 
 
When the studies that provided information on the 1920 assassinations are 
considered, we run across the information that the political officer of Kifri was 
murdered by the Kurds on 26th of August 1920.645 However, the information 
provided here needs to be corrected. The aforementioned officer was not the political 
officer of Kifri, but the deputy political officer Captain G. H. Salmon.646 
 
No wonder these rebellions had also a financial aspect and this financial 
aspect was not meaningless for the British.647 Even though Liora Lukitz648 stated that 
the rebellion had cost hundreds of British lives and £50 million but it should be 
considered that this amount was too high for only a rebellion. It would be more 
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reasonable to assume that this amount was spent for all the rebellion movements in 
1920 including the murder of Lieutenant Colonel Leachmen. 649 
 
Talbot Wilson making a general review of 1920 stated that 30 to 50 officers 
had been murdered or died due to illnesses in the last 6 months, and  50 -60 officers 
had been killed in the last year, up till September 1920.650 Of course it cannot be 
proved that all the casualties mentioned here belonged to the British officers 
murdered by the Kurds. The number provided by Talbot Wilson can be claimed to 
cover the total number of casualties in Iraq. 
 
As has been ascertained, by 1922, around 6,000 Iraqis and around 500 British 
and Indian soldiers died in the revolt.651 The revolt caused British officials to 
drastically reconsider their strategy in Iraq. The revolt cost the British government 
40,000,000 pounds which was twice the amount of the annual budget allotted for Iraq 
and a huge factor in reconsidering their strategy in Iraq. 
 
When it comes to 1922, we run across, in Philip Graves’ The Life of Percy 
Cox and Edmonds’ memoirs, the information that Captain Sidney Stephen Bond and 
Kenty McKant had been murdered.652 We also run across praise of the 
aforementioned officers and information that they had been killed in treachery by the 
Kurds, in Elizabeth Burgoyne’s Gertrude Bell: From Her Personal Papers 1914-
1926 and in the news reports of The Manchester Guardian.653 In another news report 
in The Manchester Guardian, it was reported that Captain J. F. Carvosso and First 
Lieutenant R. A. Burridge had been murdered by the Kurds in the shootouts in 
January 1922.654 
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In the telegram was sent by the High Commissioner of Baghdad to the 
Secretary of State for Colonies on 2nd of July 1922, information on how the British 
officers had been murdered was conveyed. According to this document Fitzgibbon 
had been murdered around Sulaymaniyah while chasing a fugitive who was now in 
custody.  In the document which reported that this event should be considered as an 
example of the anarchy supported by Mahmud Han Dizai at the north of Halabja, it 
was stated that this was also a typical example of how imperative an airborne attack 
on the region was. The telegram provided information that although Mahmud Han 
Dizai’s attitude towards the British was quite positive, he had serious problems with 
the Jaff aristocrats in Halabja. However, although it was well-known in 
Sulaymaniyah, that Mott and Hudson had been murdered by a thief; unclear 
information about the identity of this thief was provided. According to this 
information, the murderer of these people was one Sheikh Mahmud’s officers, who 
had participated in the 1919 rebellion. The behaviour of this person caused the levies    
to move towards Chamchamal region. 
 
In this document,655 which considered the only link between these two 
assassinations as the unrest unfolding in the region known as Southern Kurdistan, it 
was stated that the unrest was caused by two factors. The first of these was that the 
ones who had been confused by the Turkish propaganda after the failure in the peace 
negotiations with the Turks, had to make a decision; and the second was that the 
movement was oriented towards Iraq due to the improvement of the spirit of 
independence. 
 
Various comments could be made on why these officers and military 
attendants had been murdered. However, the most accurate comment was made by 
Fieldhouse. According to Fieldhouse, the main reason for the murder of these 
officers was the disregard and unfamiliarity of the officers about the customs, 
traditions, manners, practices and religious beliefs prevailing in the region.656 We 
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may argue that, this reason should be taken alongside the desire of the peoples of the 
region to resist British dominance over their region and their unwillingness to be 
separated from the Turks.  
 
Yıldız, in his comment on these assassinated officers, expressed his 
discomfort at these incidents’ being described as the attack of the Kurds upon 
western civilization.657 Again Yıldız states that658, in his study, grounded in French 
documents, these casualties were completely overlooked in British politics; however, 
this view is absolutely unacceptable. The British did not abstain from hailing down 
tons of bombs over the regions where their officers had been murdered, in the event 
of any assassination of any British servicemen. 
 
4.5 The Cost of the Rebellions to the Kurds: The Penalty Fines 
 
While on the one hand Britain tried to prevent anti-British incidents among 
Kurdish tribes by using force on the other hand British officers were trying to 
intimidate rebellious Kurds by imposing penalty fines. The documents found in the 
British archives can be shown as evidence of this situation. For instance, the 
document that shows the amounts of fines imposed on the Kurds in the Kirkuk and 
Kifri regions in September-October 1920.659 The document gives information about 
the dates of the penalties given to tribes, and the amount of fines and their payment 
dates, the amount of arms and ammunition that were confiscated by British forces. 
When the amount of penalties is analysed it can be seen that the maximum penalty 
was given to Daudi Kurds. Referring to the document, the Daudi Kurds paid a 35.000 
rupee fine. The Daudi Kurds also were forced to deliver 30 modern and 100 normal 
weapons to the British officers. Again according to this document the British 
officials collected 100 weapons and 10.000 small arms and ammunition from Bayat 
Kurds. This was the maximum amount of ammunition confiscated from a single 
tribe. 
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As mentioned above, British forces inflicted numerous casualties, and this 
was causing problems in domestic politics. Britain had allies in the region so in the 
order she established during her dominion of Iraq, England wanted to take advantage 
as far as possible of local forces. In this context, the British wanted to establish small 
units which consist of the levies    from local forces such as Arabs, Kurds and 
Assyrians. Although the biggest supporters of the British during the rebellions both 
in 1919 and after this date were the Şerif family members, the levies, established by 
the combination of various societies, should also be indicated as an addition to this 
force. 
 
For the administration of the local levies   , which started to be formed in 
1920, 32 British officers and 59 local Iraqi soldiers were commissioned. By year 
1920, approximately 7,000 soldiers were assigned to these troops. A monthly salary 
of 775 rupees for single men, and 1,550 rupees for married ones was paid.  It is 
known that the local levies    comprised of three cavalry troops, two of them from 
Kurds, and the other one from Assyrians; of three infantry troops, one Kurdish, two 
Assyrian; and one Assyrian support unit. 
 
The British took many precautions against Sheikh Mahmud’s rebellion. 
Indeed, the British did not only use British or Indian troops to repress the rebellions 
in Iraq in general and especially in the regions heavily populated by the Kurds, but 
also they used the Levies   , who had members from various societies such as Arabs, 
Kurds and Assyrians.   
 
4.6 The Royal Air Force (RAF) and Its Operations Against 
Rebellious 
 
After the occupation of Mosul, the British hesitated to decide on the political 
future of Mosul. There was not consensus among the British officers in Mesopotamia 
and London about the future of Mosul.British agents in the region had mainly two 
separate proposals in their reports to the British Foreign Office. While some 
suggested leaving Mosul to Iraq in terms of Iraq's future and British interests, the 
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agents considering the ethnic structure of the region were proposing to be included in 
the borders of the Kurdish federation to be established.  
The attitude of the British, the French and the Americans supporting the 
Armenians led to an increase in the Kurds' suspicions of the European states, 
especially Britain. The French supported the Armenians so the Armenians started to 
join the French military forces. In addition to that the British supported Christian 
Nestorian and the Assyrians in the region and they joined the British armed services. 
British support to the Armenians and the uncertainty of the British policy on the 
Kurds caused opposition of the Kurds to the British. Thereupon to reduce the Kurds' 
hostile reactions and to protect British interests in the region the British formed 
formed a unit of government named ‘South Kurdistan’ under the rule of Sheikh 
Mahmud, who had influence over the Kurds. But in the sixth month of his reign 
Sheikh Mahmud revolted against the British in May 1919 and British aircrafts 
located in British air bases660 in Mesopotamia served to suppress the revolt.661  
Meanwhile, the Kurds in Mardin registered their allegiance to the Ottoman 
Empire by sending a memorandum to the Ottoman Government. They wanted the 
government to intervene in their problems. For example, the Kurds in Erzurum and 
in Diyarbakır also declared their allegiances to the Ottoman Empire by sending 
telegrams.662 Because the Ottoman Government could not meet the Kurdish demands 
for help, the Kurds worried about their future. But after Mustafa Kemal started the 
national resistance movement the worries of the Kurds decreased. The reactions of 
the Kurds and the British officials to the propaganda were clarified with the Erzurum 
Congress (23 July - 7 August 1919). A statement issued after the Sivas Congress (4 - 
11 September 1919) emphasized that there was no problem between the Turks and 
Kurds and they would live as two independent siblings that were inseparable from 
each other.663 Already, a large number of Kurdish representatives participated in the 
Sivas Congress. In the Amasya talks, it was emphasized that the Kurds were not 
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allowed to leave Ottoman society. Also Mustafa Kemal had sent letters to the 
Kurdish leaders such as Abdurrahim Agha and Sheikh Mahmud in August 1919 to 
ask for their support against the British forces. The support of the Kurds to the Turks 
increasingly continued after the congresses. The Kurdish delegations of Diyarbakir, 
Mosul and Bitlis repeatedly declared their support by participating in the Turkish 
national movement.664 The Milli and Karakeçili tribes also agreed and declared that 
they would join armed to resist against the occupation.665  
Meanwhile, news about the establishment of an Armenian state on the 
Turkish territory and the support of Britain cooled the tribes in the region from 
England and caused them to move in common with the Turks.666 As it mentioned by 
Calthorpe in his report sent to the Foreign Office on 29th July 1919, the Armenian 
issue was bringing the Kurds back into line with the Turks. According to him British 
support for Armenia at the Paris Peace Conference changed the attitude of the Kurds 
against the British in a negative way.667  Meanwhile, a TGNA delegation headed by 
Foreign Minister Bekir Sami was sent to Moscow to conduct negotiations with 
Russian delegates to get Russian support for the Turkish National Movement. The 
representatives arrived in Moscow on the 20th July 1920 and began negotiations with 
the Russian delegation. During the negotiations Georgy Chicherin (People's 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Russian SFSR) proposed the Armenian 
question for the agenda, and demanded the Eastern Anatolia lands (Van and Bitlis) 
be put Armenia. His demand was rejected by the Turkish delegates.668 But the 
demands of Georgy Chicherin and his support to the Armenians frightened the Kurds 
and supporting the Turks became more logical for future of the Kurds and Kurdish 
support to the Turks against the British increasingly continued. For the Kurds, to 
leave the Turkish sovereignty was to enter the Armenian sovereignty. The fear that 
lands of the Kurds would be given the under the control of Armenia was the main 
factor that encourage Kurds to have a unity and protect their lands. This fear brought 
Kurds closer to the Turks. Further on, it is reported that the Karaağaç tribe began 
establishing a militia organization of twelve thousand people.669 Because of these 
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anti-British activities in South-eastern Anatolia the British authorities in Istanbul 
started to be worried. In September British bomber aircrafts were used to suppress 
the revolts. According to the news670 the Kurds around Mosul and Zaho were 
bombed by the RAF bomber aircrafts on 15th September 1919 and the rebellious 
Kurds were punished.The concerns of the British officers were also seen in the their 
reports. Colonel Meinertzhagen in his telegram dated 23rd September 1919, to Lord 
Curzon reported that Mustafa Kemal was attempting to unite the Turks, the Kurds 
and the Arabs to push the invaders out of Ottoman lands.671 In the meantime, the 
Kurds in Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah were reported to have revolted against the 
British.672  
In 1921, the British had formed an area of influence in Iraq. In March 1921 
Britain, seeking to alleviate resistance, decided to support Faisal as the king of the 
administration under the British mandate in Iraq and Faisal came to the throne in 
August 1921. But Kurds in Mesopotamia preferred to stand with the Turks rather 
than to live under the rule of the Arabian Faisal, who was the king of the British 
patronage Arabian state Iraq.673 And the resistance against the British became 
stronger. 
Until 1921 only limited use was made of the RAF to suppress riots. However, 
after 1921, the air forces began to be used frequently to suppress rebellions, as it 
would reduce both war costs and military personnel losses but would increase the 
civil losses.674  
On 31st August 1922 Ozdemir Bey attacked the British with their troops. 
Ozdemir's troops, which won the Derbent Battle, captured six machine guns and two 
pieces of artiller in this battle with many items from the British army. Then British 
aircraft started to bomb but Ozdemir's troops shot down four of the low altitude 
British bomber aircraft.675  
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Mustafa Kemal Pasha's statements about Mosul and his promises of a 
plebiscite   influenced local people so as to encourage them to act against the British 
in October 1922. Then the British began bombing Koi Sanjak, İmadiye and Dinart as 
from 17th October 1922 to punish the tribes those in the target area of the British. The 
British aircraft often bombed the territories and villages in which anti-British tribes 
lived, with their fields and herds. On 15th December 1922, the air strike which was 
carried out with 22 aircrafts and continued for an hour and a half and caused fires on 
every side of the Koi Sanjak. 
The British, who had been waiting for a while after the air and land troops-
assisted operations that the British had conducted against Köysancak and Imadiye 
had failed, began to attack again. The British Ministry of War decided to reinforce 
the eighth squadron which was under the command of General John Salmon. General 
Salmon began operations in Northern Iraq at the beginning of February 1923 and 
focused its military operations on Sheikh Mahmut and Ozdemir.676 The number of 
the British aircraft was increased to a hundred by adding new aircrafts that would 
operate in the region at that time. The aircrafts were supported by two Indian 
brigades, one infantry and the other one cavalry. There were volunteer troops of 
around 4,000 Nasturi and Armenians and about 1,500 tribal troops.677  The bombers 
bombed Rene, Derbent and the other cities in the region.678 
In these explorations conducted by planes, statements were made in order to 
cause psychological effects on the public, trying to spread the idea that the tribes 
preferred British rule, and in other ways which reduced confidence in the Turkish 
government.679  
Meanwhile, attacks of British aircraft continued unabated. Ozdemir Bey 
reported that his artillerymen shot down two bomber aircrafts in January 1923.680 On 
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2nd March 1923 while the rebellion of the Sheikh Mahmud continued the British 
aircrafts bombed Sulaymaniyah and the city was ruined.681  
While the Lausanne negotiations continued, the British-Iraqi troops in Mosul 
launched an attack against the Turkish-Kurdish forces on 8th April 1923, with one of 
them on the Hodran Suyu in the direction of the Devil's Strait, and the other on the 
Great Zap Suyu in the direction of Serderya. Many of the soldiers from both sides 
were killed during the raids on 11/12 April night. After a while, the British, who paid 
more attention to air attacks, attacked with more airplanes on 13th April and the 
British attacks were exacerbated further on 19th April 1923. 
Ozdemir Bey, who realized that he could not stay in the region any longer, 
decided to withdraw to Iran on 23rd April 1923. Ozdemir reached Van on 10th May 
1923 and the Turkish military operation, which began in 1922, ended.682 General 
Salmon continued his campaign after Ozdemir Bey took refuge in Iran. The British 
policy, which aimed to completely suppress the tribes in the region, was fully 
implemented. Many pro-Turkish Kurds were forced to move away from the region in 
order to avoid being followed by the British.683  
As can be seen the RAF had been used regularly and effectively after the 
establishment of the British domination in Iraq and in the revolts since the 1919-1920 
rebellions.684 Kurds were well armed and talented warriors. In addition to that, Anti-
British Kurds knew the topography of the region so they would frequently spring 
ambushes on British forces. That was why they caused many casualties in British 
forces. British officers joined local people in the British armies. Because pro-British 
local powers also knew the region; thus they would make a major contribution to the 
British forces. But it was not enough to decrease the loss of the personnel. The 
reason was that guerrilla tactics were practised successfully by the Kurds in the 
mountainous areas. The importance of the activities of the RAF can be better 
understood by taking in to account the geographical features of the region. The RAF 
aircraft would be used to observe the region and attack the rebels in the mountainous 
areas and this could give crucial advantages to the British forces. In virtue of the 
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aircrafts British forces’ casualties were reduced and the war costs and the reactions 
of the British public opinion would be minimized. 685  According to Wilson, the 
Royal Air Forces (RAF) made major contributions, such as making easier the control 
of densely populated region, and the protection of communication and roads in 
Mesopotamia, to the protection of the railway bridges and the petroleum filling 
plants. 686 
It is clear that, the more efficient use of the RAF started in 1921 when 
Winston Churchill was the Secretary of State for the Colonies and RAF involved 
many operations against the rebels especially between the years of 1921-1923.687 The 
Cairo Conference, where the question of enhancing the effectiveness of RAF was 
also in the agenda, turned out to be a milestone not only for the RAF, but also for 
reshaping of Middle East map.688 Again, Churchill thought that expenses for Iraq 
must be limited by taking Britain’s economic situation into consideration. But he 
emphasized that these limiting precautions must be done at such a level that it should 
not harm British sovereignty either in the short, medium or long term. Churchill 
stated that the way to sustain British long term plans concerning the region, and 
limiting expenses was to effectively use the RAF (Royal Air Force), and he created a 
sub-unit responsible for sustaining these activities in his own Colonial Office 
between the years 1920 and 1921.This sub-unit included following names: J. E. 
Shuckburgh from the India Bureau, Major Hubert Young from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Basra’s old Consul R. W. Bullard, Richard Meinertzhagen, an old 
political military officer chief in Philistine, and Colonel T. E. Lawrence.689  
 
Nadia Atia, in her article called “Mesopotamian Myths” 690 mentions that 
131,000 soldiers with modern arms were involved in the rebellions by Arabs and 
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Kurds in 1920 but even so the British army forces could not suppress these 
rebellions. She criticised the consequences of RAF involvement leading to the deaths 
of many women and children. Izady also severely criticises the use of the RAF 
against Kurds. According to him British forces applied a disproportionate level of 
force to the local community and air bombings turned civilians into targets.691 
Indeed, as can be seen from the newspapers692 the RAF carried out numerous 
operations on the anti-British Kurds. The documents found in the Turkish archives 
also give information about RAF operations against anti-British peoples in the 
Mesopotamian region. According to these documents the RAF operations were really 
effective in the region and a great number of Turkish-Kurdish casualties were 
suffered during the bombing.693 
 
It has been claimed that gas bombs were used on the region by the British 
bomber aircrafts as well. Related with this claim, a recorded graph was found in the 
archives of British Air Ministry. When this graphic was analysed, it is not hard to 
understand England preferred using the Air Forces rather than the land forces.  
According to this graphic, it is seen that RAF had a developed system which would 
drop one gas bomb in two minutes from an airplane where speed was 75 miles in an 
hour and at the height of 2000 feet and this bomb would affect an area of half mile. 
With the help of this technology it would be easier to completely dominate over the 
region. Similar information on this topic was given by Howard Kaplan. In 2007, in 
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his article for a magazine on the enhancement of RAF activities, Howard Kaplan 
asserted that Churchill was offered the use of toxic gas against the Iraqi Kurds but 
this was not put into effect as the RAF lacked the necessary technical capability for 
its use. 
 
It can be claimed that the RAF operations made a major contribution to the 
assertion of British interests. With the RAF operations a large number of anti-British 
rioters were eliminated in a short time and British casualties reduced to a minimum 
level.  Thanks to the use of bombing, British forces could launch operations in 
numerous places at one time and also psychological pressure was established on anti-
British demonstrators. Through the efforts of British officials and RAF activities 
some Kurdish tribes went over to the British side.694 
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CONCLUSION 
 
At the end of the First World War, the Kurds did not form a political entity 
but were in essence a group of tribes without real unity or harmony between them. 
According to Bell, to establish an independent Kurdish state under protection of 
Britain was too dangerous politically. She had serious doubts as to whether the Kurds 
could overcome the difficulties those they would face as a independent state. 
Kurdistan was recognized as a geographic name for the area centred on the region of 
Anatolia around Diyarbakır, Bitlis and Van, and spreading to Kirkuk. In southern 
Kurdistan, the Kurdish part of Mosul vilayet, Kurdish attempts to establish a Kurdish 
State were more intense than in Anatolia after against. The most effective resistance 
against to the Turks was led by the most active Kurdish leader Sheikh Mahmud 
Barzanji. At the end of the war Sheikh Mahmud captured the Ottoman governor and 
garrison and asked for help from England to establish the Kurdish nation as liberated 
people. The biggest supporter of the establishment of a Kurdish state Major Noel was 
assigned to Kirkuk. As can be seen in his reports after coming to Suleymaniyah and 
visiting some Kurdish notables his confidence in establishing a Kurdish state in the 
region was increased.  On 1st of December 1918, at the end of the meeting with a 
group that introduced themselves as representatives of Kurdistan, a number of 
Kurdish leaders submitted a declaration that showed their acceptance of the British 
authority. Moreover, the Civil Commissioner was asked to send a representative to 
provide the necessary assistance in order to advance peace in the civilized line of the 
Kurdish people in a British protectorate. The Kurds would accept the orders and 
recommendations of British Government, if the ruler had provided protection to 
them. Mahmud claimed that Mosul had the authority to establish an autonomous 
state, of which he would be the head, embracing all Kurds, including those from Iran 
and most other places. Nevertheless, Mahmud stated that  if feasible he would like to 
facilitate the tasks of establishing an Arab state in the rest of Mesopotamia. Upon 
instructions from London Major Noel travelled to the western and northern Kurdish 
areas and had meetings with Kurdish leaders and he introduced the new system of 
government to them. Major Noel got plenty of support from the Kurdish leaders, 
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after promising them that an independent Kurdish state would be provided by the 
courtesy of the British.  
As may be realized the belief of Noel in Kurdish autonomy would never 
decrease, but the experienced officer Wilson always found it difficult to assess to 
what extent they could succeed in creating union between the Kurdish leaders when 
there was so much serious competition between them. Because of this the attempts to 
establish a Kurdish State were seen as an artificial product of the personal ambitions 
of the Kurdish leaders. 
The appointment of Sheikh Mahmud, who was seen by Major Noel as the 
Sulaymaniyah representative of Britain, as a governor of Lower Zap and Iranian 
border, which was referred as Kurdish Area B, was an important step. Despite his 
undoubted status amongst Kurds and his successful resistance to the Turks Talbot 
Wilson saw Sheikh Mahmud as threat to government and his assignation lacked 
legitimacy. The activities of Major Noel attracted the attention of the national 
movement leaders in Ankara and the leader of the Turkish national movement 
Mustafa Kemal Pasha ordered Noel’s arrest. The over-enthusiastic activities of Major 
Noel to establish a Kurdish State also led to a hostile reaction from Wilson. For these 
reasons, Major Noel was recalled and Major Soane was sent to the region to engage 
in discussions with Kurdish notables. Major Soane had supported a Kurdish State but 
with strictly British-style government. Kifri and Kirkuk, two important districts, were 
removed from the autonomous Kurdish area in early 1919. Wilson saw his deal with 
Mahmud as a temporary concession until British control could be effectively 
provided. As Wilson wanted to keep Sheikh Mahmud under control he appointed 
officers who had similar outlooks by his own to rule over the vicinity of 
Sulaymaniyah.  
Eventually, Sheikh Mahmud attacked the British garrison; he took control of 
the garrison and arrested British officers. He confiscated the funds and the 
ammunition in the garrison and he raised a Kurdish flag after lowering the British 
flag. The idea of Mahmud establishing a Kurdish State was certainly reasonable. The 
autonomous area already had Kurdish as its official language and had its own armed 
forces. Although he took the control of some of the districts there were still some 
districts such as Halabja he could not get under control, even though it was close to 
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Sulaimaniyah. Like some local tribal leaders, some important Kurd leaders such as 
the Baban and Bedirhan families rejected the claim of Sheikh Mahmud to become 
the King of Kurdistan. The reaction of the British was also immediate and strong.  A 
battalion of soldiers was sent to the region in order to suppress the rebellion of 
Sheikh Mahmud, when he was captured. After capture, he was put on trial and 
sentenced to death. The British thought that they could benefit from Sheikh Mahmud 
in the future so his sentenced was changed to one of exile to British controlled India. 
Meanwhile, the Turkish struggle under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal 
Pasha was begun in Turkey. The Turkish people reacted to the Allied powers' 
occupation of the Turkish territories where under the pretext of Articles 7 and 24 of 
the Mondros Armistice. The reactions shown were also preparing the ground for new 
occupations. For this reason, Mustafa Kemal Pasha was sent to Samsun as the 9th 
Army Inspector to suppress the unrest in the east of Anatolia and the Black Sea and 
to control the delivery of the arms of the Turks to the representatives of the Allied 
Powers.  
But his main aim was different. Just after coming to Samsun on 19th May of 
1919, in order to understand the situation in the region Mustafa Kemal Pasha held 
meetings with the Turkish officers and local people. His area of responsibility 
covered Trabzon, Erzurum, Van, Sivas, Elazığ and Samsun. These cities were 
relatively safe places compared with others. In his reports, he noted that the unrest 
was caused not by the Turks in the region, but by the minorities. During that period 
the Istanbul Government was silent against the occupations.  Mustafa Kemal Pasha 
published the Havza Circular (28/29 May 1919), by which, contrary to his duty, he 
invited the whole nation to send protest notes to the authorities and to organize 
protests against the invasions. By reacting against the invasions Mustafa Kemal 
fulfilled the role of the long-awaited leader. He refused to deliver the ammunition to 
the Allied Powers officers, because it would be used to retain Turkish lands. The 
Allied Powers reacted strongly to the circular and 67 Turkish intellectual were exiled 
to Malta. Mustafa Kemal was called back to Istanbul but he disobeyed the order and 
went to Amasya and declared the Amasya Circular (22 June 1919).  
By the Amasya Circular it was announced that the unity and the 
independence of the nation was at great risk. The Istanbul Government could not 
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exert the authority they held and the situation of the nation looked dire. 
Independence of the nation could be saved only by determination and faith of the 
nation. To achieve the purposes of the nation and to defend the nation's rights, a 
national committee free of restraint and inspection should be established. The 
congress would be held in Sivas which was the safest place in any case. For this 
purpose by the members of Müdafaa-i Hukuk and Redd-i İlhak three people from 
every province would be selected as representatives. In any case the representatives 
were not to use their real identities on the road and this circular needed to be kept as 
a national secret. For the east side cities at July 10th there would be a congress at 
Erzurum. Until that date if the other representatives could reach Sivas the ones in the 
east cities would go to Sivas. In brief, the justification, purpose and method of the 
War of Independence had been determined in the Amasya Circular. The Government 
of Istanbul was ignored. For the first time, to establish an administration based on 
national sovereignty was offered. All citizens were called to fight against invaders in 
Anatolian lands. 
By the participation of 62 representatives from the eastern cities of Anatolia 
the congress of Erzurum was held between the dates of 21st July and 7th August 1919. 
The Erzurum Congress had many characteristics in terms of the decisions taken, but 
one of the most important of them was the decision to establish unconditional 
national sovereignty for the first time by rejecting the mandate and protection of any 
country. Moreover, the Erzurum Congress mentioned for the first time the national 
borders and it was announced that  the border of the Turkish homeland, would be the 
territory which was signed by the Mondros Armistice Agreement.  
The Erzurum Congress was a national congress in terms of decisions taken 
despite the fact that it was a regional congress in terms of the way it was gathered. 
That is why the decisions taken in the Erzurum Congress were accepted by the Sivas 
Congress which was held between 4th and 11th September 1919. In addition to that, 
by the decisions was taken at Sivas Congress, the nation would resist all kinds of 
foreign occupation and intervention and would defend itself as a whole thereafter; all 
the societies in Anatolia and Rumeli would be gathered under the name of Anadolu 
ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti. In order to organize the resistance a 
representative committee (Heyet-i Temsiliye) that consisted of 16 people was 
constituted and Mustafa Kemal was elected as head of the committee. 
229 
 
 
After all the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) was opened on 23rd 
April 1920 and the regular army was established. Thanks to the regular army the 
Ankara government had many victories over Armenians in Eastern Anatolia and over 
British-supported Greek forces in Western Anatolia. After the victory over the 
Armenians, the Treaty of Alexandropol (Gümrü) was signed on 3rd December 1920 
and the Armenian threat on the Turkish lands was ended. By the help of the regular 
army victories over British supported Greek armies, European Powers such as 
Russia, France and Italy wanted to have close relationships with newly established 
Ankara Government and National Forces. By this means both moral and material 
support were provided and Britain was increasingly isolated. 
The Kurds were now constantly stalled and given evasive replies by the 
British and the boundaries of the possible Kurdish state were not determined in any 
way. For these reasons the Kurds were disappointed in the British and some anti-
British demonstrations were organized. After the elimination of the Armenian danger 
the Kurds stood on the Turkish side as they had before. 
Although the future of Kurdistan was still undecided, it was not in any case 
envisaged that it would go beyond loose political control and the establishment of an 
indirect British administration. After the uprising of Sheikh Mahmud the British, 
who thought they were supporting the spread of the British influence over the Kurds 
in southern Kurdistan, realized that they were wrong. After that, the British preferred 
to have close contact with South Kurdistan in Baghdad, and they decided to start 
extension works to the railway network in the region. 
Meanwhile, the Kurdish attacks against the British continued increasingly, 
and in assassinations many important British officers lost their lives. Because of the 
mountainous and rough terrain, and the guerrilla tactics of the Kurds, and ambushes 
so many British officers were killed. In response before the British authorities 
wanted to deter those who opposed them by going to the destruction of their 
possessions. British authorities began to use air forces, seeing the difficulty of 
operating in Kurdish territory with land forces. Already in the British reports 
prepared earlier, it was reported that British troops could be in a difficult situation in 
a possible war with the Kurds. Although the air attacks of the Royal Air Force have 
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caused massive damage to the Kurds, it was not possible to establish full British 
control over them. 
As was occasionally mentioned in the British reports, the Kurds needed to be 
directed and kept under control. In the light of recent developments it was clear that 
Britain did not control the area, but that the Turks would, as in the past, be able to 
control it. In one sense, this could be better than to deal with ungovernable Kurds. 
But again the continuation of Turkish domination in the region was against the 
interests of Britain. Most of the British officers, except a few officers such as Major 
Noel, did not fully believe that the Kurdish nation with with strong and vibrant tribal 
traditions, could establish an independent or even an autonomous Kurdish state. 
There was no unity among the Kurds and none of the potential leaders had the 
support of the majority. It was hard to tell how far a national movement existed and 
how far it was the artificial product of the individual desires of the Kurdish leaders, 
who saw in Kurdish autonomy a unique chance for extending their own interests. 
The British Cabinet was still working to find a clear policy line in April 1920, 
Montagu was still supporting an independent Kurdish state but although months 
passed the British officers could not succeed in finding a proper leader who could 
establish an absolute authority or indeed a leader who was supported by the majority 
of the Kurds. Time was passing, and the possibility of Kurdish independence became 
more confusing as long as the delay continued and the construction of the new Iraqi 
state proceeded. The oil resources in Kirkuk found no room in the cabinet's talks but 
as its potential became better known, Iraq seemed to have a vital importance for for 
the future. Establishing an independent or autonomous Kurdish State alone and 
maintaining its existence could have had very dangerous consequences. The best way 
for the Kurds might be joining Iraq. Despite their ethnic discrimination and their 
avoidance of Arab sovereignty, the Kurds were reconciled to the Iraqi government 
under Sunni management. As Sunnis, they would help to balance the potentially 
disturbing Shiite majority in Iraq. 
The biggest obstacle to the establishment of the autonomous state was the 
inability to establish a Kurdish union in the region. Especially in Rowanduz, the 
spread of the continuing unrest in other regions damaged both British and Kurdish 
interests. The Middle East Department assumed the responsibility for southern 
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Kurdistan, which was included in the Mosul province, but only when the local people 
voluntarily joined a Kurdish State. 
On 15 March at the Cairo conference Churchill assembled a committee 
consisting of Lawrence, Cox, Bell, Young and Noel, to discuss Kurdistan. In the 
meeting Mosul and Kirkuk were considered to be an integral part of Iraq; and it was 
decided that purely Kurdish territories should not be included in the Arab State of 
Mesopotamia. But to decide which parts of Kurdistan would join Iraq was not an 
easy question. So it was decided to determine the precise area after the treaty which 
would be signed with Turkey. Until then a committee which had a British adviser 
would run the developments. Lloyd George believed that there would be a separate 
Kurdish zone, and the question to be decided was whether as part of Kurdistan or 
Mesopotamia. The most likely possibility was to leave Mosul, Tel Afar and maybe 
Kirkuk to the Arabian Iraq while the outposts of Mosul, such as Sulaymaniyah and 
maybe Kirkuk would be garrisoned by Assyrian levies    and the Kurds.  
The unification of some parts of Kurdistan with Iraq made drawing the border 
impracticable. Iraq would also be a more powerful state with the participation of the 
Kurds. Thus a more powerful Iraq State would be a more effective barrier to the 
Turks than any buffer state, such as Kurdistan. But it led to some problems in the 
region for the British. It would be difficult to keep a powerful state under British 
control. The area was managed with a delicate balance and a wrong decision could 
disrupt all the balances in the region. So it had to be considered carefully before any 
action.  
When the Paris Peace Conference convened in January 1919, the all the 
powers, except Russia, agreed that the Ottoman lands to be partitioned. The Straits 
would be brought to an international position, Armenia, Syria, Palestine and 
Mesopotamia would leave the Ottoman Empire. Between France and England, 
however, there was disagreement about partition of the Turkish lands. Meanwhile, 
Lloyd George added another region, to be cut off from Turkey. This was "Kurdistan 
between Mesopotamia and Armenia". Thus, the issue of the removal of Kurdistan 
from Turkey which was launched by the British, was immediately accepted by the 
other states.  
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The British wanted to take the Kurds under their control. Thus they would use 
the Kurds as a trump card in Mesopotamia and Iran, against Arabs, Iranians and even 
the some Kurdish tribes who collaborated with the Turks. The inclusion of Kurdistan 
in the list of lands to be obtained from Turkey was a sign of the new policies of the 
British. It was even considered that in 1918 the British would establish an 
independent Kurdish state in the summer under British supervision. Thus, Turkey 
would be prevented from maintaining the region between Armenia and 
Mesopotamia. Moreover, it would be also a buffer zone for the all-important oil 
regions. The British Civilian Commissioner Arnold Wilson was commissioned to 
establish an independent South Kurdistan State with the help of the British. The 
Kurdish issue was especially important for the British so they established contact 
with the Kurdish elements and supported the establishment of the nationalists. The 
most important of these organisations was the "Kurdistan Teali Society" under the 
leadership of Sayyid Abdulkadir. This community wanted to apply the Wilson 
Principles to provide autonomy to the Kurds.  And finally on 30th of January 1919 
with the support of Britain "Kurdistan" was mentioned as the land to be separated 
from Turkey for the first time at the Paris Peace Conference. On top of that, there 
was intense Kurdish propaganda in Istanbul and in Anatolia. For this purpose, 
Kurdish newspapers and magazines were published, Kurdish dictionaries were 
prepared and intensive propaganda activities were carried out for the Kurdish people 
to be accepted as the official language for reviving Kurdish nationalism. 
Şerif Pasha, who was a representative of the Ottoman Liberal Turks in Paris, 
represented himself as a Kurdish representative and tried to convince the delegates to 
decide in favour of the Kurds. On the other hand, Major Noel was sent to 
Mesopotamia then Anatolia to investigate whether the Kurdish people were qualified 
to manage themselves or not. While these activities were going on for the Peace 
Conference, a consensus was declared between Serif Pasha and Boghos Nubar Pasha 
from the Armenian delegates. On 20th of November 1919, the joint declaration 
proposing the unification of independent Armenia and Kurdistan was presented to 
the conference as a motion. However, the joint declaration published by Serif Pasha 
and Boghos Nubar Pasha received many negative reactions from many Kurdish 
leaders and tribes, especially Sayyid Abdulkadir. This led to new groupings among 
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the Kurds. In other words, a compromise between the Armenians and the Kurds was 
planned, but this declaration led to the formation of a new opponent grouping. 
The British had contacted the Grand Vizier Damat Ferit Pasha, thinking that 
the settlement of the Kurdish issue was in the power of the Istanbul Government. On 
16th of April 1920, Admiral de Robeck sent a letter to the British Foreign Office 
saying that Damat Ferit Pasha told him that Kurdish leader Sayyid Abdulkadir was 
ready to attack the Turkish Nationalists. The Admiral requested that the plan be 
supported on the basis of the will of the Peace Conference. Damat Ferit Pasha 
repeated that Kurdish leaders were against the invasion of Bolshevik element into 
Kurdistan and thus stated that they were ready to oppose Mustafa Kemal. Some of 
the Kurdish leaders did not agree with the map drawn by Wilson for Armenia, and 
some struggles developed between those who wanted an Armenian mandate and 
those who wanted an autonomous Kurdistan. 
The Treaty of Sèvres promised the formation of a self-governing Kurdish 
State which would have the right to request the League of Nations for full 
independence after 12 months. But that right was bound to many conditions and a 
year period. This was certainly a stalling tactic of the British Foreign Office. The 
Foreign Office wanted to assess the situation during the time. The Grand National 
Assembly under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal announced that the treaty of Sèvres 
was repudiated. In February 1920, the National Pact was declared and it was 
announced that Mosul was unalienable historic Turkish territory and would not be 
abandoned. As a result of Turkish victories over Greek forces in Western Anatolia 
the implementation of British promises for establishing an autonomous Kurdish state 
was delayed.  
In 1921, Turkish infiltration in Kurdistan intensified. A Kemalist battalion 
under the command of Özdemir Bey advanced to Rawanduz in the summer of 1921, 
hoping to start a rebellion amongst the Surchi. The British could only respond with 
Royal Air Force (RAF) attacks, which failed to remove the Turks from the places 
that they captured. The Turkish moves became more threatening in 1922 and Koi and 
Qala Diza were captured by the Turkish forces while Rania was seized by a group of 
Kurdish tribes who revolted against the British. The Turks and the Kurds began to 
cooperate against the British.  The British would be caught between two fires. The 
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possible achievements of the Turkish and Kurdish troops against the British could 
also cause great damage to the interests and position of Britain in the region. The 
moves made by Britain with utmost care for years could come to naught. 
Following all these developments in order to regain their authority over the 
Kurds and put an end to the anti-British rebellions, Britain brought back Sheikh 
Mahmud, who had previously been exiled, to Sulaymaniyah and appointed him as 
governor. 
Sheikh Mahmud gradually re-established his authority in Sulaymaniyah and 
even got more support than the first time. The influence of Sheikh Mahmud was 
increasing day by day and it was a sign of nationalist extremism. In 1922, Cox 
insisted on limits to the authority of Sheikh Mahmud and deprived him of the help he 
needed to fulfil the British demand to throw the Turkish forces out of Rawanduz. 
However, the attempts of Cox to revive the candidacy of a rival Kurdish leader, 
Sayyid Taha resulted in failure. 
Research has shown that Kurdish leaders, especially Sharif Pasha, Sheikh 
Mahmoud, Sayyid Abdulkadir and Sayyid Taha, made intensive efforts to establish 
an autonomous or independent state under their leadership. For this purpose they 
entered talks with Britain, France and even the Turks. It is seen that the Kurds relied 
especially on England for the establishment of Kurdish autonomy. The main reason 
for this was that some officers acting on behalf of Britain, especially Major Noel, 
gave promises, beyond their authority, that they would not be able to keep. Britain 
paid maximum attention in to the moves they made in the region. From time to time 
the British had been threatened by the Kurds because of their cautious approach to 
the Kurdish issue and as a result, the Kurds started several rebellions against the 
British. 
At the end of October 1922, the days after the government of Lloyd George 
collapsed and resignation of Churchill from Colonial Office, Sheikh Mahmud 
declared himself king of South Kurdistan and launched the second rebellion against 
the British. The Turkish forces had been withdrawn from Mosul after the heavy air 
attacks of RAF. In October 1922, the Turkish troops in Rania and Aqra also had to 
retreat. In consequence of air bombing the forces of Sheikh Mahmud abandoned 
Sulaymaniyah. The heavy air bombing, especially between 1921 and 1923, is 
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important to show the determination of the British to protect Mosul. Britain stayed in 
Iraq and continued to control Mosul. The status of Mosul remained uncertain after 
the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne (24th July 1923). It was decided that the 
problem should be solved by bilateral agreements between England and Turkey. If 
England and the new Turkish state could not make a joint decision, the situation of 
Mosul would be determined by the League of Nations. 
In this period, opinions were reported by the Istanbul government that it was 
possible to establish an autonomous state in the Kurds. However, contrary to what is 
claimed, an autonomy promulgated by the Government of Ankara was not found in 
the records. In the atmosphere of uncertainty after World War I, every nation wanted 
to make gains but Turkey did not respond positively to the demands of the British 
supported Kurds.  Britain was in a military and politically difficult situation and the 
National Struggle led by Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) ended successfully. As a result 
after establishing an Arab state in Mesopotamia, the British left the Kurds alone in 
the region and tried to secure their own interests by means of League of Nations. 
Overall, it seems that Britain had no desire to establish a Kurdish state in the 
region. As stated in Churchill’s speeches, the main aim of England was to control 
rich oil deposits in the region, the securing of Egyptian and Indian routes, the 
creation against the Turkish and Bolshevik Russian danger in Mesopotamia. The 
nature of the states, which would be established in the region, as long as it fulfilled 
British aims, did not seem important for England. 
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Appendix 1: The map shows the Anatolia and Mesopotamia regions in regard to the Sykes- 
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Appendix 2: The ethnographic map of Kurdish region. (Source: PRO. FO. 371/4192, ‘From 
Admiral Calthrope to Early Curzon’, 23 July 1919, p.40) 
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Appendix 3: The Map of Kurdish Tribes. (Source: Maria T. O’ Shea, Trapped Between The 
Map and Reality Geography and Perceptions of Kurdistan, Routledge New York & London, 
2004, p.xxii.) 
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Appendix 4: Map to illustrate a note by Major Noel on the Situation in Kurdistan. 
(Source: Maria T. O’ Shea, Trapped Between The Map and Reality Geography and 
Perceptions of Kurdistan, Routledge New York & London, 2004, p.137.) 
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Appendix 5: Serif Pasha’s Map of Kurdistan. (Source: Maria T. O’ Shea, Trapped Between 
The Map and Reality Geography and Perceptions of Kurdistan, Routledge New York & 
London, 2004, p.167.) 
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Appendix 6: The map that shows retreating of Turkish forces by the virtue of RAF 
operations. (Source: PRO. AIR 5/476, ‘Appendix B’, p.97. ) 
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Appendix 7: The figure shows proposed use of gas bombs against hostile forces in 
Mesopotamia. (Source: PRO. AIR 2/122, ‘Proposed Use of Gas Bombs Against Hostile 
Forces in Mesopotamia’, p.21)  
 
 
 
